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My dissertation examines how literature prompts us to visualize complex, multisensory and 
multidimensional images that push the boundaries of our cognitive capacities. Rather than 
considering descriptive power in literature in terms of perceptual mimesis, I argue that the 
imaginative challenges posed by literary images help us think outside of the habitual conceptual 
constructs that structure our normal perception of the world around us. Taking Marcel Proust’s À 
la recherche du temps perdu (In Search of Lost Time) as a case study, I investigate how Proust 
guides the reader to visualize certain sets of objects: food and other mealtime accoutrements, 
seascapes and skies, planes and people in motion, and churches and people through time. Using 
approaches drawn from literary studies, art history, and cognitive science, my chapters examine 
how Proust asks us to reconsider four conceptual categories: matter, space, energy, and time.  
My first chapter argues that materiality in the Recherche is both presence and absence, 
combining vivid sensory details with an awareness that our material impressions are transitory 
and impermanent. In my second chapter, I explore imaginative immersion through Proust’s sea 
and sky images, and situate these images within a broader dialogue about theories of landscape 
representation from nineteenth-century painting to contemporary ecocriticism. My third chapter 




fragmentation. My fourth and final chapter looks at Proust’s images of churches to show how the 
cumulative imaginative training the reader has done throughout the Recherche prepares them for 
the novel’s concluding image of spatialized time. Ultimately, “Seeing Impossible Things” both 
advances our understanding of Proustian aesthetics through close analysis of his descriptive 
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INTRODUCTION: SEEING IMPOSSIBLE THINGS 
“I can’t believe that!” said Alice. “Can’t you?’ the Queen said in a pitying tone. ‘Try 
again: draw a long breath, and shut your eyes. “Alice laughed. “There’s no use trying,” 
she said: “one can’t believe impossible things. ”I daresay you haven’t had much 
practice,” said the Queen. “When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day. 
Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.” 
(Carroll, 220-221) 
 
The White Queen’s confident proclamation in Through the Looking-Glass, and What 
Alice Found There of believing “six impossible things before breakfast” is enduringly popular, 
available on posters and greeting cards for modern-day fans of Lewis Carroll’s upside down and 
backwards universe. Something in this line resonates with contemporary readers, thrilling us 
with the possibility of engaging with the impossible. In this scene, the White Queen makes 
several impossible claims to Carroll’s heroine Alice, such as her ability to remember the future. 
She begins screaming and tells Alice she has just remembered that she will prick her finger on 
her broach when she tries to undo her shawl. When, several seconds later, she does indeed prick 
her finger, she does not scream at all, having already gotten that out of the way (219). This 
disconnection between action and reaction, or action and emotion, accounts for one sort of 
logical impossibility: the disorder of cause and effect. But the claim that Alice cannot believe in 
the above quote is somewhat less dramatic: the Queen states her age as one hundred and one. 
Alice refuses to believe that this could be true, and the Queen admonishes her to try with 
instructions to take a deep breath and to close her eyes. She emphasizes that this is a question of 
practice: she herself devoted a half hour a day at Alice’s age to believing impossible things. By 
meeting Alice’s confident “I can’t believe that!” with the prosaic suggestion that it just takes 
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practice, the Queen opens up a new conceptual space within the text. The impossible, instead of 
being the binary and invisible face of the possible, emerges as cognitive space that can be 
entered with concentration and practice. As with the example of remembering forward, which 
asks Alice to consider a reciprocal relationship between the future and the past, this famous 
passage asks Alice to consider a bi-directional relationship between the possible and impossible. 
The possible is a subjective mindset and not an empirical absolute, and it opens into a space of 
exchange with the impossible.  
In order to practice believing impossible things, Alice must turn away from the 
perceptual world around her, thus the instruction “close your eyes.” Her eyes are part of the 
process by which she has determined that the Queen is not of the age she claims, and in order to 
detach from that belief enough to allow a different one, she must detach herself from her 
perceptual habits too. But what result could have been expected from Alice’s experiment, had 
she considered trying what the Queen is asking? When she opened her eyes again, would she 
find the same Queen in front of her, or another one? What does believing the impossible actually 
look like?  
To explore this visual realm of the impossible, I turn to Marcel Proust’s À la recherche 
du temps perdu, which foregrounds the relationships between perception, conception, and 
imagination. Proust’s novel, published in seven volumes between 1913 and 1927, features a 
narrator who is extremely attuned to moments when the perceptual data we receive is in 
contradiction with our conceptual structure of the world around us. In the novel’s opening scene, 
the narrator recounts the confused territory between waking and sleeping, when the sleeper “tient 
en cercle autour de lui le fil des heures, l’ordre des années et des mondes,” a reorganized 
temporality reminiscent of the White Queen’s (5). Even with his eyes open, Proust’s narrator is 
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apt to see impossible things. A cloud in the distance turns out to be solid rock, a brown insect in 
the evening sky turns out to be an airplane, a telegram from his dead lover turns out to be from 
an old friend, a sketchy figure exiting a sketchy building at night turns out to be a respectable 
aristocrat. Proust’s narrator documents both his perceptual mistakes and their logical resolutions, 
dramatizing the process by which impossible things enter our field of vision and slowly become 
legible in the realm of the possible: the opposite of the process the White Queen would like Alice 
to undergo. Reading Proust asks us to pay close attention to the bumps in the narrator’s 
perceptual road, rather than assuming a smooth translation of perception into understanding.  
However, when we enter the textual world of Proust’s Recherche, we are not only 
analysts following the explicit lessons provided by the narrator’s experiences. We are visitors to 
a textual world that demands our imaginative as well as analytic engagement. We follow the 
narrator into the deep past and into the projected future, and through temporal folds where 
disparate moments seem to meet. We attend to the everyday object world of bedrooms and tables 
set for lunch and cast our gaze on paintings no one has ever seen outside of their mind’s eye. We 
watch scenes with the narrator that he himself tell us are impossible, where, for example, his 
fast-moving friend appears in seven different places simultaneously. We see a teacup in which 
there is and is not an unfolding paper flower that is and is not a whole town. If we heed the 
White Queen’s instructions to take a deep breath and to “close our eyes” by detaching from the 
perceptual world around us and entering the imaginative world the text inspires, what do we see? 
Through the process of reading Proust, how is he asking us to improve our ability to see 
impossible things—and when we close the book at the end of our reading, will the perceptual 
world around us contain new sights?   
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Proust is the focus of this exploration not because he is the only author whose images are 
worth attending to in this particular manner, but because the scope of his work provides many 
examples of each kind of image I examine, allowing patterns and variations to be observed over 
extensive text. Additionally, and equally importantly for my purposes, Proust’s interest in what 
could be broadly characterized as the realm of the visual is vastly inclusive. Truly encyclopedic, 
Proust treats the narrator’s lived visual experiences, daydreams and (to a lesser extent) dreams 
while sleeping, visual illusions, extra- and intra-diegetic visual art (painting and sculpture), 
theater, fashion, furniture and other household objects, the impact of new technologies on 
perceptual experiences (cars and planes), and, more abstractly, larger patterns and symbol 
systems such as aristocratic lineages and place-name etymologies.1 It is thus consonant with the 
larger field of Proust studies to ask questions about how the visual functions in Proust and the 
connections with larger questions about visualization and imagination drawn from cognitive 
literary studies and the neuroscience of aesthetics.    
Before jumping into the imaginative world the reader enters when they pick up the 
Recherche, we need to take a closer look at what is at stake when we talk about the imagination. 
Alan Richardson writes that despite a long tradition of distrust or disregard for the imagination, 
from Greek philosophy to twentieth-century science, it has now emerged as a vital topic in both 
the humanities and the sciences: “The surprising rise to prominence of imagination within 
twenty-first-century mind and brain science, along with its rich literary and philosophical 
pedigree, make imagination one of the most promising areas to date for interdisciplinary 
engagement within the growing zone of contact between literary studies and cognitive research” 
(2014: 225). In a 2003 book chapter, Francisco J. Varela and Natalie Depraz guide the reader to a 
 
1 See Deleuze’s Proust et les signes for more on the Recherche’s abstract symbol-systems.  
5 
 
multilevel understanding of imagination through three interlocking sections. “Embodiment” 
corresponds to the empirical work done on the neuroscience of imagining, while 
“Phenomenology” treats the philosophical question of the relationship of imagination to 
perception, and “Transformation” offers a practical application of their central thesis: that 
“[i]magination is central to life itself, not a marginal or epiphenomenal side-effect of perception” 
(202). Like Varela and Depraz’s chapter, the goals of this introduction will be threefold in order 
to prepare the reader to for my central argument, which is that sustained engagement with 
Proust’s images guides the attentive reader through imaginative experiments that invite them to 
reexamine four conceptual categories that structure our habitual perceptual relationship to the 
world: matter, space, energy, and time. This introduction will first define what I mean by an 
image, which requires a conversation between empirical and theoretical levels. On an empirical 
level, I briefly summarize what we know about images from work in cognitive and neuroscience 
that treat image formation in the mind. On a theoretical level, I look at the ways in which literary 
theory, and aesthetic theory more broadly, have defined an image. The third goal of this 
introduction will be to suggest a literary model for the transformative potential of engaging with 
Proust’s images.   
On an empirical level, before we can discuss the importance of visualization to the 
reading experience, we need to get at a sense of what exactly visualization is. Research in 
cognitive literary studies and in neuroscience is still debating and defining the ways in which our 
imagination (visual and otherwise) works, both when engaging with a text and during other 
forms of mental action such as daydreaming. While a complete overview of the research is 
beyond the scope of this introduction, I will highlight two general principles about visualization 
that are important for my larger argument before turning to the specific research on visualization 
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and literature. The first principle is that the world that we imagine is not necessarily a copy of the 
world that we perceive. While it may seem intuitive to see imagination as a secondary faculty 
after perception, the links between the sensory world we perceive and the mental world we 
imagine are complex and multifaceted. Antonio Damasio, talking about the use of the term 
“representation” to describe mental activity, nuances our common use of the term: “I do not have 
any idea about how faithful neural patters and mental images are, relative to the objects to which 
they refer. Moreover, whatever the fidelity may be, neural patterns and the corresponding mental 
images are as much creations of the brain as they are products of the external reality that prompts 
their creation” (320). Damasio distinguishes between “brain” and “mind” levels, the former 
consisting of neural patterns we cannot consciously access and the latter consisting of the images 
that do enter our consciousness, but he gives a certain autonomy to both levels relative to the 
sensory world outside of the body. While we do not know the exact nature of the relationships 
between all three levels (brain, mind, sensory world), Damasio does not establish a hierarchy of 
impression and impressed upon. The imagined world is not bound by the perceptual world. 
Varela and Depraz go a step further and argue that the imagination is in fact the basis for 
perception and not the other way around. Given that the flow of images in the brain never stops, 
as evidenced by the fact that we dream, they argue that “[o]rdinary perception is, to an essential 
degree, sensori-motor constrained imagination” (202). Cognition is not a “representational” or 
“accurate” copy of the world around us, it is the ground from which we are able to have 
perceptual experiences at all (202). The importance of this point for my argument about literature 
is fundamental, since “seeing the impossible” requires a mental flexibility that exceeds any 
perceptual experience we have had. Additionally, for literature to expand our perceptual 
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horizons, the relationship between imagination and perception must be one that goes two ways, 
not one in which the things that we read merely evoke copies of the real world in our minds.  
The second insight that I draw from Damasio’s work in particular is that imagination is 
not exclusively visual. He defines the term “image” as “mental patterns with a structure built 
with the tokens of each of the sensory modalities—visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and 
somatosensory” (318). This definition of image as fundamentally multisensory is worth keeping 
in mind as we build an expansive notion of the Proustian image. Proust is certainly extensively 
engaged with the visual world, but to focus exclusively on the visual is to ignore his interest in 
other senses such as smell and taste. In addition to the five physical senses, Proust writes in great 
detail of the affective sensations of suffering, sorrow, desire, and longing. Drawing on insights 
from neuroscience, Renate Brosch argues that it is not purely realistic descriptions that enable 
readers to visualize the scene before them, but that texts are particularly rich when they draw on 
“not only readers’ cognitive faculties but their empathy as well. This sort of challenge to readers’ 
embodied and enactive responses can provoke especially vivid images” (2017: 264). Images can 
depict an active and changing situation rather than a fixed and static object, and thus include 
affective details and other relational information. Damasio includes this notion in his definition 
of an image as well, writing that “[i]mages in all modalities ‘depict’ processes and entities of all 
kinds, concrete as well as abstract. Images also ‘depict’ the physical properties of entities and, 
sometimes sketchily, sometimes not, the spatial and temporal relationships among entities, as 
well as their actions” (318). The Proustian image is fundamentally a process, one that 
incorporates sensory references, state changes through time, and affective and bodily 
information, and one that both insists on the active participation of the narrator in what he sees 
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and imagines and on the active participation of the reader in engaging with the imagined textual 
world.  
Theoretical and empirical work on reading and visualization remains divided on the role 
played by perceptual mimesis. Elaine Scarry argues that reading allows for enhanced vividness 
in imagination as compared to non-directed forms of imagining such as daydreams, but she 
unites these forms of visualization under the umbrella of “perceptual mimesis”: “Imagining is an 
act of perceptual mimesis, whether undertaken in our own daydreams or under the instruction of 
great writers” (6). Anežka Kuzmičová, on the other hand, leaves open the possibly of non-
mimetic imagination in the following summary of her research on literary description and 
visualization: “Is imagery from visual description perceptually mimetic? (No.) If it has no 
correlate in perceptual experience, what other sort of experience does it resemble, if any? (The 
experience of voluntary visual imagery)” (275). Unlike Scarry, who is interested in what makes 
literary information in general visualizable, Kuzmičová discusses literary description only in the 
specific case of the description of objects. This is because in her analysis other sorts of textual 
information (i.e., landscapes, interpersonal relationships, etc.) do encourage perceptual mimesis, 
because the reader is imagining these things in an embodied and interactive way (278-279). The 
lack of embodiment characterizes literary description as such for Kuzmičová, because only there 
can imagining be purely or primarily visual. For the purposes of my argument, however, I will 
not be using perceptual mimesis as a criterion for evaluating images in Proust. Rather, my 
evaluation will be of the ways in which Proust’s images manifestly do not resemble real or 
habitual perceptual experience.  
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As research in neuroscience and aesthetics is demonstrating, by engaging readers in new 
and surprising ways art can increase cognitive flexibility. G. Gabrielle Starr writes of the 
neuroscience of aesthetic experience that  
It is not just that ideas and perceptions, however, become newly linked in aesthetic 
experience but that the hedonic value assigned to these perceptions and ideas at a neural 
level enables powerful connections that had not existed before. Aesthetic experience thus 
makes possible the unexpected valuation of objects, ideas, and perceptions and enables 
new configurations of what is known, new frameworks for interpretation, and perhaps 
even a new willingness to entertain what is strange or to let the familiar and the novel live 
side by side. (20) 
For Starr, aesthetic experience exists on the threshold between what is known and what is new, 
and that combination of the comfortingly familiar and the thrillingly unexpected can change the 
way we think. This is a fine balance: too much of the known, and the audience will not be 
pushed towards expansion; too much of the unknown, and the audience will become 
overwhelmed and frustrated. Starr is interested in “emotion and reward” rather than “perceptual 
modes” such as vision in her understanding of aesthetic experience (35). She writes, “[w]hen we 
approach aesthetics thus in terms of events—and not primarily in terms of objects—we 
foreground dynamism and temporality, even at a minute level: for example, the emotions that 
help define aesthetic experience are far from static, having varying durations and changing 
intensities” (18). It is this practice that I find in Proust’s descriptions: images as dynamic events 
unfolding in expected and unexpected ways through time. Reader engagement is unlikely to stay 
uniform across an entire description which can unfold over several pages (such as the narrator’s 
initial experience of involuntary memory in Du côté de chez Swann), let alone across image 
instances through a volume (seascape images in À l’ombre de jeunes filles en fleurs) or across the 
novel as a whole (churches from the narrator’s childhood memories of Combray, to his visit to 
Saint Marc’s in Venice, to remembering the Combray church when it is destroyed in World War 
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I). Yet in each one of these examples, the invitation is constantly open to the reader to engage 
with descriptive information on multiple levels: concrete and abstract, visual and other-sensory, 
similar to their own perceptual experience and outside of it entirely.  
Moving into the fields of literary criticism and aesthetic philosophy, my analysis of 
Proust dialogues with two main bodies of work. The first is, of course, the field of Proust studies, 
especially insofar as it deals with questions of imagery and/or verbal versus visual art in the 
Recherche’s descriptions and/or theoretical apparatus. The second is the larger field of work 
about text and image, ekphrasis, and related fields which examine the question of the image from 
the joint perspective of the verbal and the visual (and sometimes beyond). To address this second 
category first, I draw on WJT Mitchell’s work, which defines images in visual and verbal art in 
terms as broad and flexible as Damasio uses to define images in the brain and mind. Mitchell’s 
early work already argues that “images ‘proper’ are not stable, static, or permanent in any 
metaphysical sense; they are not perceived in the same way by viewers any more than are dream 
images; and they are not exclusively visual in any important way, but involve multisensory 
apprehension and interpretation” (1986: 13-14). Consequently, “[t]here is no ‘essential’ 
difference between poetry and painting, no difference, that is, that is given for all time by the 
inherent natures of the media, the objects they represent, or the laws of the human mind” (1986: 
49). While Mitchell is writing against a strict division of verbal and visual imagery, the lack of 
an essential difference should not be taken to mean there is no difference, but rather that the 
elements at work in any given piece of artwork (media used, objects represented, and the mind 
that focuses on them) create individual iterations of imagery. The first line quoted above about 
images not being “stable, static, or permanent in any metaphysical sense” is in line with 
Damasio’s note that representational accuracy is not a feature of images in the mind or brain. 
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Mitchell’s later work will propose that images are not identical with the pictures that contain 
them,2 meaning that images are not contained somewhere ‘out there’ in the world.  
This nonconcrete, multisensory nature of the image has important consequences for our 
understanding of how writers and readers are able to incorporate the nonverbal into literary 
production and reception. The field of intermediality looks at the exchanges and blends between 
mediums, not only as theoretical inspiration but as actual combination. While this may be easiest 
to see in contemporary art that incorporates sound and image, or in Wagner’s notion of the 
Gesamtkunstwerk, or in textual experiments such as the incorporation of photographs into André 
Breton’s Nadja, critics working on this topic also propose that intermedial effects can be found 
in the absence of the literal inclusion of multiple art forms. In his work on narrative literature and 
intermediality, Jørgen Bruhn argues against “the idea that literature has only recently been 
overrun by numerous non-literary forms and content” (4). This understanding of intermediality 
privileges the imaginative collaboration between art forms both in creation and in reception over 
their literal copresence. This same conception of collaborative possibility is present in recent 
work on ekphrasis. In her introduction to the 2018 Poetics Today special issue on ekphrasis in 
the digital age, Brosch argues that we must move beyond a reductive understanding of ekphrasis 
as the verbal representation the visual. She proposes a definition of ekphrasis that is instead 
“interest[ed] in adaptive and collaborative processes,” “a literary response to a visual image or 
visual images,” and “performative instead of […] mimetic (2018: 226, 227). This contemporary 
understanding of ekphrasis can change our retrospective view of writers highly engaged with 
 
2 He writes of the distinctions that “[y]ou can hang a picture, but you cannot hang an image” because [t]he image 
seems to float without any visible means of support, a phantasmatic, virtual, or spectral appearance” and “[t]he 
picture is the image plus the support; it is the appearance of the immaterial image in a material medium. That is why 
we can speak of architectural, sculptural, cinematic, textual, and even mental images while understanding that the 
image in or on the thing is not all there is to it” (2005: 85). 
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visual art as well. Brosch’s emphasis on process is apparent throughout her discussion, as is 
obvious in the lexicon of adaptation, collaboration, response, and performance in the above 
quotations. Inspired by these theoretical approaches, I consider Proust’s textual visuality to be a 
composite practice of transformation, where the visual elements that inspired the text, the text in 
and of itself, and the reader’s imaginative response represent three linked but not identical 
realms.  
Literary critics concerned with images and aesthetics in Proust have similarly recognized 
the multimedial nature of the Recherche, which incorporates no explicit extraliterary material (in 
the form of pictures, etc.) and yet seems saturated with art forms outside of the literary. Momcilo 
Milovanovic writes, somewhat rhapsodically, that “l’atmosphère du roman apparait saturée par 
ces présences réelles des autres formes d’art. Par le biais de la référence elle absorbe différentes 
formes esthétiques, et les incorpore, les fond dans sa matérielle en perpétuelle fusion” (258). The 
“atmosphère” Milovanovic mentions seems to be both the fact of Proust’s references to 
extraverbal art forms and the experiential reality of the text as it exists in the process of creation 
and consumption. By implying a separation between “roman” and “atmosphère du roman,” it is 
possible to speak of the transformative process (incorporation, melting, fusion) in a meaningful 
way despite the concrete reality of the novel-as-object as a collection of ‘just’ words. Mieke Ball 
writes “on pourrait dire que les métaphores sont les images verbales d’images mentales, tandis 
que les descriptions sont les images verbales d’images perceptuelles. Toutes deux les images 
mentales et les images perceptuelles, sont susceptibles, à leur tour, de se référer à des images 
graphiques, visibles, mais par le biais de cette médiation ‘en cascade’” (11). While she will 
ultimately affirm that Proust’s images are “après tout, des produits langagiers,” her 
understanding of these literary images is formed through a blend of multiple but specific 
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interactions between the verbal, the mental, the perceptual, and the graphic. This is backed up by 
the science of imagery; as Varela and Depraz write “although visual and verbal activities are 
quite distinct cognitive entities, there is a coherent cross-model activation that works in imagery 
just as well as in actual cross-model perception” (198). Distinct but entwined, these realms of the 
verbal and the visual and the mental and the perceptual will be drawn upon throughout my 
dissertation to illuminate the ways in which Proustian imagery draws us out of conceptual clarity 
and into the realm of imaginative (im)possibility.  
To reconcile the multifaceted nature of the image with the specific goal of understanding 
how Proust’s particular images work, my analysis will be rooted in close readings to balance the 
theoretical complexity of the subject. As Hugues Azérad writes, in Proust “[t]he image provides 
true cognition, combining normally conflicting qualities: the imaginary and the senses, absence 
and presence, past and present” (86). These “conflicting qualities” will all play a part in my 
analysis, but they are not equally at play in every image. Each of my chapters looks closely at 
imagery sets to illuminate how these qualities are evoked throughout the Recherche. The 
structure of each chapter links the broader conceptual category addressed (matter, space, energy, 
and time) to certain sets of images. Matter is explored through the images linked explicitly and 
implicitly to still life painting, as well as imagery evoked in the process of involuntary memory. 
Space is explored through the broad concept of the landscape, with particular attention to the role 
of light as a spatial organizer and the seascape as a particularly present and potent landscape 
subcategory. Energy is examined through the character of Saint-Loup and images of planes. 
Finally, time is examined through images of churches and through Proust’s attempts to image 
human life, particularly at the very end of the novel. The passages chosen are not and cannot be 
exhaustive, but where possible represent many iterations of each image over volumes (and, in the 
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case of still life images, though a text anterior to the Recherche as well). Throughout, my goal is 
to excavate as fully as possible the complexity of the imaginative tasks Proust is inviting or 
prompting the reader to perform. Each reader may not choose to engage with each of these 
images, and, indeed, some readers will not visualize much at all while reading given the 
variability of imaginative function while reading.  
It is thus not my intention to propose that readers must visualize certain things (or not) 
while reading Proust. What I do want to propose is that the process of grappling with Proust’s 
images, on a variety of individual levels, pushes readers to become more cognitively flexible. 
Even in the absence of visualization, surprising language forms can stimulate the mind and brain 
in new ways. As Philip Davis writes,   
A reading expert, Keith Oatley, reports that scanners show that once a metaphor becomes 
clichéd it no longer activates the brain’s motor system across domains as it did when it 
was new; my own collaborators in cognitive science have demonstrated how a 
dramatically compressed Shakespearean coinage such as ‘this old man godded me’ 
excites the brain in a way that ‘this old man deified me’ or ‘made a god of me’ does not. 
(5)  
Surprising language can indeed be a hinderance to visualization, as Brosch demonstrates, noting 
that visualization is “prompt and smoothly affected” when it draws on the “common storehouse 
of iconic topoi in cultural memory” (2017: 257) whereas “complicated spatial or imagistic 
relations that necessitate a realignment of spontaneous imaginings are not productive of more 
intense imagery” (2017: 266). As Kuzmičová has argued, detail in images can prohibit clear 
visualization. She writes of texture and pattern details on described objects that “[a]lthough the 
reader may not cease to experience visual imagery while processing references to visual 
complexity, the images experienced are no longer experienced as images of the central object 
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proper” (309). Accordingly, my goal is to ask what heavy lifting3 the reader is doing when 
engaged with Proust’s images rather than trying to demonstrate, as Scarry has done in Dreaming 
by the Book, where a reader is likely to find particularly vivid images. When vividness or 
vibrancy is evoked (in certain examples from my third chapter on energy, for example), it is for a 
restricted case, and the potential imaginative vividness or lack thereof of Proust’s images is not a 
criterion for inclusion in my analysis.   
Having looked that the empirical and theoretical background for my analysis of Proust, 
we can turn now to what I see as the transformative practice of reading Proustian impossible 
images. Below, I sketch out a model for thinking about literary images not as models of or 
variations on perceptual experience, but as new mental structures. Because of the newness and 
the complexity of these image structures, they cannot necessarily be visualized clearly in their 
entirety. Rather, they hover on the edge of visibility, challenging us to incorporate very 
complicated information (multisensory, spatial, temporal, process-oriented, or all of the above) 
into our understanding of what is being described. Davis writes of John Milton’s description in 
Paradise Lost of Satan falling through Chaos that “[i]t feels like some mind-spinning idea in 
poetic physics, making us take in thoughts we cannot really think” (81). The scope of the spatial 
and temporal relations involved in the description of Satan’s fall take us far outside of the 
conceptual constraints we use to navigate our day-to-day lives, and thus hover at the edge of 
thinkability. Proust’s subjects are not so classically epic, but my chapters will explore how his 
 
3 In an essay on self-reflexive fictions, Joshua Landy refers to this type of work as “mental calisthenics”: “By 
gradually increasing the size of the cognitive weights we have to lift—by putting additional pressure on our 
simultaneous ability to have and to stand back from a given mental attitude, whether belief, desire, or feeling—
reflexive fictions […] give an intensive workout to our capacity for simultaneous trust and distrust, readying us for 
the difficult business of life” (2015: 572). 
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dining room tables, his seascapes, his people and planes, and his churches and memories pose the 
same sort of challenges to the reader.  
How do we interact with things we cannot imagine concretely? A straightforward attempt 
to translate Proust’s images into normal perceptual information is a limited way to approach 
them.4 I propose Edwin Abbott’s novel Flatlands: A Romance of Many Dimensions, which looks 
at the imaginability of dimensions beyond our own, as a model for the kind of imaginative work 
Proust’s images require. Flatland narrativizes its protagonist’s conceptual movement from 
visible surface to intimated depth. Malcom Bowie writes of a scene in the Recherche in which 
the writer Bergotte marvels at the painter Vermeer’s “petit pan de mur jaune” that “Bergotte 
discovers in Vermeer’s exquisite detail what the narrator has already found in Bergotte’s prose: a 
flat surface that is suddenly stratified and opened up into the dimension of depth” (118). This 
relationship of depth and surface, this notion that a small patch of color could contain within it 
whole new dimensions and depths, provides a model for understanding the imaginative work of 
Proust’s images throughout the novel. This is also the imaginative work Abbott’s protagonist, 
two-dimensional Flatland resident “A. Square,” must perform as he shifts from the (perceived) 
surface of his world to the (imagined) depth of a three-dimensional one, and beyond. With this 
model in mind, we can consider Proust’s images as invitations to his readers to reconsider the 
“surfaces” (in this case, conceptual categories) that bind our habitual perceptual experience, and 
 
4 That is not to say it cannot or should not be done. If the narrative of the Recherche is prioritized, it can be useful to 
chunk images in terms of what the narrator might ‘really’ be seeing at any given moment. For example, Stéphane 
Heuet’s graphic novel adaptation uses two straightforward, temporally disjointed but narratively sequential, images 
to show Du côté de chez Swann’s involuntary memory. First, the teacup and madeleine, and then the town of 
Combray. There is only the use of the stream from the tea across the initial drawings of Combray to represent the 
process-oriented textual image by which teacup becomes town. This choice of narrative progress over descriptive 
strangeness is a wholly valid one, but it is not the only possible approach to a retelling of Proust.  
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through this process to find unexpected openings into unthinkable thoughts and impossible 
sights.  
Abbott’s 1884 novel is fictionalized physics, a narrative attempt to help a lay audience 
imagine relationships to space that are not our own. Since we are always inhabiting three-
dimensional space, our conceptual notions of what is spatially possible are structured in the same 
way. In order to make us more conscious inhabitants of our own relationship to dimensionality, 
Abbott asks us to follow a character who lives in Flatland, a two-dimensional plane, and must 
grabble with learning of the existence of Pointland (no dimensions), Lineland (one dimension) 
and finally Spaceland (the three-dimensional world). Davis writes the following about the 
relative difficulty of Spaceland for Abbott’s protagonist in comparison to Pointland or Lineland: 
“this is a mind now blindly struggling to think outside its own framework or configuration whilst 
still embodied within it. It is easy for the creatures in each successive dimension to look down on 
the level below them and recognize the limitations there: what is harder is to imagine that their 
own dimension is, likewise and analogously, not the ultimate one” (73). When Abbott’s 
protagonist visits lands with one dimension and with no dimensions, he easily sees how he 
himself can move in ways that the inhabitants of these other worlds cannot. For the three-
dimensional reader, we just as easily perceive the constraints of A. Square’s two-dimensional 
life. Conversely, A. Square cycles through doubt, disbelief, fear, and anger as he is told of the 
three-dimensional world and must be brought into it before he is able to believe it is real. His 
conceptual struggles mirror our own struggles if we are confronted with the idea that there are 
dimensions beyond our own. My second and fourth chapters engage more concretely with the 
specifics of dimensionality in Proust, but in general, this push to think outside our “own 
framework or configuration while still embodied within it” is challenge the Recherche poses to 
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us. Abbott’s protagonist makes his rallying cry “Upwards, and yet not Northwards” (Davis 73) as 
he is exploring the three-dimensional world, knowing that he must find a direction of motion 
that, unlike north, does not exist in his homeland plane. Proust challenges us to recognize the 
limitations posed by our own embodiment by giving us a narrator who is hyperaware of his own 
(restless, ill, tired, or desiring) body, but to nonetheless persist through these challenges in our 
imaginative work to visualize what could lie beyond them.  
Both the Recherche and Flatland ultimately propose that learning how to see, literally 
and conceptually, is a multilevel, open-ended process. Proust’s narrator learns this throughout 
the Recherche, finding that his interactions with works of art have the power to influence his 
interactions with the world around him. He compares his reading of the novelist Bergotte, whose 
works he knows so well that “ses phrases étaient aussi claires devant mes yeux, que mes propres 
idées, les meubles dans ma chambre et les voitures dans la rue” (Côté de Guermantes 316). Note 
that this clarity is both conceptual (“mes idées”) and concrete (“les meubles” “les voitures”). 
Proust here links artistic experience with both internally oriented cognition and externally 
oriented perception. As the narrator considers new innovations in art, brought about by an 
unnamed novelist and the painter Pierre-Auguste Renoir, he proposes that a truly original artist 
recreates the world for us, inviting to us with a “[m]aintenant regardez” to look anew at the 
visible universe. This is a process that, again, links cognition and perception; in the case of 
Renoir, for instance, “[d]es femmes passent dans la rue, différentes de celles d’autrefois puisque 
ce sont des Renoir, ces Renoir où nous refusions jadis à voir des femmes” (317). Proust is not 
only saying that we see things differently after being exposed to new and surprising works of art, 
but that we see things where we did not even recognize them before. Renoir’s women are not just 
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a new way of looking at women, they expand the very category. This is a process without end, as 
our minds will grow accustomed to each new way of thinking and seeing.  
In Flatland, we see a similar linking of conceptual understanding with perceptual 
possibility but done in such a way that makes it clear that the concept and the perception are 
inextricably linked. When A. Square asks the three-dimensional Sphere who has been his guide 
to Spaceland to take him up to a place where he can see inside of solid objects (as he could see 
inside of the inhabitants of Lineland, and as the Sphere can see inside of him), his interlocuter 
casts doubt on the possibility that beings exist in more than three dimensions. Of potential 
visitors from these theoretical lands, he explains “most people say that these visions arise from 
the thought—you will not understand me—from the brain, from the perturbed angularity of the 
Seer” (73). This does not dissuade A. Square, who does not separate conception and perception 
in his response, entreating “that if this other Space is really Thoughtland, then take me to that 
blessed Region where I in Thought shall see the insides of all solid things” (73).  To be sure, 
there is a certain logic operating here: the narrator calls it analogy. He has been perceiving two 
dimensions, and now he perceives three. It stands to reason minds accustomed to three 
dimensions live in ignorance of a fourth dimension, and beyond. But the process he has gone 
through to get to this conclusion is in fact much less linear than that. Before Spaceland, he 
visited the lands of one dimension, Lineland, and no dimensions, Pointland. He has moved 
downwards before moving upwards. He has taken the role both of would-be instructor to the 
inhabitants of fewer dimensions and of impatient, disbelieving student to the inhabitant of three. 
Theory and practice have not succeeded one another neatly but have advanced in fits and starts. 
Substituting the experience of the narrator for the experience of the reader, they themselves 
grappling with the notion of four dimensionality, we can see that the reconditioning and 
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recreating effect of art is thus not linear: change your thoughts → change your sight. Rather, it 
demonstrates the entanglement of thought and matter, which change together in unpredictable, 
not sequential, ways.  
Consequently, my chapters function both individually and sequentially. They are both 
four individual case studies of certain sets of images, and one possible iteration of the 
progressive imaginative skills a reader might learn from deep engagement with the text of the 
Recherche. Here, I will briefly outline the progressive path, and end with a few words about the 
choice of image-sets. My opening chapter builds a Proustian notion of materiality that is 
intimately concerned both with real sensual presence and with the intimation, now familiar from 
quantum physics, that the object-world we can see and touch is not reality as such but a 
construction of our cognitive constraints. This fluid notion of materiality—materiality as 
spectrum, rather than absolute—is the basis from which my other chapters build. As such, I do 
not adhere to strong distinctions between spiritual and material, art and life, and involuntary and 
voluntary memory. The work the reader does with the Recherche is an invitation to reimagine, in 
different combinations, the variants of these categories. From this foundation, my second chapter 
examines how Proust describes space, specifically landscapes, not as something out there in the 
world, but as something into which the reader can penetrate. This inviting-in, however, is not an 
attempt to recreate our habitual perceptual experience of space, but rather to show that spatial 
understanding is a process of negotiation between conception, perception, and representation. 
After matter and space, my third chapter tackles energy, both in the everyday sense of motion in 
a direction and in a specifically literary sense of feeling an imaginative pulse from a description. 
My final chapter aims for a cumulative, if necessarily incompletely so, effect, showing how this 
work of rethinking materiality, space, and energy within the text prepares the reader to take on 
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the imaginative challenge of the book’s closing lines, to see with something resembling 
simultaneity the many disparate moments of one life.   
Because of concerns for clarity and length, each chapter will address two descriptive 
clusters (still lifes and involuntary memories, light and Balbec seascapes, Saint-Loup and 
airplanes, and churches and subjective appraisals of life experience). There is a certain textual 
logic to these pairings: the narrator’s first involuntary memory arising from a now-iconic tableau 
of teacup and madeleine; the presence of luminosity as a major descriptive feature of many of the 
narrator’s Balbec experiences; the association between Saint-Loup, airplanes, and war; and the 
use of temporal spatialization to describe the Combray church and the narrator’s sense of the 
span of life at the novel’s close. On an evaluative level, these seem to me to be the clearest 
examples for the argument on each chapter. However, these are certainly not the only places 
where each imaginative skill is tested throughout the Recherche, nor are they necessarily 
developed in an orderly, progressive nature throughout the text (though, as stated above, the 
reader does need all of the preceding practice to grapple with the final image). Nor are they 
distinct. The Combray involuntary memory description, for example, requires the reader to 
consider the distinctions between material objects, sensory properties, visual metaphors, and 
memories (tools from chapter one); to move from a mental model of miniaturized town in a 
teacup to a scaled-up model of a town inhabited by the young narrator and his family (tools from 
chapter two); to process images in motion such as unfurling paper flowers and the appearance of 
the town (tools in chapter three); and, finally, to simultaneously consider two normally disparate 
temporal moments in the narrator’s life (chapter four). The Recherche is rich in opportunities to 
imagine the impossibly complex, and to take pleasure in the moments when something hitherto 




CHAPTER 1: MATTER 
While watching children build a toy model of the camp their parents have made for 
shelter, the protagonist of Hernán Díaz’s 2017 novel In the Distance notices something strange 
about the scene in front of him: “[p]erhaps because the miniature emphasized the vastness of the 
surroundings, it seemed denser, heavier with actuality than the real thing” (86). That the 
miniature camp seems “denser, heavier with actuality” than the properly sized, usable camp 
points to a strange feature of representational models: they sometimes feel more real than the real 
thing. Art, and images in general, can not only mimic reality but supplant it. Art objects impress 
themselves upon our mind and we in turn use these impressions to create art of our own or 
simply construct our understanding of the world based on our artistic experiences and 
observations. Far from being copies or shadows of the material world, art objects are training 
grounds where we learn about and deepen our relationship to this world in myriad ways. 
This chapter argues that the Recherche offers an important exploration of how art and 
reality are mutually self-constituting. To understand their overlaps and mutual influence, we can 
look at how Proust portrays the material world and the materiality of art throughout his novel. I 
propose that the Recherche develops the complexity of this relationship by offering two distinct 
and paradoxical attitudes towards materiality. The first of these attitudes is wonder at the marvel 
of tangible sensual presence, of the play of colors, sounds, scents, textures, and other material 
phenomena both in the real world and in art. The second attitude is an awareness that this 
sensually present object-world around us is not solid and permanent as it appears to be but is 
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rather a by-product of our physiological constraints and perceptual biases. The second of these 
attitudes may seem more intuitive to reading Proust than the first, because as a novel the 
Recherche is an artistic production in a medium that presents a comparatively low level of 
sensual stimulation (as opposed to visual art, for example), and because Proust embeds in his 
narrative a multitude of ordinary objects that are primarily valuable not for their own material 
qualities but because they provoke involuntary memory. And yet these features of Proust’s work 
do not indicate a denial of materiality but instead invite a meditation on the mixed sensations of 
presence and absence that are susceptible to arise in all of our interactions with the world around 
us. Art such as Proust’s invites us to look closer at the things around us and to notice when they 
press close to our consciousness as well as when they remind us of their own instability and 
impermanence.  
When thinking about material presence in Proust, I follow critics such as Hannah Freed-
Thall and Thomas Baldwin who have recently called for an increased attention to objects in the 
Recherche, especially those which are not explicitly aesthetic. Freed-Thall invites the reader to 
reconsider the priorities of the Recherche: in her reading, “Proust’s novel looks less like a heroic 
monument to high art and more like a guide to commonplace, modest modes of enjoyment. I 
argue that Proust teaches us to value the formal and material vibrancy of inestimably ordinary 
things” (3). Bowie’s earlier work on Proust does not explicitly deal with materiality but notes 
that an expansive variety of objects inspire the narrator’s interest and analysis in the world of the 
Recherche: “[t]he work of art triggers in the narrator as an exemplary reader, hearer, or beholder 
a sensuously enlivened process of construal and interpretation, but then so does sunlight falling 
on walls, the noise of gossip, the blossoming of shrubs” (114). The ordinary, everyday, and 
banal: Freed-Thall and Bowie point out that these categories of objects are as compelling in the 
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Proustian universe as the extraordinary, rare, and precious. Baldwin also highlights the 
importance of the object world, arguing that “[i]n Proust, objects are—or at least become—world 
making. They are not rocks around which the fiction swirls” (2005: 27). In his analysis, objects 
such as Sodome et Gomorrhe’s “jet d’eau d’Hubert Robert” are neither used exclusively for 
visual effect (as the reference to Robert, an eighteenth-century genre painter, would seem to 
imply) nor exclusively as narrative props or décor. This ambiguity is part of why objects are 
powerful for both the narrator and the reader, who balance between a fascination with their 
marvelous material qualities and a curiosity about their status and their importance within the 
text.  
These important reexaminations of materiality within Proust’s work all highlight how the 
narrator, and the reader through him, are inspired by these objects to ask bigger questions about 
their own cognition, including their consumption of artistic work. The second attitude toward 
matter that Proust delineates is a result of this questioning, which leads to an awareness that we 
are constructing the material world as we interact with it. The material world is thus absent even 
at the heart of its sensual wonder. Here I am drawing on the ideas outlined by Daniel Tiffany, 
who examines the aesthetic response to the suggestion in science that the real content of the 
world is imperceptible to the eye and potentially unrepresentable to consciousness. Advances in 
quantum mechanics through the twentieth century led scientists to understand that the reality of 
the physical world is very different from our everyday experience of it: “the real is in fact 
inaccessible to the human senses without technological aid, and perhaps not even then” (293). At 
the quantum level, physical objects are largely composed of empty space, and the scattered 
particles that compose them behave in ways contrary to the laws that govern them at the level of 
our experience. Tiffany argues that these advances, like scientific advances before them, pose a 
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representational problem: how can they be understood by laypeople, when visual representations 
such as diagrams inevitably distort and oversimply the reality? Applied to literature, this problem 
of representing what cannot be seen may initially seem to lend itself to “abstraction or extreme 
formalism” but instead Tiffany finds in modernist poetry “a symbolic mode in which images of 
ordinary experiences betray, but don’t represent, impossible bodies and events” (273). Instead of 
choosing not to represent the material world, the poets he finds “most compatible with quantum 
representation” (273) give the reader “a conception of the body that is at once intuitive and 
abstract, mundane and phantasmagorical, real and unreal” (293).  Proust’s materiality is similarly 
double sided; it draws attention to itself and in the same moment draws attention to what it is not. 
Involuntary memory, as my second section will argue, provides an encapsulation of this dynamic 
in which a strong sensual experience gives way to the paradoxical presence of that which is not 
there. This process teaches us a great deal about cognition, inspiring critical works such as 
Evelyne Ender’s on memory, but it also teaches us about our relationship to material objects as 
such.   
The aim of this chapter is to consider what Proust can show us about our relationship to 
material objects by closely examining the areas of contact and overlap between art and reality 
and how they illuminate this joint dynamic of material presence and absence. The second half 
will use involuntary memory to explore the cognitive and phenomenological experience of 
materiality as absence. The first half will look at material sensual presence in Proust through his 
references to the eighteenth-century genre painter Jean-Baptiste-Siméon Chardin. Chardin is a 
major intermedial reference for Proust in the Recherche and in his earlier work, and an important 
figure in French art criticism from Diderot to the Goncourt brothers. Since Lessing’s Laocoon 
argued forcefully against the idea that visual and verbal art could portray the same thing, 
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examining literature and painting together has raised the question of the suitability of the written 
word to portray material reality. Nicolas Valazza’s work has nuanced this discussion, showing 
that Proust explicitly explores the interaction between the real and the aesthetic without 
establishing a binary parallel or contrast between art and painting: “[il] ne se contentera pas 
d’assujettir son écriture ‘artiste’ à la sensation de la chose peinte: la reconnaissance d’une 
peinture souveraine l’amènera plutôt à se dégager de l’espace du tableau afin d’incorporer les 
choses qui y sont figées dans le temps de la narration” (293). Through a close exploration of 
Proust’s textual objects inspired by Chardin, I will show how the painted world teaches his 
narrator to better understand the sensual marvels that surround him.  
Proust’s Chardin  
Chardin painted portraits and other genre scenes as well as still lifes, but his still lifes left 
the strongest impression on Proust. Proust’s preference is not without precedent here. These still 
lifes were highly regarded by Chardin’s most important eighteenth-century commentator, 
Diderot, who wrote extensively about his paintings when reviewing Parisian art salons for the 
periodical Correspondance littéraire. They were also essential for the later rehabilitation of his 
reputation in the nineteenth century when much of the French art of the previous century had 
fallen out of favor.5 The Goncourt brothers include Chardin prominently in their Art du XVIII 
siècle, published between 1859 and 1875. They center their praise on the marvelous sensation of 
reality a Chardin painting generates: “[q]ui a rendu, comme il la rend, la vie inanimée des 
choses? Qui a donné aux yeux une pareille sensation de la présence réelle des objets ?” (115). 
Chardin’s ability to create a reality effect is almost magical, in their estimation, as his work gives 
 
5 Gita May writes of this rehabilitation that Chardin’s later admirers included Delacroix, Fantin-Latour, Pissarro, 
Cézanne, et Manet, while artists such as Greuze and Van Loo that had been more famous during his lifetime had 
fallen permanently out of favor by the nineteenth century (404).  
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one the impression of the real presence of material objects. His talent was such, the Goncourt 
brothers continue, that he achieved the full illusion of three dimensionality on the two-
dimensional surface of the canvas: “C’est là le miracle des choses que peint Chardin : modelées 
dans la masse et l’entour de leurs conteurs, dessinées avec leur lumière, faites pour ainsi dire de 
l’âme de leur couleur, elles semblent se détacher de la toile et s’animer, par je ne sais quelle 
merveilleuse opération d’optique entre la toile et le spectateur, dans l’espace” (118). His work is 
miraculous, but that miracle seems scientific: objects in his work are marvelous because they 
seem to retain their weight and their shape, because they fool our eyes into attributing to them 
density and dimensionality. 
Diderot’s extensive writings about Chardin’s still lifes are a vibrant introduction to the 
visual power of his painting and of the aesthetic puzzles it raises. Diderot’s review of the 
painter’s work at the 1763 salon mentions “plusieurs petits tableaux de Chardin; ils représentent 
presque tous des fruits avec les accessoires d’un repas” (483). The resulting descriptions make 
clear the paradox at the heart of the praise he will give these paintings: what is so marvelous 
about Chardin’s work is how extremely ordinary it is. Diderot insists on the one-to-one 
correspondence between the painted representation and its real referent: “C’est que ce vase de 
porcelaine est de la porcelaine, c’est que ces olives sont réellement séparées de l’œil par l’eau 
dans laquelle elles nagent” (483-484). His praise becomes almost whimsical in its rhapsodies: 
rather than layers of paint, “c’est le substance même des objets, c’est l’air et la lumière que tu 
[Chardin] prends à la pointe de ton pinceau et que tu attaches sur la toile” (484). These are, of 
course, great exaggerations; no one has actually mistaken painted olives for real olives, painted 
light for real light. The game Diderot is playing, by insisting there is no difference between 
seeing a Chardin still life and seeing an actual arrangement of objects, is to lead his readers to 
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question their own perceptual habits. But how, indeed, does our perception of an aesthetic object 
differ from that of a real object? Where are these boundaries, and how do we establish and 
enforce them?  
Rather than a simple correspondence where the painted world is a copy of the real world, 
Diderot suggests that the aesthetic and the real influence one another dialectically—in other 
words, that our experiences with aesthetic objects change how we interact with real objects. It is 
easy to understand that after seeing many olives and many porcelain bowls, we are prepared to 
judge the verisimilitude of a painter’s representation of olives and porcelain bowls. But Diderot 
(and Proust is very explicit about this as well, as we will see) is insisting instead that the way 
painters paint informs the way non-painters see actual objects. For a sophisticated twenty-first 
century art viewer, saying that Chardin paints with the real substance of objects can at first seem 
to be a rather unsubtle method of praise.6 It has been a long time, after all, since verisimilitude 
was a valuable category by which art was institutionally judged. Examined more carefully, 
however, the radicality of this reading begins to emerge. Indeed, it seems to anticipate a question 
that would later preoccupy artists like Marcel Duchamp and Andy Warhol: what is the actual 
distinction between aesthetic substance and real substance, between aesthetic objects and other 
objects? Diderot plays with these distinctions and their relationship to the viewing process 
throughout the years. In 1763 he writes, “[p]our regarder les tableaux des autres, il semble que 
j’aie besoin de me faire des yeux; pour voir ceux de Chardin, je n’ai qu’à garder ceux que la 
nature m’a donnés et m’en bien servir” (483). The salon of 1765, however, posits that rather than 
echoing our natural vision Chardin too participates in this process of teaching us how to see. 
 
6 May suggests that while Diderot is often taken to be “un adepte un peu simpliste d l’imitation servile de la ‘belle 
nature’” in fact “il n’en conseillait pas moins aux peintres d’interpréter largement et de refondre en une nouvelle 
harmonie humanisée et épurée, l’harmonie toute accidentelle de la nature” (409). 
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Diderot apostrophizes the painter’s ability to refresh his sight: “[v]ous venez à temps, Chardin, 
pour récréer mes yeux” (485). There could be many reasons for this change from natural sight to 
recreated vision—perhaps the difference in the paintings exhibited, or Diderot’s lack of concern 
about consistency in his descriptions. But taken together, these two statements offer an invitation 
to consider the complexities of the links between art and nature, and reveal that rather than 
simply praising Chardin for his approximation to nature Diderot posits a much more complex 
perceptual relationship: aesthetic objects change how we view all objects, and this relationship 
continually evolves as we see more art. The marvel of Chardin’s work is not that it is a perfect 
copy of the objects it represents, but that it provokes the viewer’s curiosity about the areas of 
linkage between the aesthetic and the ordinary. 
The Recherche’s exemplary painter, Elstir, does not immediately recall Chardin. The 
lengthy ekphrasis in À l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleur (henceforth JF) of Elstir’s Porte de 
Carquethuit, which typifies the painter’s current work at Balbec, elucidates a method of aesthetic 
creation which aims to restore the pre-conceptual immediacy of visual impressions. In the 
Carquethuit ekphrasis, this restoration is achieved by the disorganization and confusion of the 
relationships between the composite parts of a landscape. This type of perceptual decomposition, 
however, is not the only relationship to materiality suggested by Elstir’s work. In the narrator’s 
visit to Elstir’s atelier and his subsequent viewing of Elstir paintings owned by the duke and 
duchess of Guermantes, he is exposed to several phases of the painter’s work, and thus multiple 
lenses through which to view the relationship between material reality and aesthetic creation. 
The copresence of these different modes of representation in Elstir’s work testifies to Proust’s 
complex understanding of the relationship between the real experience of a thing represented and 
its representation. Rather than decomposing our normal organization of the visual universe as the 
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Carquethuit ekphrasis does, the painting of a young Odette Swann dressed in men’s clothing as 
‘Miss Sacripant,’ has a mysterious potency that is too close to strong impressions of beauty in 
the real world. While Elstir’s seascape paintings are reminiscent of James Abbott McNeill 
Whistler’s attempts in his Nocturnes to render on canvas the fleeting impressions of lights and 
shadows and fog,7 the wonder the narrator feels in front of ‘Miss Sacripant’ is closer to the 
wonder Diderot and the Goncourt brothers felt in front of Chardin’s hyperreal still lives. 
In fact, before moving into his detailed description of the “métamorphoses des choses 
représentées” in Elstir’s Balbec seascapes, the narrator’s initial pleasure in the painter’s atelier 
seems to come from how clear and lifelike some of his paintings are (JF 469). Elstir, in a 
“nouvelle création du monde,” has taken (“tiré”) the objects in his paintings from the real world: 
“une vague de mer écrasant avec colère sur le sable son écume lilas” or “un jeune homme en 
coutil blanc accoudé sur le pont d’un bateau” (468-9). The wave and the young man’s jacket take 
on “une dignité nouvelle” because, although merely painted, they seem somehow to retain “ce en 
quoi ils passaient pour consister” (469). The narrator finishes his description by reemphasizing 
the distinction between painting and reality, as though he needs to remind himself that it exists: 
“la vague ne pouvant plus mouiller, ni le veston habiller personne” (469). The work does not 
remake the narrator’s perspective on the world by making its elements unrecognizable, as Elstir’s 
seascapes do. Instead, these paintings remake his perspective by inciting awe in the face of vivid 
material presence. This side of Elstir’s work allows for a super-defined, detail-oriented aesthetic 
awareness grounded in the impression of intense materiality. 
 
7 In his 1878 libel trial against John Ruskin, Whistler describes a Nocturne as “arrangement of line, form, and color 
first, and I make use of any incident of it which shall bring about a symmetrical result” (Art in Theory 835). See 
chapter two for further discussion of Whistler.  
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If the lesson of the Porte de Carquethuit ekphrasis is how to unlearn our perceptual 
habits and see familiar objects anew, the narrator’s description of the wave, the young man, and 
‘Miss Sacripant’ place more value on the what than the how of representation. When the narrator 
discovers the ‘Miss Sacripant’ painting, he is filled with “cette sorte d’enchantement” that one 
feels in front of a work that is remarkable not only in execution, but also in the choice of a 
subject that is “si singulier et séduisant” (483). The narrator’s description of the painting focuses 
on the precise details of the accessories and clothing (484), and his theoretical explanation of his 
delight focuses on the materiality of the painting: “Que de tels objets puissent exister, beaux en 
dehors même de l’interprétation du peintre, cela contente en nous un matérialisme inné, 
combattu par la raison, et sert de contrepoids aux abstractions de l’esthétique” (483). Material 
power and material beauty, Proust suggests, are their own aesthetic justification. 
Le Côté de Guermantes explicitly associates Chardin and Elstir, identifying the former as 
one of the painters the latter admires (407). Both make “le même effort […] devant le réel” to 
remake it according to their own vision (407). The narrator comments that this comparison 
between Elstir and Chardin would scandalize traditionalists who see no commonalities between 
the contemporary experimental painter and the previous century’s canonized portrayer of 
domestic scenes, but their acceptance of the latter is only possible because his work is temporally 
distant, and thus no longer has the power to scandalize.8 The occasion of this rapprochement is 
the narrator’s viewing of the Elstirs at the Guermantes residence. The narrator is “ému” before 
these paintings, “plus réalistes” than Elstir’s current works, due to their apparent reality. He 
 
8 Sartre’s Qu’est-ce que la littérature describes the false dichotomy between sanctified dead artist and contentious 
living artist: “C’est une fête […] quand les auteurs contemporains lui font la grâce de mourir: leurs livres, trop crus, 
trop vivants, trop pressants passent de l’autre bord, ils touchent de moins en moins et deviennent de plus en plus 




notices the same figure in several paintings, and muses that it must be a real friend or patron in 
Elstir’s life (470). He describes a river scene as “carré de peinture […] découpé dans une 
merveilleuse après-midi” highlighting the notion that art is taken is taken directly from real 
experience (407). The intermedial relationship between Chardin’s painting and Proust’s writing 
is a productive space of contemplation about the overlaps between art and reality.  
Before turning to a more explicit discussion of Chardin’s role in Proust’s work, however, 
I want to briefly raise the question of materiality and medium specificity. In addition to the 
interactions between art and reality that inform all artistic creation, the specific interaction 
between Chardin’s paintings and Proust’s novels raises the question of compatibility versus 
exclusivity between visual and verbal art. Namely, can literature produce visual cognitive 
sensations, and should it? One of my overarching goals is to move past a contrast between 
material presence in reality and its corresponding absence in artistic production—past a point of 
view, in other words, that draws a sharp distinction between art objects and other sorts of objects. 
This larger art/non-art binary is reproduced on a smaller scale in discussions of medium 
specificity that draw a sharp material/immaterial binary. In other words, theories that consider 
architecture or sculpture as more material than literature or music because they are more directly 
and sustainably available to the senses. I argue here against readings of Proust’s aesthetic 
philosophy that hierarchize the Recherche’s attitude towards different artistic mediums, which 
tend to echo a Laocoon-esque distinction between arts with a stronger material presence 
(painting, architecture) and ones with a comparatively weaker one (writing, music). These 
readings downplay the importance of the material world in Proust’s literary universe, and risk 




A quick detour through two critics, one discussing Proust’s views on architecture and one 
his views on visual art, demonstrate this type of hierarchization. Anne Henry has argued that 
architecture is the “plus bas” level of the arts for Proust, because “historicité n’est pas un élément 
valorisant mais aliénant, qui maintient l’esprit du monument prisonnier d’un style qu’on ne 
comprend pas, donc d’une matérialité” (284). The question of historicity and the difficultly of 
‘reading’ past works of art outside of their historical context is certainly present in Proust. As 
Françoise Leriche notes of Proust’s interest in art manuals and reproductions, he was “perfectly 
aware […] there is a cultural history of art and of the gaze, that renders illegible to him most 
works from past eras, unless he approaches them with the aid of works of erudition” (170). 
However, this awareness does not preclude Proust from allowing his readers to access 
architecture through two strategies (both discussed at length in my fourth chapter). The narrator 
himself develops intimate relationships with certain architectural spaces, notably the Combray 
church of his childhood and Saint Marc’s basilica in Venice. Additionally, throughout the 
Recherche, the cathedral is a leitmotif in discussions of literary construction.9 For Jonathon Paul 
Murphy, visual arts are “relegated to the rank of illustration” by the end of the Recherche “as the 
written word finally ascends to a central position of certainty” (12). For Murphy, the written 
word is central because it offers the narrator more imaginative freedom, a “mobile form of 
desire, less tied to a specific object” (12). In my reading, however, the mobility of desire in 
Proust is generated in part by the interaction between art forms, and particularly between 
literature and painting. Chardin’s paintings are an example of the cross-productivity resulting 
from these interactions.   
 
9 Although in Le Temps retrouvé the narrator ultimately decides against viewing his novel as a cathedral, he 
ultimately compares it to a dress: “je bâtirais mon livre, je n’ose pas dire ambitieusement comme une cathédrale […] 
mais tout simplement comme une robe” (338). A humbler comparison, certainly, but one that presents the same 
problems of materiality and changing styles. 
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By way of a short essay written in 1895 and its eventual rewrite in JF, we can see how 
Chardin’s vibrant still lifes inspired Proust’s writing about vivid sensual impressions not only in 
Elstir’s paintings, but in quotidian life. In the posthumously published essay “Chardin et 
Rembrandt” still life paintings become a paradigmatic lesson on ordinary life and aesthetic 
perception. A young, disaffected would-be artist is instructed to go to the Louvre and see 
Chardin’s paintings in the hopes that their aestheticization of quotidian objects will teach the 
young man how to see beauty in his day-to-day surroundings. The aesthetic potential of the 
ordinary is both the impetus to create and the outcome of creative work. “Chardin et Rembrandt” 
is in part a pedagogical demonstration: an art-loving young man finds himself depressed by the 
banality of his surroundings. The essay’s narrator offers a prescription to cure his malaise: follow 
the lessons of Chardin and learn to transform your perception of the ordinary world, not to 
escape it. What a painter like Chardin teaches is not that the world-made-art is superior to the 
real world, but rather that there is a radical equality of aesthetic potential in all things in the eyes 
of the artist. Christine McDonald summarizes the lesson Chardin imparts: “[w]hat Proust has 
learned from Chardin, he writes, is that a pear is as alive as any precious stone because the 
painter has declared the equality of all things before the painter’s thoughts” (42). Art valorizes 
the marvel of material presence without attention to the objective worth of the object 
represented. When Proust’s young man feels suffocated by “la banalité traditionnelle de ce 
spectacle inesthétique” of his shabby home (68), the remedy is to look at Chardin’s paintings of 
“la vue d’un buffet, d’une cuisine, d’un office, d’une chambre où on coud” and learn from them 
the aesthetic potential of any object (69). Chardin’s buffet, kitchen, or sewing room already gave 
him pleasure; by painting these settings that pleasure becomes accessible to the viewer.  
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In the essay’s opening paragraph, the initial description of the young man’s despair at his 
surroundings does not so much serve to reify the distinction between the aesthetic and the non-
aesthetic as to provide a lesson in the fact that we are always inflecting what we see around us 
with a certain perceptual tint: 
Prenez un jeune homme de fortune modeste, de goûts artistes, assis dans la salle à manger 
au moment banal et triste où on vient de finir de déjeuner et où la table n’est pas encore 
complétement desservie. L’imagination pleine de la gloire des musées, des cathédrales, 
de la mer, des montagnes, c’est avec malaise et avec ennui, avec une sensation proche de 
l’écœurement, un sentiment voisin du spleen, qu’il voit un dernier couteau traîner sur la 
nappe à demi relevée qui pend jusqu’à terre, à côté d’un reste de côtelette saignante et 
fade. Sur le buffet un peu de soleil, en touchant gaiment le verre d’eau que des lèvres 
désaltérées ont laissé presque plein, accentue cruellement, comme un rire ironique, la 
banalité traditionnelle de ce spectacle inesthétique. Au fond de la pièce le jeune homme 
voit sa mère, déjà assise au travail, qui dévide lentement, avec sa tranquillité quotidienne, 
un écheveau de laine rouge. Et derrière elle, perché sur une armoire, à côté d’un biscuit 
qu’on tient en réserve pour une ‘grande occasion,’ un chat gros et court semble le génie 
mauvais et sans grandeur de cette médiocrité domestique. (68)   
It is not that the young man is seeing the banal objects around him objectively and without 
aesthetic gloss and he will be taught to perceptually transform them into something beautiful. 
Rather, he was already distorting the objects around him with his initial attitude, and thus the 
inflection of that distortion (exasperatingly banal versus aesthetically rich) can change.  His 
dejection at “la salle à manger au moment banal et triste où on vient de finir de déjeuner et où la 
table n’est pas encore complètement desservie” is heightened because his imagination is 
occupied with the paintings of cathedrals, seas, and mountains he saw earlier that day. This 
imaginative contrast is what makes his surroundings ugly, rather than anything inherent in those 
surroundings themselves.  
Looking closer at the description of the dining room table that follows the essay’s 
opening, we see myriad hints of intentionality in the negative aesthetic valuation the young man 
makes of his home. A ray of sunlight hitting a water glass “accentue cruellement, comme un rire 
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ironique, la banalité traditionnelle de ce spectacle inesthétique.” The light accentuates the young 
man’s impression of the banality of the scene the way light might accentuate certain features in a 
painting. It is, like the ironic laugh it is compared to, an intentional inflection. This display is not 
only a scene but a “spectacle,” as if it is in some way being performed for the viewer. The young 
man goes so far as to project intentionality onto “un chat gros et court” that seems to be “le génie 
mauvais et sans grandeur de cette médiocrité domestique.” What this attribution to the cat hides 
is that the animating force behind the young man’s disgust is his own manner of evaluating and 
organizing the objects that surround him. In this case he has compared them to his existing list of 
valuable objects (museums, cathedrals, seas, mountains) and found them to be “inesthétique” and 
unworthy of the attention he is nonetheless forced to give them. Taken one by one, the objects 
that compose his dining room scene are hardly incompatible with the aesthetic, even by pre-
nineteenth century standards: the young man’s mother “assise au travail, qui dévide lentement, 
avec sa tranquillité quotidienne, un écheveau de laine rouge” could easily be found in a domestic 
scene by Chardin or Greuze; at least one of Chardin’s still lives also features a cat as the essay’s 
narrator indeed points out to the young man (69).  
Compare this to Proust’s use of ordinary objects in JF. The narrator and his grandmother 
receive a box of fruits from Madame de Villeparisis, and the narrator experiences these plums, 
grapes and pears as objects of wonder. They draw the narrator’s attention because they were 
originally given to Mme de Villeparisis by the Princesse de Luxembourg, and because their 
luminous surfaces remind him of the sea at Balbec. The strange sea-effects on these fruits show 
the permeability of interior and exterior spaces in Proust’s Balbec descriptions, which I explore 
in chapter two, but it is worth anticipating them here to show the compatibility of the ordinary 
(food) with the beautiful (the sea). The plums the narrator sees being delivered to the hotel are 
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“glauques, lumineuses et sphériques comme était à ce moment-là la rotondité de la mer” (325). 
The first two adjectives describe a contradiction: “glauques” indicates both a greenish-blue color 
and the general appearance of murkiness, while “lumineuses” suggests exactly the opposite 
quality. The effect, magnified by the reference to the sea that immediately follows, is one of light 
reflecting off a surface that nonetheless gives the impression of depth, that retains a deep 
coloring. These plums not only resemble the sea; they seem to influence how the narrator 
perceives it. If their murky yet luminous coloring seems to suggest the sea, the sea’s “rotondité” 
seems to be suggested by the plums themselves. The descriptions continue, and continue to be 
marvelous: there are also “des raisins transparents suspendus au bois desséché comme une claire 
journée d’automne, des poires d’un outre-mer céleste” (325). The grapes “suspendus” in their 
box recall the descriptions of Chardin’s fruits suspended in his paintings as if in real air in 
Diderot and the Goncourts. They seem to capture and contain that which is much larger: a clear 
autumn day, as the plums are the murky, luminous, rotund sea. When the narrator and his 
grandmother receive the fruits later that day, they have undergone, as it were, a sea-change: “les 
prunes eussent passé comme la mer à l’heure de notre dîner, au mauve et que dans l’outre-mer 
des poires flottassent quelques formes de nuages roses” (325). The plums are now mauve in 
color, and it is now the surface of the pears that seems to have taken on the living aspect of the 
sea with the reflection of pink clouds floating across it. These twin sites of fascination for the 
narrator—the luscious fruits, particularly valued as the narrator’s grandmother finds the ones 
served by the hotel “généralement détestables” (323), and the sea—share a set of material 
qualities and reciprocally lend form and color. There is no aesthetic hierarchy here, only the 
wonder of material presence.  
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“Chardin and Rembrandt” ultimately rewrites this “spectacle inesthétique,” advising the 
young man to return to the Louvre, study the still lifes, and use Chardin’s loving gaze on the 
objects around him as a way to reevaluate his appraisal of his home. In JF, Proust uses this 
rewritten description from his earlier essay as the basis for his most still-life-like dinner scene at 
the Balbec hotel. Yae-Jin Yoo writes of this scene that “la description métaphorique du spectacle 
banal correspond à la transcription littéraire d’une toile de Chardin” (43).10 The narrator takes 
delight in the objects left undone and half-empty on the table at the end of the meal, because 
“[d]epuis que j’en avais vu dans des aquarelles d’Elstir, je cherchais à [les] retrouver dans la 
réalité, j[e les] aimais comme quelque chose de poétique” (506). Proust’s advice from his earlier 
essay is fully dramatized here: the narrator has learned to see beauty where (for him) there was 
none before. Whereas prior to his experience with Elstir he had spent meals gazing “uniquement 
du côté de la mer,” now he feasts his eyes on a host of miraculous sights at the table:  
[L]e geste interrompu des couteaux encore de travers, la rondeur bombée d’une serviette 
défaite où le soleil intercale un morceau de velours jaune, le verre à demi vidé qui montre 
mieux ainsi le noble évasement de ses formes et au fond de son vitrage translucide et 
pareil à une condensation du jour, un reste de vin sombre, mais scintillent de lumières, le 
déplacement des volumes, la transmutation des liquides par l’éclairage, l’altération des 
prunes qui passent du vert au bleu et de bleu à l’or dans le compotier déjà à demi 
dépouillé, la promenade des chaises vieillottes qui deux fois par jour viennent s’installer 
autour de la nappe, dressée sur la table ainsi que sur un autel où sont célébrées les fêtes 
de la gourmandise et sur laquelle au fond des huîtres quelques gouttes d’eau lustrale 
restent comme dans de petits bénitiers de pierre. (506) 
The narrator’s new appreciation of the beauty of the dining table is an appreciation for the 
harmonious play of form, color, and light suggested by the descriptions quoted in the last 
sentence. This appreciation contains a strong element of aesthetic reverence. He continues his 
 
10 Yoo notes as well the value of reading “Chardin et Rembrandt” and this dining scene in tandem: “l’article nous 
offre une source précieuse pour la compréhension de l’évolution du langage descriptif de Proust. Le langage plat et 
sec de l’article se transforme en langage suggestif et riche que le narrateur de la Recherche emploie pour décrire une 
table desservie au Grand-Hôtel de Balbec” (42).  
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description of the table with the tablecloth draped over it as if “sur un autel où sont célébrées les 
fêtes de la gourmandise.” The religious lexicon continues with “quelques gouttes d’eau lustrale” 
resting in oyster shells as if “dans de petit bénitiers de pierre.”11 The harmony and beauty of the 
objects on the dining table becomes the stuff of religious ritual but rather than a transmutation to 
the immaterial, this comparison locates transformative aesthetic power as always already 
possible in the material world. The particular texture and sheen of drops of water within an 
oyster shell is doubled with the slightly different texture and sheen of water in a stone font to 
create a reverence rooted in material presence rather than transcending it.  
The dining room description I have been quoting from is all contained within one of 
Proust’s paragraph-length sentences, which begins with the reference to Elstir’s watercolors and 
ends with “la vie profonde des ‘natures mortes’” (506). This account of the narrator’s attempts to 
find beauty in “les choses les plus usuelles” is thus bookended with art references, beginning 
with the narrator’s specific desire to find the objects from Elstir’s watercolors in real life so as to 
experience them as beautiful, and ending with an evocation of the compellingly lifelike quality 
of still lifes in general (this evocation is doubly compelling in French—“the deep life of ‘dead 
natures’”) (506). Both of these references grammatically confuse the two levels of art and reality; 
the narrator is looking to find what he has seen in Elstir’s paintings, putting representation and 
thing represented on the same level, and looking to find beauty in the most normal things, the 
“vie profonde” of still lifes while he is looking at a “real” dining room table (506). All of this is 
being communicated in writing to the reader, who is not in a strict sense seeing either painting or 
table, but rather words on the page. Depending on the individual reading, these words could 
 
11 Le Côté de Guermantes repeats this comparison: “[…] bénitier rugueux de l’huître dans lequel restent quelques 
gouttes d’eau salée […]” (110).  
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evoke mental images of real tables or of painted objects, or impressions or flashes of shapes and 
colors and lights, or simply conceptual understanding of the objects mentioned.  
Proust’s material world in this dining room scene is neither purely a description of a real 
dining room table nor purely the ekphrasis of a Chardin still life. It incorporates both of these 
visual sources but cannot be limited to them, inviting us to consider literature’s unique potential 
to ask us to examine the relationship of art to real materiality. Gillian Pierce describes Diderot’s 
project in his salon reviews as “a radical attempt to come to terms with the individuality of the 
experience of viewing, with the difficulty of rendering the visual into the verbal, and with the 
relationship between art and la nature même” (16). This tripartite description of the problematics 
that must be considered when writing about visual art provides a roadmap for exploring the 
radical theoretical potential of JF’s verbal still life of a dining room table. First, what Pierce 
describes as “the individuality of the experience of viewing”: Proust’s ‘viewer,’ his narrator, has 
in fact seen this dining room table many times, but he is only just now learning to see it as a 
tableau, with the help of lessons from a more experienced ‘viewer’ (Elstir). The narrator’s 
viewing habits are guided by his own interests: as noted above, he used to only look out on the 
ocean during meals, and in fact still does should there be a chance the “jeunes filles de la petite 
bande” might pass by (506). While the dining room table is a consistent presence in his day-to-
day life at Balbec, his attention to it is only intermittent. The reader’s ‘viewing’ is equally 
individual: to the already-variant experience of literary visualization is added an individual 
history or lack thereof with still life paintings and dining room tables.  
Next there is “the difficulty of rendering the visual into the verbal”: as expected, Proust’s 
dining room table description consists in part of a list of objects (“couteaux” “serviette” “verre”) 
with which the reader is most likely familiar from their own daily life. The facility of imagining 
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a common object, though, is not the same as conveying an individual experience of aesthetic 
pleasure. Guiding a reader to imagine a knife through the narrator’s eyes trained by Elstir’s still 
lifes, or through Proust’s eyes trained by Chardin’s, or both at once, is a much trickier task. In 
general, the lexical references to still lifes might help the reader by reminding them of paintings 
that they themselves have seen to help them contextualize the narrator’s experience in this scene. 
More importantly, Proust’s descriptive skill instructs the reader on how to imagine these ordinary 
objects in order to see the strange aesthetic power possible within them. The description itself is 
dense with words referencing light (“soleil” “lumières” “éclairage”), color (“jeune” “vert” “bleu” 
“or”), and form (“rondeur” “formes” “volumes”), all of which add a painterly element to the 
description by reminding the reader that it is composed and not accidental. There is, in addition, 
a kind of energy in this description due to a series of nouns referencing physical changes: 
“évasement” “condensation” “déplacement” “transmutation” “alteration.” These are not so much 
the concrete changes or motions enacted on objects in ordinary life as they are subtle 
transformations caused by light and shadow, by attention and by imagination. The effect on the 
reader is unlikely to be a clear mental image of a collection of objects on a dining table, which 
they could get more effectively from observing their own table or visiting the Louvre’s collection 
of Chardins. Rather, the imaginative effect is likely to be a series of strange impressions, of 
fragments of shape and light, that might encourage one to notice more attentively, and thus 
potentially more aesthetically, the objects in their own life. This textual materiality impresses 
itself on the reader through the seemingly sensual impoverishment of the written word, not 
despite it.   
Finally, there is “the relationship between art and la nature même.” Without a 
background in art history and theory, it is easy to see a still life and assume a simple one-to-one 
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relationship of representation to object represented. In other words, to presume that the painter 
placed in front of him an apple and then painted that apple. Writings about or inspired by visual 
art such as Proust’s description of the dining room and Diderot’s Salons introduce a third term, 
writing, into this equation of representation and object represented, and this increasing 
complexity draws attention to the oversimplification of the initial formulation. In the case of 
Proust’s dining room still life, what, in fact, is the object represented? Is it Proust’s own 
experiences of dining tables or of still lifes, or is it a re-representation of those things as 
represented in “Chardin et Rembrandt”? Is it the narrator’s imagined experience of dining rooms 
or of still lifes? By multiplying the possible references and possible points of view, Proust 
evokes the complexity of all of these relationships. Material presence in Proust is multilayered, 
drawing on real experience and on visual art to ultimately guide the reader to a specifically 
textual sensuality.   
Reading the opening of “Chardin et Rembrandt” next to the dining room description in 
JF show the multiplicity of visual interpretations similar objects can have within art. With the 
Recherche’s narrator, fresh from his perceptual lessons at Elstir’s studio, taking the role of the 
young man from the earlier essay, objects which caused the young man’s despair delight the 
narrator, and through him, the reader. In the opening of “Chardin et Rembrandt,” the “dernier 
couteau” left on the table seems to indicate disorder and ugly hazard, while the Recherche’s 
“geste interrompu des couteaux encore de travers” is a much more lively and engaging 
description of the same utensil. The heavy irony of the glass of water touched “gaiement” by “un 
peu de soleil” accentuates the banality of the scene while in the later text the description of wine 
left in a glass as “scintillant de lumières” creates a pleasantly shifting and sparkling object. The 
essay’s sad ray of sunlight is further contrasted to the Balbec sunlight that can “intercale un 
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morceau de velours jaune” onto an undone napkin, evoking the richness of color. While the 
essay’s young man imagines the cathedrals he wishes he could see, the narrator in the later 
passage finds the cathedral (at least, its alter) right at the table, which becomes “un autel où sont 
célébrées les fêtes de la gourmandise.” Hints of the ocean and mountains, other cherished objects 
for the essay’s young man, find their way into the Recherche’s dining room table passage as 
well. References to liquids are a major lexical component of this description; in particular the 
interplay of light and water (a leitmotif of the narrator’s stay in Balbec which will be more fully 
discussed in chapter two): the “vin sombre, mais scintillant des lumières,” “la transmutation des 
liquides par l’éclairage,” and the “quelques gouttes d’eau lustrale […] au fond des huîtres.” The 
description of the surface of plums turning from green to blue and from blue to gold also seems 
to evoke the changing surface of the sea throughout the day. The lexical resonances of mountains 
are less frequent, but can be seen in “la rondeur bombée” of an undone napkin and perhaps even 
in the “pierre” of the font to which the oysters are compared.  
These two fictional dining room tables, one ugly, one beautiful, are shaped by the 
complex interactions between the cognitive and affective dispositions and previous aesthetic 
experiences of their viewers, and the (diagetically) literal collection of objects present before 
them. Both young men are sensitive to their surroundings and both have a strong interest in art; 
both have come to this scene fresh from experiences with paintings that have shaped their 
evaluations of knives and glasses. The Recherche’s narrator has seen Elstir’s scenes of ordinary 
subjects and their striking material power. The young man of Proust’s early essay, on the other 
hand, has recently visited the Louvre to see “des visions de palais à la Véronèse, de princes à la 
Van Dyck, de ports à la Claude Lorrain” (69). Objects that have not been sanctified by these 
masters appear to him covered by “un laideur ambiante,” the adjective already belying the 
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nonessential nature of the young man’s judgement of ugliness (69). In fact, a further lesson from 
Chardin that Proust incorporates into the Recherche is that the apparent ugliness of objects does 
not prevent them from having aesthetic power.  
The celebration of everyday experiences of beauty is one possible reason for the 
representation of ordinary objects in art, but it is not the only one. The unpleasant or the 
revolting can be part of an aesthetic investigation of the material presence of the world as well. 
Diderot writes of Chardin’s painting Raie dépouillée that the “objet est dégoutant, mais c’est la 
chair même du poisson, c’est sa peau, c’est son sang; l’aspect même de la chose n’affecterait pas 
autrement” (484). The viewer’s sense of wonder due to the perceptual proximity of art to nature;  
Chardin seems to have produced flesh by paint. Diderot attempts to explain what could have 
caused this effect, though he warns us “[o]n n’entend rien à ce magie,” noting that this artificial 
nature produces the opposite aesthetic effect of a real fish served at dinner—the effect of the 
painted fish is marvelous (484). He describes the ‘flesh’ of the creature as a mix of layer and 
texture effects: “des couches épaisses de couleur appliquées les unes sur les autres et dont l’effet 
transpire de dessous en dessus,” “une vapeur qu’on a soufflé sur la toile,” and “une écume légère 
qu’on y a jetée” (484). This reality effect is thus the product of an inexplicable alchemy of 
substances behaving oddly; colors showing through one another as if they were blood visible 
through and animating living flesh, and a vapor or a light foam one imagines clinging to the 
surface of the canvas.  
Proust takes this image of the fish and inverts the relationship of art and nature to 
highlight the same sense of the marvelous. Chardin’s raie has left the salon and found itself on 
the dining room table at Balbec. The narrator’s desire to think of himself in Balbec as at “la 
pointe extreme de la terre” means he is most interested in the dining table when “quelque vaste 
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poisson” reminds him “des époques primitives” (321). Just as in Diderot’s description of 
Chardin’s painting, the fish becomes the sign of an intensity exceeding the normal experience: 
Diderot’s fish defies the laws of paint and canvas; Proust’s is the image of an impossibly faraway 
past. Like Diderot, Proust focuses on the strangeness of the literal substance of the fish to 
highlight its mystery. Diderot uses vapor and foam in his description as if the real surface of the 
sea had been fixed to the surface of the canvas, while Proust’s description of the fish has 
anthropomorphic artistic intention structuring narrator’s daily meal: “le corps aux innombrables 
vertèbres, aux nerfs bleus et roses […] avait été construit par la nature, mais selon un plan 
architectural, comme une polychrome cathédrale de la mer” (321). The fish is pushed back into a 
deep, oceanic past, but the final description of the creature is imbued with art in the spectacular 
image of a “polychrome cathédrale de la mer.” The disgusting object of the dead fish undergoes 
multiple transfigurations in the hands of Chardin, Diderot, and Proust, becoming the source of 
aesthetic pleasure. Gita May writes that Diderot and Proust were faced with an important 
aesthetic question looking at the Raie dépouillée: how do things that would not seem 
aesthetically appealing in real life “se trouvent-ils enrichis d’une signification expressive 
transcendante, d’une espèce d’enchantement lorsqu’un grand artiste les reproduit sur la toile?” 
(406-407). Proust’s ultimate configuration of the fish—finding a cathedral within its natural 
architecture—suggests that it is not art that gives status to certain objects, but art which permits 
us to see the strange sources of delight always waiting in the familiar.  
The lesson that Proust takes from Chardin about the omnipresent possibility of artistic 
material in the physical world is one of the importance of a certain type of attention, but not that 
of an attention to exact details. Proust’s material universe is not model of representation built 
from intense observation and documentation. The Recherche’s narrator indeed feels himself to 
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lack observational skill. After finding a fictional passage in the Goncourt brothers’ Journals 
describing the guests at the Verdurin salons in vivid and merry detail, the narrator reflects on 
what he still believes to be a fatal flaw in his ability to write: unlike the Goncourt brothers, “je ne 
m’étais jamais dissimulé que je ne savais pas écouter ni, dès que je n’étais plus seul regarder” 
(Le Temps retrouvé 23). Rather, the narrator’s model of attention is based on affective sensations 
of interest, admiration, delight, and this sort of attention can be wandering, inexact, and prone to 
overemphasize certain elements of an object and ignore or diminish others. Bal writes that what 
we see in a Chardin still life is the gaze itself, but not, perhaps, as we are accustomed to 
imagining it: “C’est comme si ce qui est dépeint était moins l’objet que le regard qui le 
contemple, non pas un regard doté d’une acuité d’observation mais, au contraire, un regard doté 
d’une sorte d’inattention, promue et dirigée par le hasard de l’œil détendu et intime” (43). This 
idea of the gaze recalls (and recuperates) the narrator’s confession he is not very good at 
listening and watching. What art such as Chardin’s or Proust’s does is to capture the experience 
of seeing in a way that is caught up with myriad other related impressions and textures, sounds 
and smells and tastes, as well as affective signals—Bal’s “œil détenu et intime.” 
 This inattentive, wandering eye demonstrates the complex temporality of artistic 
experience, which is both the singular instance of viewing and the habitual nature of this type of 
sight. Robin Adèle Greeley identifies two distinct relationships to time in Chardin’s paintings of 
domestic work: “Time here is at once linear and circular, bound by the illusion of the scene on 
offer and separate from it as it verges into our own lived time of viewing” (282). The painting 
she uses as an example, La Ratisseuse, does this through its domestic subject of a woman 
cleaning radishes. Household chores, she argues, have a double temporal nature: they are both an 
endless repetition (of radishes to be cleaned in a lifetime), and a succession of tasks to be 
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completed one by one (in a day). Viewing a painting in a gallery, similarly, is both a repeatable 
and repeated event (it can be and is viewed many times by many people) and a moment in a 
series (of paintings in a gallery, of events in the daily life of a spectator). The explicit and 
implicit use of Chardin’s still lifes in “Chardin et Rembrandt” and JF creates a similar double 
temporality of art in ordinary experience. The narrator is progressing in his aesthetic 
apprenticeship by learning how to see the world through the eyes of the artist. At the same time, 
there is a circularity to this experience. In “Chardin et Rembrandt,” the capacity to see beauty in 
the ordinary, once discovered, becomes infinitely repeatable. As McDonald writes, the young 
man of Proust’s essay would only need to see Chardin’s paintings once because after that “he can 
see them everywhere in his own kitchen. That is, Chardin’s work will be integrated to the point 
where it infuses all space as though it were a still life” (42). The material world is not just the 
thing that art represents, our perception of the objects and scenes around us is conditioned by our 
experiences with art.  
Returning now to Diderot’s descriptions of Chardin’s still lifes, we can see that the vivid 
presence of the object world the critic so loves goes beyond mimesis into a relationship of 
mutual transformation. In order to help his readers grasp the incredible experiential effect of 
seeing a Chardin, Diderot writes “[c]’est toujours la nature et la vérité. Vous prendriez les 
bouteilles par le goulot si vous aviez soif, les pêches et les raisons éveillent l’appétit et appellent 
la main” (481). This description evokes a tactile sensuality that moves beyond the merely visible 
to imply a relationship of direct contact, a give and take of touch, between the viewer and the 
painting. Thirst can be an aesthetic desire as well as a physical one, such as the idea of “drinking 
in” the sight of someone or something. Taking the bottles by the neck implies most immediately 
that you could reach into the painting, but this also recalls notions of sight based on the 
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projection of the eye towards an object in sight—a relationship of touch between the eye and the 
material world. This multisensory contact continues with peaches and grapes that awaken the 
appetite and call to the hand—a seemingly simple example of effusive praise that is in fact the 
description of a multifaceted network of interactions. The peaches and grapes act on the viewer, 
stimulating their desire, they call the hand of the viewer towards them even as the viewer knows 
they are not literal objects. Art and the real world interact in a cycle, animated by mutual hunger 
and mutual agency. Diderot calls Chardin’s work “entre nature et art” (495). To exist between 
nature and art is to be both and to be neither. For Diderot and for Proust, Chardin is part of a 
network-building effort that results in a multiplicity of ways of experiencing the material. 
Chardin will remind you of the ripe fruits and full bottles you have known at dinner tables of 
your own, and subsequent interactions with those objects will remind you of the Chardins you 
have seen. Diderot is correct, in the end, to insist that you could reach out and take the objects in 
his paintings and bring them to your lips: as McDonald points out, the end goal of Proust’s 
advice to the young man of “Chardin and Rembrandt” is that the still life he sees at the Louvre 
“infuses all space.” The fruit he bites and the wine he drinks at his own dining table has become 
what it always was—the material of a brilliant still life painting.  
The Matter of Memory  
Alongside Proust’s writings on Chardin, involuntary memory gives us a second lens 
through which to examine the multilayered nature of materiality in the Recherche. Examining 
Chardin’s influence on Proust puts at the forefront strong visual impressions, the imposition of 
objects on our senses in the real world and in art. Involuntary memory, on the other hand, is the 
experience of the immediate material world receding to give way to an unusually vivid memory. 
Properly speaking, though, involuntary memory is not really remembering at all but 
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reexperiencing. It is thus inescapably entwined with the physical and material rather than with 
the abstract and idealized. In experiencing an involuntary memory, we are taken away from the 
world around us only to be given to a different iteration of it, as sensually plentiful as the world 
we left. At the same time, we are reminded of the importance of material objects, which can 
provoke an involuntary memory despite not having been physically present in the initial 
experience involuntary memory reproduces. Involuntary memory is a play of absences that 
shows the multiplicity of materialities we can access or intuit.  
In Du côté de chez Swann, the narrator describes his childhood relationship to the object-
world around him as a mixture of two competing sensations. On one side, he feels a sensual 
fascination with the colors and forms and scents of the world, the experiences of which are 
pleasurable and satisfying in and of themselves. On the other side, however, these experiences 
spark in the young narrator a feeling of curiosity and expectation: an intuition, like the feeling 
which precedes the adult narrator’s fully realized experiences of involuntary memory, that there 
is something more to discover beyond this play of sensually appealing surfaces. Given the 
prominence of involuntary memory in critical and popular responses to Proust’s work, this 
second sensation of curiosity and expectation may seem to be more essential to the Recherche 
than the former. However, rereading Proust with attention to the sensual world (including the 
materiality of the involuntary memory experience itself) demonstrates that this impression is 
limited. Freed-Thrall discusses the value of both types of experience for the narrator, using the 
examples of viewing Elstir’s painting of asparagus and of involuntary memory. She argues that 
both require important cognitive operations on the part of the narrator and the viewer, and simply 
differ in focus, representing “the difference between an open-ended, object-oriented 
metamorphosis and a subject-centered one” (79). If involuntary memory teaches the narrator 
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about himself and his past, viewing a still life such as Elstir’s asparagus requires confronting the 
mystery and the potency of the object world. 
The young narrator himself worries that his interest in the world around him is 
antithetical to his vocation as a writer. As a child, he assumes the myriad experiences that appeal 
to his senses— “un toit, un reflet de soleil sur une pierre, l’odeur d’un chemin”—must exist 
“bien en dehors de toutes ces préoccupations littéraires” (176). The “plaisir irraisonné” and 
“illusion d’une sorte de fécondité” that the narrator feels while interacting with alluring material 
objects is contrasted to the “ennui” and “sentiment de mon impuissance” that the narrator feels 
when looking for a fitting philosophical subject for his work. Despite his boredom and 
frustration with abstract ideas, he still believes that rooftops, reflections, and odors, however 
pleasing, cannot be the literary inspiration he is searching for. These “impressions” are “toujours 
liées à un objet particulier dépourvu de valeur intellectuelle et ne se rapportant à aucune vérité 
abstraite” (176-177).12 If it were indeed possible to find the deeper philosophical meaning behind 
the sensual impressions “de forme, de parfum, ou de couleur” it would no doubt be hard work, 
and the young narrator looks for excuses which “me permissent de me dérober à ces efforts et de 
m’épargner cette fatigue” (176). The impressions themselves cannot be enough, the narrator 
thinks, they must be transformed into proper literary material through rigorous intellectual 
work—work he doubts he is capable of performing. However, taken as an aggregate, the 
Recherche amply demonstrates that sensuality is not merely a lazy enjoyment ultimately devoid 
of intellectual and aesthetic value. Le Temps retrouvé indeed suggests that “[i]l n’est pas certain, 
pour créer une œuvre littéraire, l’imagination et la sensibilité ne soient pas des qualités 
 
12 Despite this belief, the narrator’s first literary production and his sole literary production that is “reproduced” 
whole in the Recherche, will be on the subject of just such an object, or to be more precise, just such an 
“impression” (in this case, a momentary perception taking into account real objects and subjective placement) of the 
Martinsville bell towers in Du côté de chez Swann. 
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interchangeables et que la seconde ne puisse pas sans grand inconvénient être substituée à la 
première” (207). Experiential awareness can also be the basis for literary accomplishment.  
When the narrator first experiences involuntary memory, the strangeness and the 
fluctuation of the material world is foregrounded again and again. Instead of an escape into the 
abstract, the text lingers on the material substance(s) of the narrator’s childhood not in an attempt 
to model in a typically realist manner the sights, sounds, and smells of his memories, but instead 
to highlight the oddities of our emotional and aesthetic engagement with the world around us. 
Recall Diaz’s description from above of the miniatures “heavier with actuality” than the objects 
they model. Similarly, the narrator re-lives Combray not as an accurate topographical copy of the 
town, but as a strange miniature. The town is initially reduced to the church, which 
“summarizes” or “represents” the rest of it. Combray “n’était qu’une église résumant la ville, la 
représentant, parlant d’elle et pour elle aux lointains” (47). The church exerts a gravitational pull, 
“tenant serrés autour de sa haute mante sombre […] les dos laineux et gris des maisons” resulting 
in an image of the town “aussi circulaire qu’une petite ville dans un tableau de primitive” (47). 
What emerges from Proust’s experiment in describing the unexpected and euphoric experience 
of plentitude that is involuntary memory is not a conventionally realist description of a town but 
rather a reconstruction of perceptual and emotional distortions. Involuntary memory provides 
less a map of the past in which the narrator can move around, and more a powerful imagescape 
that is both the center and the container of Combray and the narrator’s childhood. The material 
power of this memory experience could not be replicated by revisiting Combray as an adult 
because the material specificities of the narrator’s childhood cannot be experienced again at a 
later date by returning to the same location. The world of his childhood was “peinte de couleurs 
si différentes de celles qui maintenant revêtent pour moi le monde” that it seems to belong to the 
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world of the marvelous, not the real (48). He compares this difference to the illusory images the 
magic lantern projected on his childhood bedroom walls, and this analogy does leave open the 
possibility that these material differences are, fundamentally, simply surfaces. That is, that the 
real material of the world could be uniform and continuous, as in a realistic view of the object-
world. The narrator’s subjective perception, bound to develop between childhood and adulthood, 
makes him see Combray differently just as the projection of the magic lantern on his childhood 
bedroom walls temporarily changed their appearance, but neither of these necessarily undermine 
the solidity and continuity of the world.  
However, this play of (changing) surface and (stable) depth is then undermined during 
the narrator’s continued mediations on the spaces of his childhood. As the description of 
Combray continues, the material differences he senses between the world he knew as a child and 
the world he knows as an adult are not only a question of surface appearance, but a matter of 
imperceptible physical machinations that, unseen, inhabit and structure the world in which we 
live. His aunt’s rooms are paralleled to the surrounding countryside because in both of these 
spaces the air-bound miasmas of vegetal, terrestrial, and human elements form an undeniable but 
inexplicable material atmosphere. In the country, “des parties entières de l’air ou de la mer sont 
illuminées ou parfumées par des myriades de protozoaires que nous ne voyons pas” (49). While 
we cannot see what is causing these effects, we experience them, and we experience them 
aesthetically—the air is illuminated and perfumed, adjectives we might normally use to describe 
human-created lights and scents. The reference to “protozoaires” grounds human subjective 
experience (our perceptions of color, light, scent) in its scientific rationale (these sensual effects 
are created by real physical processes), but these processes are made up of elements invisible to 
the human eye, and, for most of us, not clearly grasped beyond a simple causality (the world is 
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composed by many things we cannot see). The narrator is not creating a simple opposition 
between perception-subjectivity-visibility, on one hand, and scientific understanding-objectivity-
invisibility, on the other. Rather, these air-bound effects “nous enchantent des milles odeurs qu’y 
dégagent les vertus, la sagesse, les habitudes, toute une vie secrète, invisible, surabondante et 
morale que l’atmosphère y tient en suspens” (49). The visible and human is not to be contrasted 
with a complex physical world acting by its own laws outside of human understanding, instead, 
the total whole of an atmosphere and the distinct and sensuous pleasure it provides is composed 
of an indescribable blend of elements. This the “vie secrète” of the material world is composed 
in part by and is certainly not antithetical to the human. 
This meditation on the narrator’s childhood has begun our discussion of involuntary 
memory at the end of the process, rather than at its beginning, which is anchored in the sensual 
properties of a given object. In JF, the narrator reflects on his once-passionate love for Gilberte 
Swann. While he is now mostly indifferent to her, the only reminders capable of reigniting his 
formerly all-consuming love for her are banal things from their relationship. Direct references to 
her and memories of sentimental moments produce no emotional effect. Musing from the 
particular case of his feelings about Gilberte to the general pattern they reveal, he makes the 
claim that most of our memory is actually stored “hors de nous, dans un souffle pluvieux, dans 
l’odeur de renfermé d’une chambre ou dans l’odeur d’une première flambée,” because memories 
that are useless to the intellect take up residence anywhere they can (266). He revises this initial 
formula of intellectually unimportant memories living “hors de nous” to these memories living 
“en nous” but hidden (266). Neither of these formulas is quite correct as the “real” site of these 
memories might be said to be in the meeting between their internal and external containers. They 
are less objects that can be found at a specific location and more the product of a specific 
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interaction.  The passage continues with a theoretical description of what one feels during 
involuntary memory that draws attention to the important bodily reality of the experience.  
Proust’s exploration of materiality indicates the always-embodied nature of experience, 
insisting on the importance of spatial relationships and of the tactile in art and cognition. Proust 
is working neither in the realm of empiricism nor that of immaterial abstraction; the body’s 
relationship to the world around it is always important but never transparent. Maurice Merleau-
Ponty demonstrates that any sensory experience we have necessarily occurs from an embodied 
point of view: “le sentir […] investit la qualité d’une valeur vitale, la saisit d’abord dans sa 
signification pour nous, pour cette masse pesante qui est notre corps, et de la vient qu’il 
comporte toujours une référence au corps” and Proust’s descriptions, including those of 
involuntary memory, are embedded with references to the physical (79). Starr suggests that we 
should pay more attention to touch and tactility in our discussions of literary imagery: “Motor 
imagery is, I believe, a better paradigmatic case for imagery than is visual imagery: the mind’s 
body is more encompassing than the mind’s eye” (82). Note, for example, this tactile description 
of the narrator’s cognitive sensations when “[j]e regardais les trois arbres, je les voyais bien, 
mais mon esprit sentait qu’ils recouvraient quelque chose sur quoi il n’avait pas prise, comme sur 
ces objets placés trop loin dont nos doigts, allongés au bout de notre bras tendu, effleurent […]” 
(JF 345). The double sight verbs regarder and voir give way to the figuration of the narrator’s 
interest in the three trees as a cognitive act of reaching, the stimulation of something tactile in the 
mind.  
In the case of involuntary memory, these experiences allow us to “retrouver l’être que 
nous fûmes” and to “nous placer vis-à-vis des choses comme cet être l’était” and “souffrir à 
nouveau” (266). This description of the way we can “be” again during involuntary memory 
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focuses on the concrete experience of the internal and external world. This phrasing seems 
almost clunky, compared to the initial involuntary memory scene of Du côté de chez Swann and 
the suite of involuntary memories the narrator experiences before the Guermantes matinée in Le 
Temps retrouvé, which use sensually vivid language to express the awe and the pleasure the 
narrator feels. This attempt to theorize involuntary memory strips away some of that magic. ‘We 
can place ourselves in relationship to things as the being that we were before had’ is an oddly 
specific way to describe the reality effect of involuntary memory. One outcome of this 
specificity is an invitation to edge away from a primarily visual understanding of the effect of 
involuntary memory. Du côté de chez Swann’s image of the town twisting and unfurling out 
from a cup of tea is a marvelous one but, just as Diderot and the Goncourt brothers insist on the 
fact that Chardin’s painted objects seem to exist in relation to one another in three-dimensional 
space, the subject’s ability to re-experience their being in proper spatial relation to other objects 
in a given field is of prime importance to this experience. This theorization of the spatial reality 
of involuntary memory is immediately followed by another capability the body has during this 
experience: to “souffrir à nouveau” (266). Given that this passage will be followed by an 
exploration of the problems a suffering body might have while travelling, it seems very possible 
that Proust wants to reinforce the link between involuntary memory and physical sensation.  
That Proust is well aware that there’s no necessary distinction between the mental and the 
physical is shown again and again in the Recherche, both in his discussion of involuntary 
memory and in his descriptions of the suffering body in general. The narrator understands part of 
the work of consciousness as erasing much of our physical experience, in the way, for example 
that habit makes familiar surroundings reassuring and comfortable by allowing their initially 
overwhelming material presence to recede from us and become unobtrusive: “C’est notre 
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attention qui met des objets dans une chambre, et l’habitude qui les en retire et nous y fait de la 
place” (JF 291). His own body teaches him this lesson in reverse, because as a “nature 
nerveuse,” he tells us, his internal boundaries and hierarchies do not function as they should, 
meaning that this material erasure is often not possible. He is someone “chez qui les 
intermédiaires, les nerfs, remplissent mal leurs fonctions, n’arrêtent pas dans sa route vers la 
conscience, mais y laissent au contraire parvenir, distincte, épuisante, innombrable et 
douloureux, la plainte des plus humbles éléments du moi” (296). If involuntary memories, joint 
citizens of a deep internal reservoir of forgotten things and of a simple sensual object or 
impression, disrupt the internal/external boundary by belonging to both, this short description of 
the suffering body disrupts the internal boundaries between somatic functionality and 
consciousness.  
In the Recherche’s first and most famous scene of involuntary memory, the madeleine 
and tea of Du côté de chez Swann, the narrator describes the past as “caché […] en quelque objet 
matériel” and then, in parenthesis, writes more precisely that they are hidden “en la sensation que 
nous donnerait cet objet matériel” (44). The magic is neither in the material world nor in its 
transcendence; it is in the interaction between the external world and the largely unconscious 
cognitive processes that collect and store memories. It is not reducible to this sensation, but this 
sensation is its necessary condition. Our intellectualized understanding of the material world and 
our interactions with it are insufficient to explain our actual experiences, as involuntary memory 
cannot be summoned or repeated and its process of causation, though clear in hindsight, is 
certainly not scientific. That is not to say that these experiences are beyond the material or 
antithetical to it. Rather, Proust is among the twentieth-century thinkers, within art and within 
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science, whose work deals with the uneasy possibility that our understanding of the universe is, 
perhaps constitutively, misguided and partial.  
The Recherche includes definitions that distinguish the conscious process of voluntary 
memory from the unconscious process of involuntary memory and differentiate between the 
material world that sparks an involuntary memory and the essence of that memory itself. The 
presence of these definitions seems to imply that a rigorous philosophical structure underlays the 
contradictions and wanderings of the Recherche. These distinctions, however, do not need to be 
absolute for them to be meaningful. The productive work of these distinctions is in their 
moments of confrontation and contradiction. Acknowledging this allows us to see these 
distinctions along a continuum rather than as absolutes, a procedure that Proust builds into his 
description of the narrator’s first experience of involuntary memory. Even within a material 
object, there is a descriptive play of material and essence. The madeleine itself is described in 
terms of its self-contradiction. Its “petit coquillage […] si grassement sensuel” is directly 
contrasted to its scent as odor and taste are “plus vivaces, plus immatérielles, plus persistantes, 
plus fidèles” than other sensual qualities (47). Rather than a sensuous whole, a material trap to 
which revelatory experience cannot and should not be reduced, the madeleine is itself the site of 
conflicting materialities. Scent, Proust writes, is more like a soul than other material qualities of 
an object (47). A pure essence/material distinction would seem to make that nuance impossible 
or beside the point.  
For from ignoring the material, Proust’s descriptions of involuntary memory are full of 
sensual wonder, as he uses synesthetic description to allow the reader to cognitively reconstruct 
an analogous state to that of involuntary memory. The imaginative power of his description of 
the narrator’s memories of Combray hinges on the association between the taste and smell of the 
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madeleine dipped in tea with the surprising visual—but visually mobile (see chapter three)—
images of pieces of paper untwisting into flowers and houses when placed in water and the town 
of Combray emerging complete from the cup of tea and gaining “forme et solidité” (47). The 
images of the paper moving in water and of the town gaining in solidity as it emerges fully 
formed from the teacup, as well as the initial evocation of taste and scent, create a strikingly 
complex cognitive model of the experience of involuntary memory. As Le Temps retrouve’s final 
set of involuntary memory experiences prepare the narrator for the revelations that will lead him 
to finally fulfil his vocation as a writer, Proust mixes increasingly synesthetic descriptions of the 
material experiences that lead to these memories and the sensual content of the memories they 
evoke. Sensory references in this passage include: “un azur profond” “des impressions de 
fraîcheur, d’éblouissante lumière” “je goûtais la saveur” (173) “la vison éblouissante et 
indistincte me frôlait” “la sensation que j’avais senti jadis sur deux dalles inégales” (174). The 
visual, the tactile, the gustatory, and their intermixtures are evoked to help the reader construct 
the overwhelming sense of “félicité” that “invades” (“m’envahit”) the narrator in these moments. 
Of the narrator’s list in the ‘adoration perpetuelle’ of partial or total experiences of involuntary 
memory he has had in his lifetime there are sensations which are haptic (uneven paving stones), 
visual (views of trees and church steeples), gustatory and olfactory (the madeleine dipped in tea), 
and aural (Vinteuil’s music, the sound of a spoon hitting a plate) (173-174). Using this scene as 
one of his examples, Fredric Jameson argues that the resurrection theme in modern literature “is 
scarcely to be understood in any religious sense;” that is, it is separate from the division between 
matter and spirit and between immanence and transcendence fundamental to religious thinking 
(196). Instead, Jameson explains, “resurrection expresses the euphoria of a secular salvation 
otherwise inexpressible in material or social terms, religious language here offering the means of 
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rendering a material possibility rather than the other way around” (196-197). We can look at 
involuntary memory as just such a material possibility; the language of revelation does not 
divorce the experience from the material world, but rather guarantees that this experience will be 
understood as something exceptional, a rare occurrence of a purely distilled joy.  
In this final suite of involuntary memories, Proust emphasizes that much of our experience 
goes unnoticed as we are living it. The deep truths accessed during involuntary memory are those 
that “la vie nous a malgré nous communiquées en une impression, matérielle parce qu’elle est 
entrée par nos sens, mais dont nous pouvons dégager l’esprit” (185). Cognition and sensation are 
connected and work with one another to create the revelatory effects of involuntary memory. 
These effects, in Proust’s description, are quite concrete: the “joie du réel retrouvé” is in 
reexperiencing “tout le tableau fait d’impressions” (note that the artistic metaphor is already 
present in the narrator’s understanding of experience in general) (186). The ensuing description 
of the elements of which this “tableau” is made shows the variations and shades of ordinary 
cognition: “cette infaillible proportion du lumière et d’ombre, de relief et d’omission, de 
souvenir et d’oubli” (186). It is not only light but shadow, not only memory but forgetting. This 
real texture of lived life is not known or not understood by “la mémoire ou l’observation 
conscientes” (186). In Sodome et Gomorrhe the narrator notes that mastering something 
completely is not the same thing as understanding it. Just as an insomniac is more likely to have 
a revelation about sleep than someone has always slept easily, “[u]ne mémoire sans défaillance 
n’est pas un très puissant excitateur à étudier les phénomènes de mémoire” (52). There is not, 
here, a binary relationship between states of cognition or states of being, but rather a series of 
complex interactions between the cognitive and the external world.  
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Voluntary and involuntary memory, finally, serve less as absolute distinctions and more as a 
meditation on the variants of sensual experience. Our tendency to rely on voluntary memory to 
understand and explain our lives conceals the many inconsistencies in both the material world 
itself and in our interactions with it. Russell T. Hurlburt, a psychology professor who works on 
inner experience, finds our everyday use of the term “experience” to be too wide-reaching and 
inexact. He instead distinguishes what he calls “pristine experience” from “broad experience.” 
Pristine experience is “something actually directly before the footlights of consciousness at some 
moment” (54). Broad experience is a retrospective summary of a given time period. Hurlburt 
explains the distinction using the example of someone who has vacationed in Amsterdam and is 
describing their trip to an acquaintance back home. While their pristine experience of the city 
included vast quantities of positive and negative sense data and cognitive processes, the 
description they give will clarify and organize certain parts of their memory and privilege things 
that might be interesting to their interlocutor (56). This description is what gets consciously 
stored as broad experience and takes the place of the much messier and fluctuating pristine 
experience of the trip itself.  
Voluntary memory corresponds nicely to the concept of broad experience, and pristine 
experience helps us understand the process that allows involuntary memory. As Hulbert takes 
great pains to explain, we are not necessarily conscious, retrospectively, of our pristine 
experience. Our sense of our broad experience, looking back, does not necessarily reflect much 
at all of our pristine experience. Applied to Proustian memory, this dynamic of forgetting (or 
more properly, never consciously incorporating) our pristine experience is what enables 
involuntary memory to occur. The adult narrator, in front of his madeleine, is not having a broad 
intellectual recollection of having tea with his aunt, he is plunged into a complex experiential 
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world of sensation and cognition that corresponds to an anterior moment in time. The pristine 
experience of tea with his aunt can be brought back whole because it has never entered the realm 
of broad experience at all. He has never voluntarily recollected it. Hurlburt’s definition of 
pristine experience includes both internal processing and external sense input, describing sensory 
awareness as “the paying of specific attention to some sensory aspect of the external or internal 
world, not for its utilitarian but for its sensory sake” (117). The difference between pristine 
experience and broad experience is not that one is body-oriented, and one is mind-oriented. 
Rather, broad experience has a use value that the immediacy of pristine experience lacks. The 
same is true of voluntary memory and involuntary memory. We use the former to organize and 
explain our experience, while the latter reflects the complex and dynamic interactions that occur 
between external material world and our bodily processes, including cognition.  
Looking at the process of memory in terms of artistic creation helps us see how these 
bodily processes give shape to our eventual memories, voluntary and involuntary. Evelyne Ender 
argues that memories are constructed in ways akin to artistic creation and insists on the physical 
nature of these constructions. She writes that authors such as Proust “have learned that memories 
are constructions, that they depend on mood and context, and above all that there is no 
readymade template to be found somewhere in the brain that reproduces an initial impress or 
trace” (5). Instead of an analogical model that postulates that the brain works like a video 
camera, faithfully recording the image of lived life, or even a model that admits that this 
recording mechanism is sometimes faulty (as in, for example, the well-documented occurrences 
of false memories in witnesses to crimes), Ender posits a model of memory that always includes 
an active relationship between things experienced and the memories made of them. There is 
always a process of negotiation and construction that goes into memory formation and memory 
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recall. Involuntary memory captures a layer of experience that voluntary memory cannot, but it 
does not capture the objective truth of the world.  
This complex view of the process of memory formation and recall helps us understand 
the narrator’s ideas about specifically aesthetic impressions. The narrator criticizes the duchess 
of Guermantes for her “parole […] méconnaissant la façon dont se forment en nous les 
impressions artistiques” (Côté de Guermantes 507).  He is reacting to her claim that a certain 
painter’s work would be worth seeing even “du haut d’une impériale de tramway sans s’arrêter” 
(507). The narrator fundamentally disagrees with her implication that “notre œil est dans ce cas 
un simple appareil enregistreur qui prend des instantanés” (507). In order to benefit from such a 
quick viewing, the eye would have to be able to glimpse a painting and carry it away a complete 
memory despite the less-than-ideal viewing conditions. But viewing a painting is not like taking 
a photograph, and these “impressions artistiques” are impacted by the conditions of viewing, by 
physical sensations, by societal norms. Leriche has demonstrated that Proust refuses a simple 
distinction between original and copy in reference to his interest in art reproductions. Art 
reproductions are often considered inferior or degraded copies of original artwork, much as 
memories could be considered shadowy copies of real experience. Leriche posits instead that 
these artistic reproductions are not simply a supplement to viewing the original, but individual 
experiences in their own right (167-70).  
The Recherche demonstrates early on in Du côté de chez Swann the insufficiency of the 
copy/original model of experience. As the young narrator is too sickly to travel, his grandmother 
wants to give him “des photographies des monuments ou des paysages les plus beaux” to 
decorate his bedroom (39). After forming this plan, however, she is unable to bring herself to 
purchase the photographs she had planned, finding that the one-to-one relationship between the 
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object and its photographic copy lets “vulgarité” and “utilité” take the place of the “valeur 
esthétique” of the monuments or landscapes represented (39). Instead, she seeks representations 
that are increasingly removed from the original object, including more and more distance 
between the creative act and the thing it is intended to represent: “d’y introduire comme 
plusieurs ‘épaisseurs’ d’art” (40). She asks Swann for advice on which artists painted the desired 
objects, preferring “des photographies de la Cathédrale de Chartres par Corot, des Grandes Eaux 
de Saint-Cloud par Hubert Robert, du Vésuve par Turner” to photographs of the objects 
themselves (40). Even this “distance” from the vulgar photographic relationship does not prove 
satisfactory for her, and she turns to Swann again to find out if there are etchings of these 
paintings, especially ones that have their own specific aesthetic value, such as those that 
represent a painting in an earlier, less degraded state (40). As with Ender’s understanding of 
memory, the objective faithfulness of copy to original is not the source of value; value comes 
from the creative, constructive relationship between the two.  
This relationship of original to copy, or of experience to recollection, is always 
conditioned by our cognitive and physiological constraints. Leriche writes of Proust’s interest in 
art books that “[i]n his reading of art books, Proust privileges those images that his eye can 
‘animate’ […] by recalling memories that are not visual, but physiological. In other words, 
certain images strike Proust because they reactivate in him a lived corporeal experience” (172). 
The relationship of copy to original is not determined by technical accuracy, but rather 
complicated by the introduction of a third term: bodily awareness. Nathalie Aubert writes that in 
the Recherche Proust is elaborating “a concrete theory of the mind which shows the mind in a 
relationship of reciprocal exchange with the instruments it uses” (10). The mind is not a mere 
recording device; it does not somehow stand outside observing but rather is constructed as it 
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constructs. She argues that one of the narrator’s breakthroughs in the novel is to understand 
through his experiences with Elstir’s art and artistic philosophy that there are important 
commonalities between the cognitive experience of verbal and visual art. By dramatizing the 
process of this realization, she writes, “Proust is telling us that visual images are not 
instantaneous snapshots of external reality, that they have a duration” (17). This understanding in 
Proust anticipates modern scientific analysis of the physiology of viewing art.  
In my analysis of “Chardin et Rembrandt” I argued that one of things Proust insists on is 
that we never have an objective gaze on the world. Our aesthetic evaluations are never impartial 
and thus we can learn to see the objects around us differently. Accordingly, visual art is not 
necessarily transparent where literature is opaque. Artistic experience, like all experience, is 
conditioned by the interactive processes I have been discussing. Wendy Steiner writes that “the 
eye can in fact focus only on relatively small portions of visible objects and must scan them in 
order to build a unified image. Pictorial perception is thus a matter of temporal processing, like 
literary perception” (36). She is careful not to collapse the pictorial and literary perception into 
one another and notes important differences, for example that in visual arts “the order of this 
perceptual sequence is not predetermined by the painting itself (at least, as far as we know),” 
unlike in literature, where a temporal sequencing is imposed. However, nor is there an absolute 
distinction between how we perceive visual and verbal art. Our tendency to assume visual 
processing is instantaneous is contradicted by scientific studies that show that this processing in 
fact occurs in small chunks, an unconscious approximation of the way one would read a book 
paragraph by paragraph. Memory, artistic creation, and artistic reception all work as dynamic 
processes, as interactions between external objects and our physical and cognitive responses and 
constructions. Rather than a binary between the material and a term framed as its opposite (in art, 
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often abstraction; in philosophy, the mind, etc.) these sets of relationships point towards a 
spectrum of materialities which are mutually self-constructing and move away from a realistic 
view of the object-world while still allowing for the real presence of material objects.  
In the many forms of sensual pleasure we find in the world around us, in viewing still 
lifes, in eating dinner or having tea, we are always engaged in a process of constructing our 
experience. By highlighting this process, Proust is inviting us to consider the vast mystery of the 
material world as we balance between the intensity of its presence and our intuitions of its 
ultimate absence. Richardson’s description of what he calls the neural sublime begins with an 
exploration of the ways in which the brain constructs “the pragmatically useful (if 
philosophically suspect) sense of a relatively stable object world” (2010: 19). The brain, for 
example, prevents us from perceiving the blind spot where the optic disk is located in the retina: 
in normal function it fills in this blank space so that our perception of the world is seamless 
(2010: 18). Richardson expands this illustration of normal cognitive function with a series of 
illustrations that demonstrate the unreliability of perception by presenting two equally plausible 
but mutually exclusive visual possibilities within the same image. Richardson’s interest in 
illustrations such as Joseph Jastrow’s duck-rabbit, where the figure either appears as a duck 
looking to one direction or a rabbit looking the other direction, leads him to ask the question, 
“Why should figures that, as Keats says, ‘tease us out of thought’ yield fascination rather than 
annoyance, pleasure rather than anxiety?” (2010: 20). The framework Richardson sets out to 
answer this question, his elaboration of a “neural sublime” in European and American 
Romanticism, can help us understand the power of Proust’s use of similar figures in the 
Recherche that force us to hesitate between competing interpretations.  
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By exposing the work the brain does to unify our experience of the world, the neural 
sublime astonishes and yields pleasure by teasing the what-if: what if we could access what lies 
beyond our habitual conscious perception? Rather than an idea of the sublime rooted in contact 
with a feeling of transcendence, this idea of the sublime is rooted in the material possibilities of 
the brain. Richardson demonstrates this sublime through analysis of a passage from Henry David 
Thoreau where, descending a mountain, he marvels at the real wonder of nature: not as a symbol 
of or an invitation to something larger, but as a source of wonder and mystery all on its own. 
Richardson writes, “[t]he pleasure of such a sublime—a pleasure accompanied by a disturbing 
sense of loss and disorientation for the conscious subject—would have to consist in the feeling of 
‘contact’ itself, of material (rather than spiritual) fusion with the environmental surround” (2010: 
35). To reject an empirical objectivity is not to invite a transcendent sublime; it is to appreciate 
the wonderous immanence of the material world. Jane Bennett has written of a state of 
enchantment that can result from our interactions with the material world, which she defines as 
“a state of wonder, and one of the distinctions of this state is the temporary suspension of 
chronological time and bodily movement” which induces a “mood of fullness, plentitude, or 
liveliness, a sense of having had one’s nerves or circulation or concentration powers turned up or 
recharged” (2001: 5). Like Proust’s involuntary memory and Richardson’s neural sublime, this 
enchantment is, if not omnipresent, at least omni-possible: “the world that I describe as 
enchanted is not confined to structures, entities, and events in nature: there are also literary, 
machinic, and electronic sites of enchantments” (2001: 11). Proust’s invitations to the reader to 
test our imaginative capacities, to see the impossible, creates literary sites of enchantment: dining 




Looking at how Proust layers his textual presentation of materiality allows us to nuance 
our understanding of reality and art, and experience and memory, without needing to posit 
absolute distinctions between them. The fragmentation, expansion, and/or unfamiliarity the 
Proustian narrator describes and the reader experiences through him are present and possible in 
the material possibilities of the brain without being wholly reducible to an empirical explanation. 
The well-studied instability of the Recherche’s narrative voice itself echoes the understanding in 
contemporary neuroscience of the illusory nature of the self, that, in Richardson’s words, is not 
“permanent and unified” but rather “a kind of proprioceptive illusion generated by neuronal 
mechanism” (2010: 35). Along these lines, Bowie writes that for the narrator “[t]he desire for 
knowledge of the beloved, or of art, or of the photon-stream shedding a sudden radiance on 
brickwork, turns unfailingly into the would-be knower’s desire for knowledge of his own 
cognitive skills and disabilities” (115). Thus I have retained through this chapter and will retain 
through my dissertation as a whole a material grounding that is not an attempt to limit Proust’s 
philosophical speculations and aesthetic demonstrations, but to explore the possibilities 
suggested by an interrogation of the limits and illusions of perception. Ultimately, I argue that 
the pleasurable difficulties of reading Proust stem from his invitation to us to test our own 
cognitive skills through his reformulation of the material world. My second, third, and fourth 
chapters explore Proust’s use of specifically literary techniques to guide the Recherche’s reader 
to deconstruct our everyday experiences of space, energy, and time in order to see them anew. 







CHAPTER 2: SPACE 
Contemporary American artist Mary Corse plays with light in her work, using paint and 
florescent bulbs to produce all-white canvases that change subtly when viewed from different 
angles. The Whitney Museum’s 2018 exhibition of her work, “A Survey in Light,” included the 
following description of a rather unique material Corse began using in the late twentieth century:   
While driving through Malibu one evening Corse made a serendipitous discovery that 
inspired her return to painting. She noticed that when light struck the highway lines in 
front of her, they illuminated for an instant as she moved past. Realizing that the same 
glass microspheres embedded in that road paint could be used to transform her white 
paintings into light-responsive works, Corse began covering the surfaces of her works 
with these tiny, retroreflective beads. In the resulting White Light series, begun in 1968, 
Corse embraced the potential for her paintings to exist in ever-changing states, to appear 
flat and alternately full of brushwork, depending on the perspective of the viewer and the 
light. (“Painting with Light”) 
Corse’s body of work as a whole, and particularly these works with retroreflective beads, 
disrupts the idea that a painting can or should be seen from a single unified perspective. Her 
concerns in this work echo and extend the drive Impressionist painters felt to portray accidents of 
light and weather in their work, capturing a moment’s sensation instead of an accurate 
representation an object or a collection of objects as such. From the revolution of plein-air 
painting, we move to the urbanized revelation of a driver suddenly liberated from the mundane 
as the white lines of the highway in front of her suggest new aesthetic possibilities. This 
possibility is no longer so much the attempt to capture a moment as the attempt to capture 
multiple perspectives in the same work, moving from the representation of an impression into 
that of a changing field of possibilities.  
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 This changing field of possibilities is what Proust captures in his seascape images 
throughout the Recherche’s second volume, 1919’s Prix Goncourt-winning À l’ombre des jeunes 
filles en fleurs (JF). This chapter uses these seascapes to reconsider a set of linked ideas about 
flatness, dimensionality, and ekphrasis within literature, to ultimately reconsider how we 
understand our relationship to space in general. Within Proust studies, my analysis of these 
seascapes reconsiders two ideas from the critical canon of writing on this volume and on the 
Recherche as a whole: the primacy of the Port de Carquethuit ekphrasis to the narrator’s 
understanding of landscape, and the idea that Proust’s images favor flatness over depth. On a 
macrolevel, these seascapes call into question the empirical reality of light and space as external 
features structure our reality, considering them instead as experiential, process-driven forces with 
which we exist in reciprocal relationship. By reading Proust’s descriptions of the seaside town of 
Balbec alongside theories on land and landscape from nineteenth-century debates on painting to 
contemporary ecocriticism, it becomes clear Proust uses landscape to guide the reader towards a 
view of the world that is multiperspectival and constantly shifting, decentralizing the aesthetic 
experience as such (i.e. the experience of literally viewing artwork) in favor of an exploration of 
our bodily and imaginative engagement with the world around us. The reader is guided 
throughout the volume to construct and reconstruct, to shape and reshape, landscapes in their 
own mind as Proust leads us through many imaginative iterations of the Balbec sea, asking us to 
perform a variety of material and spatial manipulations within and across iterations. We are 
asked over and over again to visualize seascapes, to see them framed through various windows, 
to reflect them from a window into glass cabinet doors, to reverse the seascape and see interior 
light as water. These seascape descriptions often include long mutations and transformations, 
rather than discrete descriptive moments of a singular seascape image. In an analogous process 
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to the narrator’s own, we are encouraged to see our participatory role in the aesthetic impressions 
we receive. All of this imaginative work of framing and reframing, visualizing and revisualizing, 
has the final, paradoxical effect of situating us inside of the world looking around it rather than 
outside the world looking in at it. Proust tests our imaginative power to create and manipulate 
spaces, allowing us to play with immersion in the world of the book. This imaginative immersion 
mimics our often-unconscious immersion in the real world of light, atmosphere, and motion, 
inviting us into awareness. 
Viewing Balbec  
The space of this exploration is a seaside resort in the fictional town of Balbec, where the 
narrator has gone on holiday with his grandmother. Their stay at Balbec gives rise to numerous 
passages where, with quiet awe or giddy excitement, the narrator’s sense of scale, scope, 
direction, and elemental demarcation is confused and rearranged. The descriptions of the Balbec 
seascapes in JF’s second book, Nom de pays: le pays are so effective because they entwine the 
narrator’s remarkable perceptual experiences with artistic philosophy and traditional ekphrasis 
through the narrator’s encounters with Elstir. The narrator’s perceptual experiences are neither 
naïve in comparison to Elstir’s practiced methods of perception and representation, nor do they 
become sophisticated solely through the study of the artist’s work. Rather, this volume builds up 
a back-and-forth motion between the narrator’s engagement with sensual experience in the real 
world, and his imaginative engagement with artwork with both informing and nourishing one 
another. The key quality of Proust’s seascapes is the use of light and water to create immersive 




These marvelous seascapes are accessible to anyone, as we will see, but only if the 
observer has the right combination of curiosity and admiration. For patrons of the Balbec Hotel 
like the narrator and his grandmother, the dining room windows serve as a frame for the seascape 
outside. This frame can both highlight the beauty of the seaside scene by circumscribing the 
visual focus, but this framing also allows it to be taken for granted: “Pendant les longs après-
midi, la mer n’était suspendue en face d’eux que comme une toile d’une couleur agréable 
accrochée dans le boudoir d’un riche célibataire” (306). Here, there is none of the play of 
dimensionality and focus on the variations of texture and color we will see below, but merely an 
ornamental canvas. The rather bland adjective “agréable” and the reference to the wealthy 
bachelor make the sea into a social status symbol of limited aesthetic power. Proust uses this 
limited view of the hotel guests to demonstrate the permeability of the boundary between interior 
and exterior, and the hotel’s dining room becomes a luminous spectacle for the Balbec working 
class.  
 Once night begins to fall, “les sources électriques faisant sourdre à flots la lumière dans la 
grande salle à manger, celle-ci devenait comme un immense et merveilleux aquarium” (306-
307). The electric lights of the hotel do not just mimic the visual impression of water, the light 
itself moves as if through water (“sourdre à flots”). This aquarium effect is both a lovely 
descriptive touch for the reader, and an ambiguously attractive scene for the diegetic observers. 
The latter are “la population ouvrière” of Balbec, and the passage considers in an aside what 
would happen if they were ever to rise up against this luminous luxury: “une grande question 
sociale, de savoir si la paroi de verre protégera toujours le festin des bêtes merveilleuses et si les 
gens obscurs qui regardent avidement dans la nuit ne viendront pas les cueillir dans leur 
aquarium et les manger” (307). This class distinction works with the framing device of the 
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window to reinforce the aesthetic strangeness of the scene for its observers; just as the narrator 
observes the sea from inside the hotel, the workers of Balbec observe the extraordinary animals 
within. However, the permeability of this glass is suggested not only by the social question 
Proust raises but by the transferability of qualities between the beach and the interior space of the 
hotel. The “vie luxueuse” of the hotel patrons is “lentement balancée dans des remous d’ors” as 
“poissons et mollusques étranges” would be underwater (307). Again, the description references 
not only the visual qualities of water, but the different quality of motion; the lives of the hotel 
patrons are lightly balanced in the luminous light like the bodies of sea creatures balance in the 
water. In the previous chapter, we saw how the dining room table at Balbec represents the 
omnipresent possibility of aesthetic experience in Proust, and this framed scene of the same 
dining room evokes the same aesthetic potentiality. This potentiality coexists with the class 
commentary found in this passage, again showing that in Proust’s novel aesthetic experience is 
concurrent with other types of experience, and that it is always accessible to an interested viewer.  
 Here, as in other sections of the novel, aesthetic experience is highlighted and 
differentiated from other sorts of experience through a literal or figurative frame. Malcom 
Andrews writes of the three-way relationship between land, landscape, and art that underlies our 
conceptual understanding of ‘landscape’ that “in the conversion of land into landscape a 
perceptual process has already begun whereby that material is prepared as an appropriate subject 
for the painter or photographer, or simply for absorption as a gratifying aesthetic experience. The 
process might, therefore, be formulated as twofold: land into landscape; landscape into art” (3). 
Landscape is not merely the stuff out there in the world that is sometimes represented in art. 
Noticing and appreciating a particularly attractive piece of land is an active experience, not a 
passive one. In this moment of identifying a slice of land as a landscape, “[w]e are constructing a 
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hierarchical arrangement of the components within a simple view so that it becomes a complex 
mix of visual facts and imaginative construction” (Andrews 3). The aesthetic apprenticeship the 
narrator undertakes in JF increases his awareness of both parts of the twofold process Andrews 
described in the first passage I quoted. The narrator in this volume is becoming aware that in 
order to turn land into landscape, he must be in the proper disposition to do so; overwhelming 
physical suffering or desire can preclude the possibility of successful aesthetic perception. He is 
also becoming aware that he can learn to understand the transformation of landscape into art 
through comparison with painting, which deepens his own appreciation of landscape—and gives 
the reader the chance to deepen our own appreciation of the literary seascape through the 
contrast with the painted seascape. Throughout both parts of this process, the seascapes of 
Balbec are constantly transforming, land becoming landscape that the narrator is teasing into art.  
 A representative sample of framed seascape descriptions in this volume show the 
relationships between land, landscape, and art. The most extensive meditations on framing and 
landscape in JF occur at the narrator’s bedroom window. As the summer advances, this bedroom 
window occasions multiple meditations on the distinctions between the aesthetic and ordinary, 
combining secular and religious aesthetic effects in “le tableau que j’y trouvais dans la fenêtre”: 
D’abord il faisait grand jour, et sombre seulement s’il faisait mauvais temps ; alors, dans 
le verre glauque et qu’elle boursouflait de ses vagues rondes, la mer, sertie entre les 
montants de fer de ma croisée comme dans les plombs d’un vitrail, effilochait sur toute la 
profonde bordure rocheuse de la baie des triangles empennés d’une immobile écume 
linéamentée avec la délicatesse d’une plume ou d’un duvet dessinés par Pisanello, et fixés 
par cet émail blanc, inaltérable et crémeux qui figure une couche de neige dans les 
verreries de Gallé.  
Bientôt les jours diminuèrent et au moment où j’entrais dans la chambre, le ciel 
violet semblait stigmatisé par la figure raide, géométrique, passagère et fulgurante du 
soleil (pareille à la représentation de quelque signe miraculeux, de quelque apparition 
mystique), s’inclinait vers la mer sur la charnière de l’horizon comme un tableau 
religieux au-dessus du maître-autel, tandis que les parties différents du couchant, 
exposées dans les glaces des bibliothèques basses en acajou qui couraient le long des 
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murs et que je rapportais par la pensée à la merveilleuse peinture dont elles était 
détachées, semblaient comme ces scènes différents que quelque maître exécuta jadis pour 
une confrérie sur une châsse […]. (435-436) 
                                                                                                                                        
 At the beginning of the season, the narrator sees the sea “sertie entre les montants de fer de ma 
croisée comme dans les plombs d’un vitrail,” a description which invites the reader to frame the 
scene both in the secular sense of the window frame and in the religious sense of stained glass. 
This vertical border of the window is followed by a description of a border on the horizontal 
plane: the sea “effilochait sur toute la profonde bordure rocheuse de la baie des triangles 
empennés d’une immobile écume.” The tension between the two-dimensional effect of the 
window frame with the three-dimensional rocky border against which the sea brushes prevents 
the passage from being read merely as an ekphrastic evocation of an Elstir-like seascape. The 
narrator and the reader are working simultaneously with two different models for this view, 
vertical and two-dimensional, and horizontal and three-dimensional. This description of the 
early-season sea ends with two medial figurations for the effects of seafoam on the rocks 
bordering the sea, again creating tension between two- and three-dimensionality. The foam is 
“linéamentée avec la délicatesse d’une plume ou d’un duvet dessinés par Pisanello” and 
“fixé[…] par cet émail blanc, inaltérable et crémeux qui figure une couche de neige dans les 
verreries de Gallé.” The Pisanello drawing reference is two dimensional, emphasizing the line, 
and the Gallé glasswork reference is three dimensional, emphasizing materiality and texture.  
 As the summer progresses and the days grow shorter, the narrator sees that “le ciel violet 
semblait stigmatisé par la figure raide, géométrique, passagère, et fulgurante du soleil.” The 
cluster of adjectives in the first part of this description evoke at least three types of aesthetic 
power. Calling the sky “stigmatisé” evokes a religious register that continues throughout this 
passage; the sun is “pareille à la représentation de quelque signe miraculeux, de quelque 
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apparition mystique” and “comme un tableau religieux au-dessus du maître autel.” The 
adjectives “raide” and “géométrique” move out of the religious and into a sort of mathematical 
precision. Finally, “passagère” and “fulgurante” seem appropriate adjectives for an impressionist 
painting, denoting to attempt to capture what is already beginning to fade. This passage 
continues by evoking again the framing effects of the window, and explicitly connecting these 
effects to a pleasurable cognitive effort on the part of the narrator as he imaginatively 
reconstructs his artificially deconstructed view of the sea.  
 These bedroom seascapes gain in complexity as the narrator moves one step further from 
the actual landscape outside his window into the reflection of that landscape into the glass front 
of his bookshelves. The “parties différentes du couchant” are “exposées dans les glaces des 
bibliothèques basses en acajou qui couraient le long des murs et que je rapportais par la pensée à 
la merveilleuse peinture dont elles étaient détachées.” Rather than look at the real landscape 
outside his window, the narrator takes pleasure in the several degrees of remove, using his 
imagination to reconstruct their original composition. Instead of privileging the reality of the 
natural landscape, that landscape is described as “la merveilleuse peinture” from which the 
miniature in his bookcase glass has been detached. This layered representation leads the narrator 
to ruminate on the connections between his own disposition and his appreciation of certain kinds 
of beauty. He identities depth of feeling as the desired outcome of aesthetic contemplation, a 
theory which reinforces the play with perspectival depth that is key in the JF seascapes. This 
depth of feeling is contrasted to a purely visual surface. “[B]ien souvent,” he explains, these 
beautiful views are only “des images, j’oubliais que sous leur couleur se creusait le triste vide de 
la plage” (437). The beach’s reality is lost by the narrator and he no longer remembers “le vent 
inquiet du soir que j’avais si anxieusement ressenti à mon arrivée à Balbec” (437). However, the 
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distinction the narrator is driving at is not between real experiences and false images, but rather 
between profound experience and frivolous experience. Art can be either, as can reality. 
Recently, the narrator has been in a state of distraction because he has been thinking of the 
“petite bande” of young girls he has seen on the beach, and this distraction means that he is no 
longer “dans des dispositions assez calmes ni assez désintéressées pour que pussent se produire 
en moi des impressions vraiment profondes de la beauté” (437). He is thus distinguishing 
between these “impressions vraiment profondes” and superficial visuality.  
 In addition to his general thoughts of the young girls, he finds he cannot “mettre de la 
profondeur derrière la couleur des choses” because of his excitement about his dinner that night 
at Rivebelle (437). As he prepares for this dinner, he longs to be a visually appealing surface for 
the approving gaze of women: he will dress himself to “tâcher paraître le plus plaisant possible 
aux regards féminins qui me dévisageraient dans le restaurant illuminé” (437). The vocabulary of 
this description highlights the superficiality of this desire; he wants to “paraître” not “être” as 
pleasing as possible in the well-illuminated restaurant under the appraising looks of his female 
audience. Bowie characterizes the Rivebelle dinner scene itself as an apprenticeship in balancing 
physical pleasure and aesthetic appreciation, writing that the narrator “must seek vertigo, yet 
seek to regulate it, drink himself silly with the sheer welter of things, yet establish a new calm 
and a new harmony among them” (322). The aesthetic lessons the narrator learns at Balbec are 
inextricably linked both to his pursuit of physical pleasure and to his experience of physical 
suffering. These physical demands and desires can be antithetical to his pursuit of aesthetic 
knowledge, as is the case with his initial difficulty adjusting to the difficulty of being in a new 
environment at Balbec and his pursuit of the “petite bande” dissuades him from visiting Elstir 
more often. It is not the case, however, that the aesthetic and the physical are always distinct. 
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Physical pain and pleasure (or the fear or desire thereof) are not to be avoided; proper aesthetic 
enjoyment requires a perceptual and emotional quest for depth that includes the physical. The 
young women he desires bring him out of his hotel and his illness keeps him in it, but in either 
case the narrator is surrounded by the ever-changing landscape of the sea. His visits to Elstir’s 
atelier keep him away from his watchful gaze on the beach, but it is unexpectedly at that atelier 
he can finally connect with the girls he so desires to meet. His own bedroom, initially a site of 
suffering because of its unfamiliarity, becomes a playground of paintings, landscapes cut from 
the outside world and glimpsed from or reflected in the glass surfaces around him.  
 Proust’s description of the landscapes the narrator sees from his bedroom gives the 
impression of a continuous and ever-changing spectacle, but only insofar as it is noticed, 
organized, and appreciated by the narrator’s consciousness, a process which is informed by his 
interest in visual art. The narrator describes his pleasure on “les soirs où un navire absorbé et 
fluidifié par l’horizon apparaissait tellement de la même couleur que lui, ainsi que dans une toile 
impressionniste, qu’il semblait aussi de la même matière” (438). The passage that is dense with 
lexical references to visual art, starting with this reference to “une toile impressionniste.” At 
another moment, “la mer n’était peinte que dans la partie passe de la fenêtre” and the clouds that 
filled the rest of the frame seem to be “poussés les uns contre les autres par bandes horizontales, 
que les carreaux avaient l’air, par une préméditation ou une spécialité de l’artiste, de présenter 
une ‘étude de nuages’” (438).  Another view of the sky is a “‘harmonie en gris et rose’ dans le 
goût de celles de Whistler” (438-39). The narrator is not only studying landscape, but studying 
art—or more accurately, imaginatively creating art. His descriptions invent a fictional artist who 
has painted the sea in the window and structured the “étude de nuage” and refer to the real artists 
as well, but these inventions and references only obfuscate on a surface level the real artistic 
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agency in this passage: the narrator’s own. Paintings are one element of many that he finds in the 
seascapes outside of his window, one item of many from which Proust constructs his dynamic 
and ever-changing descriptions.  
 The narrator’s return visit to Balbec in Sodome et Gomorrhe takes up this same 
discussion of the ever-changing field of the seascape. The narrator’s temporal distance from his 
first visit to Balbec helps him describe more explicitly his own agential role in the construction 
of the landscape around him. On his return to the town, he notes that “[c]omme la première 
année, les mers, d’un jour à l’autre, étaient rarement les mêmes” (179). In addition to this 
continuous daily change, he proposes a series of shifts responsible for the new seas he finds this 
year at Balbec: 
Mais d’ailleurs elles ne ressemblaient guère à celles de cette première année, soit parce 
que maintenant c’est le printemps avec ses orages, soit parce que, même si j’étais venu à 
la même date que la première fois, des temps différents, plus changeants, auraient pu 
déconseiller cette côte à certaines mers indolentes, vaporeuses et fragiles que j’avais vues 
pendant des jours ardents dormir sur la plage en soulevant imperceptiblement leur sein 
bleuâtre d’une molle palpitation, soit surtout parce que mes yeux instruits par Elstir à 
retenir précisément les éléments que j’écartais volontairement jadis, contemplaient 
longuement ce que la première année ils ne savaient pas voir. Cette opposition qui alors 
me frappait tant entre les promenades agrestes que je faisais avec Mme de Villeparisis et 
ce voisinage fluide, inaccessible, et mythologique, de l’Océan éternel, n’existait plus pour 
moi. Et certains jours la mer me semblait au contraire maintenant presque rurale elle-
même. (179-180) 
His first explanation is the simplest, that he has arrived at a different time and thus found a 
different landscape: “maintenant c’est le printemps avec ses orages.” He complicates this 
seasonal explanation with the recognition that even if he had come to Balbec on the same date 
both years, the weather would be different and this year’s changeable skies “aurait pu 
déconseiller cette côte à certains mers indolentes, vaporeuses, et fragiles” that he had seen in his 
first year. These three adjectives present an idea of the sea which is evocative but vague, but the 
rest of the description is a strikingly kinetic image: these seas “que j’avais vues pendant des jours 
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ardents dormir sur la plage en soulevant imperceptiblement leur sein bleuâtre d’une molle 
palpitation.” The movement this phrase describes is imperceptible and yet present in the 
narrator’s mental image, as if he is both outside of the sea watching it indolently sleep on the 
beach and inside of it, feeling the gentle palpitating motion of the waves. His memory is both 
visual and bodily as if he himself could feel the body of the ocean.  
 His final explanation of the changing face of the sea is his recognition of the role his own 
cognitive constructions play in what he is seeing. His “yeux instruits par Elstir à retenir 
précisément les éléments que j’écartais volontairement jadis, contemplaient longuement ce que la 
première année ils ne savaient pas voir.” He has learned new mental habits of viewing from 
Elstir, a set of techniques by which he can see the same thing in a different way. He can do this 
by retaining in the landscape objects he might have voluntarily ignored previously and 
contemplating at length parts of the image he would not have been able to previously identify at 
all. The aesthetic hierarchies that governed his habits of sight his first year at Balbec have 
collapsed; the contrast between his “promenades agrestes” with Mme de Villeparisis and the 
“voisinage fluide, inaccessible, et mythologique, de l’Océan éternel” that he felt so keenly during 
his first stay at Balbec has given away to a world where some days “la mer me semblait […] 
presque rurale elle-même.”  The narrator’s changing gaze throughout his first stay in Balbec 
takes on a retrospective uniformity; it is now of a definitively earlier period than his current look 
which allows the sea to be “rurale.” But at the same time, within this larger structural change—
how and what he can see and contemplate—is the continuous rule of the sea’s changeability by 
day, season, and weather. The sea functions as the nexus where we see the constant flux of our 
relationship with the world around us. 
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With this representative overview in mind, we can look more closely at the component 
parts of this landscape construction. We will begin, as Mary Corse does, by considering light. 
Kenneth Clark has traced the development of a “landscape of fact” in European landscape 
painting from the fifteenth century forward, which ultimately gave way to impressionism but 
only after several centuries. The origins of this quest for a factual representation of landscape, 
Clark explains, happened simultaneously in Flemish painters as an empirical “by-product of [the] 
perception of light” creating an objective space as if “on a transparent screen,” and in Florentine 
painters in the development of the mathematics of perspective (43). Ultimately, “by the end of 
the seventeenth century the painting of light had ceased to be an act of love and had become a 
trick,” befitting the artistic representation of the Newtonian “mechanistic universe” (65). Light 
plays a central role in how Proust constructs his landscapes, but instead of being a passive 
filtration across the landscape it plays an active affective and agential role. This is clear in 
descriptive passages such as this: “le soleil me désignait au loin d’un doigt souriant ces cimes 
bleus de la mer qui n’ont de nom sur aucune carte géographique” (298). The smiling finger of the 
sun invites the narrator into a landscape new to human experience and understanding. The 
narrator repeatedly acknowledges this transformative power of light, noting that “[l]a diversité de 
l’éclairage ne modifie pas moins l’orientation d’un lieu, ne dresse pas moins devant nous de 
nouveaux buts qu’il nous donne le désir d’attendre, que ne ferait un trajet longuement et 
effectivement parcouru en voyage” (298). Beyond a simple perceptual difference, lighting can 
create desire, and specifically here, the desire for motion, the aesthetic pleasure of the voyage.  
The use of light as an active participant in the affective and aesthetic effects of a given 
scene is present from the novel’s beginning. Roger Shattuck traces Proust’s use of optical 
imagery through the Recherche, beginning with the novel’s incipit: “The first objects distinct 
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from the I mentioned in À la recherche appear in the second sentence: Marcel’s candle and his 
eyes. […] This strand of imagery, linking not so much things seen as particular circumstances or 
modes of vision, never slackens through three thousand pages of text” (6). Before looking 
closely at what this opening passage shows us about the use of light in Proust, it will be helpful 
to give a counterexample to illustrate a more classic use of light as the source of positive 
knowledge. In the scene following the opening passage, as the narrator recalls himself as a 
distraught child waiting for his mother to come kiss him before bed, light serves an 
epistemological function. It helps the narrator organize the household and anticipate motion. 
While he is waiting outside his room, hoping his mother will come to give him the bedtime kiss 
his father has forbidden, he knows his mother is finally coming upstairs because of the “lumière 
projetée” by her candle (35). This light brings him relief, which then turns to fear when, once she 
has come to him, he sees that “le reflet de la bougie de mon père s’élevait déjà sur le mur” (35). 
However, this association of light with positive knowledge is not typical of the use of light in the 
Recherche. Even in this scene, the light may correctly indicate the motions of his parents, but it 
provokes an incorrect emotional response as the anticipated fury of his father never manifests. 
Throughout the novel’s opening and beyond, light is a form of visual and imaginative play. It is 
more like a material substance with shapeshifting qualities than a source of understanding, and it 
is as likely to conceal knowledge or mislead as it is to indicate the truth.  
 In the opening passage, the reverie of the half-sleeping narrator “empêchait [mes yeux] 
de se rendre compte que le bougeoir n’était plus allumé” (3). Light is doubly negated by the 
absence of candlelight and the sleeper’s inability to have visual contact even with the darkness. 
Even the absence of light cannot be known for certain. Later, the narrator remarks on the 
experience of the invalid waiting for morning in a hotel room when their joy at seeing “une raie 
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de jour” appear under their door turns to suffering when they realize that they are mistaken and 
the light is merely someone passing by with a candle. The experience of light is concomitant 
with the experience of darkness, and the states of obscurity and illumination are constantly on the 
edge of slipping into one another. Proust gives the startling image of opening “les yeux pour 
fixer le kaléidoscope de l’obscurité” when briefly awakened in sleep (4). In real life, the varied, 
colorful patterns of the kaleidoscope are created by light pouring into the device, which seems in 
clear contrast to the uniform blackness of a darkened room. This inversion of the expected 
focuses our attention on illumination and obscurity as modes of seeing, perceptual lenses which 
reorganize and transform the object world. Darkness too can give textures and depths, patterns 
and shades. The verb “fixer,” which can mean to stare intently but also to stabilize, set, or fasten, 
seems also in contrast with the idea of the kaleidoscope’s constant motion and rearrangement. 
Patrick ffrench writes that “Proust’s figures conflate kaleidoscopic multiplicity with speed and 
rotation, finitude with immobility, suggesting that the stable image of things in front of us is due 
to the arrest of a flux of moving images” (15). The play of the fixed and the mobile, like that of 
darkness and light, is repeated throughout Proust’s images. 
This strange world in between wakefulness and sleep conflates light with darkness and 
immobility with motion, and it displaces the visual to focus on the narrator’s distorted experience 
of his other senses. In the same sentence that references the paradoxical kaleidoscope of 
obscurity, the narrator mentions two other possibilities of perceptual experiences happening in 
brief moments of wakefulness during otherwise deep sleep. He might hear the “craquements 
organiques des boiseries” or “goûter grâce à une lueur momentanée de conscience le sommeil où 
étaient plongés les meubles [et] la chambre” (4). The association of consciousness with a flash or 
a gleam might seem to return to an epistemological association of light with revelation, but what 
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is “revealed” to the narrator here is not the organized world but the flux of a world with stability 
melted away. This confusion of boundaries is pleasurable to the narrator’s half-sleeping 
consciousness. The sound of the wooden furniture creaking is organic, like the sound of the 
breath or the body shifting in rest. He can “goûter” (here, appreciate, but the verb also means to 
taste, another sensory evocation) not the reality of the furniture and the room around him, but the 
experience of them as sleeping alongside him.  
While the bedroom of the incipit and the Balbec bedroom from which the narrator 
watches the sea are temporally and geographically distinct, the two are linked by the use of the 
bedroom throughout the Recherche as a space of aesthetic contemplation. ffrench highlights that 
the narrator very often both perceives and imagines the world from the confines of his bedroom. 
He writes that for the narrator in the incipit “[i]n this primordial state [between sleeping and 
waking], before any certainty in relation to time and place, consciousness is consciousness of a 
room, but also, strangely, consciousness as a room, a chamber” (8). Throughout JF as well, 
Proust uses the narrator’s room as a way to thematize and to experiment with the positioning of 
the viewing subject. The narrator’s room, like the space of an art museum or of a cinema, is in 
some respects a standardized space from which the viewing (or listening, imagining, etc.) 
experience can happen. The narrator’s “habitude” makes the materiality of his room feel discreet 
and unobtrusive, in the way that public spaces for viewing art are designed to allow you to 
concentrate on the aesthetic experience at hand. The modern museum favors evenly spaced 
paintings along an otherwise neutral wall, and the comfortable seats and darkness of the cinema 
allows the viewer to focus their attention as completely as possible.   
 However, the personal and affective resonances of the space of the bedroom in the 
Recherche make it distinct from the public spaces of art consumption. From JF on, Elstir’s 
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method of decomposed viewing becomes the explicit model by which the narrator will (and in 
fact has already) interact(ed) with the world around him, but the narrative moments that best 
demonstrate these interactions are not when the narrator views Elstir’s paintings themselves. 
Rather, the repeated device of viewing through a window creates a diegetically real but 
nonetheless aestheticized space that invites us as readers to explore both the ways that texts 
construct imaginative space and the ways that we construct landscapes in and out of art. ffrench 
uses the famous optical device of the camera obscura explore how Proust is playing with space 
and perception in general. He writes,   
On the one hand, the novel is punctuated by recurrent scenes in which the narrator’s 
perception and knowledge of the outside world takes place in the interior space of his 
room. On the other hand, the security and certainty of this knowledge is compromised by 
the fact that, in the room, he is not a disembodied and abstracted subject, but a 
physiological presence, and one whose very presence is mined internally by the 
intermittences of time and of consciousness. (52) 
 
Like the narrator’s room, the camera obscura is a dark place from which to view the play of light 
and motion, but rather than merely assert this technical correspondence, ffrench argues for the 
particular physiological experience of the space of the bedroom. The narrator’s sick body or 
discomforted mind, his lapses in attention, his rhythms of sleeping and waking—all of these are 
built into the conceptual structure of the bedroom in Proust.  
The case of the Balbec dining room demonstrates that ffrench’s insights apply to cases of 
viewing even from spaces that are not the space of the bedroom. For ffrench, though Proust 
broadly adapts “the skeletal structure of the camera obscura, so to speak” he then “troubles it 
through the mutual complication of different senses, and through a pervasive attention to the 
surfaces or limits separating inside from outside” (52).  The Balbec dining room is a particularly 
apt demonstration of both points. In the case of the dining room, this public space is obviously 
linked to the physiological through the consumption of food, and, as discussed above, also 
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contains a certain associative porousness between inside and out when the items in the dining 
room are contrasted with or linked to the landscape outside the large windows. The smell and 
taste of food is the non-visual sensory experience par excellence of the Recherche, and the literal 
and figurative permeability of the dining room is repeatedly highlighted though the visual and 
literal contact with the sea and sea creatures discussed in my first chapter, and, as we saw above, 
in the reversal of the viewing experience when the diners become the spectacle for Balbec 
inhabitants watching them from outside.  
 This physiological grounding and sensory permeability characterize the narrator’s 
experiences of viewing, and with this basis established, we can turn our attention towards the 
sorts of things that he sees in the world, and that we “see” through Proust’s descriptions. A short 
passage from Autour de Mme Swann, the first section of JF, shows the strange world of light and 
space in the Recherche. In this passage, the narrator is musing on the lesson discussed in the 
previous chapter that the quality of milieu and the quality of object does not matter for artistic 
achievement. He explains that what is important for an artist is not their social situation or 
intellectual gifts per say, but rather “la faculté de les transformer, de les transposer” (172). Proust 
uses two metaphors to explain this transformative power, one using light, and one using space. 
These two descriptive metaphors echo the two main themes in Proust’s creation of textual 
landscapes: the importance of the material presence of light and the importance of a mixed 
horizontal and vertical perspective.  
Proust begins with a lamp: “Pour faire chauffer un liquide avec une lampe électrique, il 
ne s’agit pas d’avoir la plus forte lampe possible, mais une dont le courant puisse cesser 
d’éclairer, être dérivé et donner, au lieu de la lumière, de la chaleur” (172). Applied to artistic 
achievement, this model of derivation argues that what is important is not the concentration of 
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one quality, such as the abovementioned intellectual prowess or social positioning. Rather, what 
is critical is the ability to move in a different direction, at an oblique angle, towards an 
unexpected goal. “[L]a plus forte lampe possible” is a superlative description referring to 
extreme specialization in what is the main goal of a lamp, to provide light, but in this case where 
the goal is heating liquid, the desirable lamp is one where (emphasis mine) “le courant puisse 
cesser d’éclairer […],” both the verb pouvoir and the subjunctive tense pointing to the crucial 
value of possibility over certainty. This multifaceted use of light prefigures the association 
between light and liquid in the second part of JF, where light becomes a key player in the 
transformative game the narrator performs with the sky, sea, and glass around him. Proust’s 
second metaphor retains this focus on derivation, this time in spatial terms: “Pour se promener 
dans les airs, il n’est pas nécessaire d’avoir l’automobile la plus puissante, mais une automobile 
qui, ne continuant pas à courir à terre et coupant d’une verticale la ligne qu’elle suivait, soit 
capable de convertir en force ascensionnelle sa vitesse horizontal” (172). This model of 
horizontal force being converted to vertical force will serve as a guide for analyzing the creation 
of space in Proust’s seascape images, which are often structured by a descriptive move from a 
horizontal plane to a vertical plane, or vice versa, encouraging the reader to visualize in three 
dimensions.  
 Returning to the narrator’s Balbec bedroom, the following passage includes agential 
luminosity and perspectival play. Glimpsed through the window, the sea becomes a wild, 
mountainous landscape that changes in composition and location: 
[J]e retournais près de la fenêtre jeter encore un regard sur ce vaste cirque éblouissant et 
montagneux et sur les sommets neigeux de ses vagues en pierre d’émeraude çà et là polie 
et translucide, lesquelles avec une placide violence et un froncement léonin laissaient 
s’accomplir et dévaler l’écroulement de leurs pentes auxquelles le soleil ajoutait un 
sourire sans visage. Fenêtre à laquelle je devais ensuite me mettre chaque matin pour voir 
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si pendant la nuit s’est rapprochée ou éloignée une chaîne désirée—ici ces collines de la 
mer qui avant de revenir vers nous en dansant, peuvent reculer si loin que souvent ce 
n’était qu’après une longue plaine sablonneuse que j’apercevais à une grande distance 
leurs premières ondulations, dans un lointain transparent, vaporeux et bleuâtre comme 
ces glaciers qu’on voit au fond des tableaux des primitifs toscans. D’autres fois c’était 
tout près de moi que le soleil riait sur ces flots d’un vert aussi tendre que celui que 
conserve aux prairies alpestres (dans les montagnes où le soleil s’étale çà et là comme un 
géant qui en descendrait gaiment, par bonds inégaux, les pentes) moins l’humidité du sol 
que la liquide mobilité de la lumière. (297-298)   
Proust’s sea descriptions combine unlike notions to highlight the specificity of the aesthetic 
pleasure brought by each iteration of the sea view. Here, it is enormous like snowy mountains, 
and polished and transparent like precious stone. This strange mountain range changes distance 
from his window daily; some mornings he sees “à une grande distance leurs premières 
ondulations,” an effect he compares to “ces glaciers qu’on voit au fond des tableaux des primitifs 
toscans” highlighting both the spatial remove and the painterly echoes of the scene before him. 
Other days, “c’était tout près de moi que le soleil riait sur ces flots d’un vert aussi tendre que 
celui que conserve aux prairies alpestres […] moins l’humidité du sol que la liquide mobilité de 
la lumière.” In this description, the sea has changed in spatial orientation to come much closer to 
the window. Like the “doigt souriant” above, the sea “riait,” again associating light with action 
and joyous affect. The second part of the description plays with solidity and color by claiming 
that the “tendre” green of an alpine prairie is not due to the objective coloring of its vegetation 
but, like the green of the sea, to the liquid effect of light.  
 So far in the quotes I have used, the sea moves back and forth with relation to the 
window frame, but the viewer stays put. In the case of the last, however, this is not the case; the 
full quote askes the reader to visualize the landscape using a quasi-cinematic bird’s eye view. 
The ellipsis I inserted into the last quote (between “praires alpestres” and “moins l’humidité”) 
took the place of the parenthetical description of the sun in the mountains: “dans les montagnes 
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où le soleil s’étale çà et là comme un géant qui en descendrait gaiement, par bonds inégaux, les 
pentes.” To visualize this description, the reader must move from a vertical to a horizontal plane 
to imagine a point of view very high above to the mountains. It is only from here that we can 
grasp the effect of the irregular pattern the sun makes. While holding this point of view, they are 
visualizing the pattern not as a static one but as one created by the tracks of a giant as he 
gleefully leaps down between the peaks.13 
Textual Landscapes Beyond Ekphrasis  
 These descriptive marvels provide the reader with imaginative exercise and aesthetic 
pleasure within the Recherche, but they are also in dialogue with the long history of debate about 
what landscape representations should do. Two of Proust’s intertextual references for the 
Recherche, art critic John Ruskin and by the painter James McNeil Whistler, represent opposite 
points in this debate. Proust was fascinated by Ruskin’s work, producing French translations of 
The Bible of Amiens in 1896, and Sesame and Lilies in 1906. Whistler is one of the references 
Proust uses for the seascape images the narrator sees reflected in his room, as we saw above. The 
disaccord between the two on the proper method of landscape painting had both theoretical and 
practical consequences, culminating in Whistler’s libel suit against Ruskin following a negative 
review of a painting. The distinction between their ideas hinges on a disagreement about whether 
landscape should be the expression of a “specific truth,” in Ruskin’s words (205), or if it should 
be the expression of an impression. Having this debate in the background will allow us to see the 
originality of what Proust’s landscapes do, which is combine clarity and specificity with the 
acknowledgement and representation of changeability and impermanence. Looking at the former, 
 
13 This gigantesque orientation foreshadows the ‘elevated’ temporal position the reader is asked to consider in the 
description of humans as giants stretched in time at the end of Le Temps retrouvé (see chapter 4) 
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Ruskin writes in Modern Painters that expressing the specific truth of a landscape necessitates 
exactitude in the painted details. He writes, “there is no grandeur, no beauty of any kind, nothing 
but destruction, disorganization, and ruin, to be obtained by the violation of natural distinctions 
(208). His rhetorical rigor in this passage extends to the smallest details. He compares a sloppily 
painted rock, half granite and half slate, to a centaur, arguing that both are impossible in nature 
and therefore absurd. He reminds his reader that in the case of rocks and clouds, “the difficulty 
of observing [the distinctions between types] proves not the merit of overlooking them” (208). 
This is in contrast to Whistler’s use of an artistic practice privileging perceptual immediacy 
above all else in his Nocturnes.  
Ruskin’s negative review of Whistler’s Nocturne in Black and Gold hinged on the idea 
that the “eccentricities” and “impudence” of Whistler’s style blotted out the real landscape 
supposedly represented in favor of an incomprehensible play of colors and lines (“Cross-
Examination” 834). In aiming to represent a moment’s impression, Whistler’s Nocturne distorts 
or destroys the referential reality of the painted subject. For Ruskin, an aesthetic theorist 
interested in truth, no proper moral relationship to the world can exist without an attempt at 
accurate representation. By contrast, in his cross-examination at the trial, Whistler flatly denies 
that his painting has or should have any power to convey actual knowledge about a real 
landscape. His outright dismissal of accuracy as an important category for aesthetic judgement 
shows the deep gap between his practice and Ruskin’s theories. For Whistler, the question of the 
relationship of painting to the external world is irrelevant. In response to a question from the 
attorney-general clarifying whether Whistler’s Nocturne was a view of Cremorne, Whistler 
responded in the negative: “If it were called a view of Cremorne, it would certainly bring about 
nothing but disappointment on the part of the beholders” (836). This is radically different than 
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Ruskin’s insistence on exact observational detail even down to details viewers might have 
difficultly recognizing, such as granite versus slate. Whistler on the other hand not only denies 
the need for exactitude in detail, but indeed the need to create a painting that has any identifiable 
relationship at all with the location where it was painted.  
During his cross-examination, Whistler articulates what his paintings are trying to do and 
what they are trying to represent. He gives his definition of a Nocturne as an “arrangement of 
line, form, and color first, and I make use of any incident of it which shall bring about a 
symmetrical result” (835). A Nocturne is above all an arrangement of visual information 
organized according to a visual logic that is aimed at representing an impression for its own sake 
rather than accurately portraying on object. Such a method leaves room for “incident” in 
composition rather than obeying a previously conceived rational organizing design. The building 
blocks of these paintings are pure visual information as “line, form, and color” rather than 
broader conceptual categories. While discussing a second painting, his Nocturne in Blue and 
Silver, Whistler explains that “the thing is intended simply as a representation of moonlight” 
(836). Light is no longer a device that illuminates, conceals, or throws into relief the solid objects 
in a painting but rather the sole referential subject Whistler claims. As in Mary Corse’s work 
discussed in the introduction, light is not a component part or a means to an end here, but the 
substance of the painting itself. Returning to Nocturne in Black and Gold, Whistler explains that 
this “picture was painted not as offering the portrait of a particular place, but as an artistic 
impression that had been carried away” (837). As we will see below, Whistler’s description of 
his methodology is in line with Proust’s description of Elstir’s painting practice. What Proust 
identifies as Elstir’s “dénomination” permits him to represent our preconceptual “impressions 
véritables,” and here the “véritable,” the true, is only present in momentary impressions and not 
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conceptual knowledge (470). The close observation of the specific detail that Ruskin so highly 
recommends will not allow Whistler to paint moonlight or fireworks, nor will it allow Elstir to 
paint the ever-changing variations of sea and sky. As Darci Gardner writes in an essay on the 
relationship between perspectival distortions in Proust’s landscapes and their connection to the 
narrator’s misleading interpretation and presentation of events, “[i]n his narrative as in his 
picturing of landscapes, verisimilitude is not a priority” (139). Rather, the value of the narrator’s 
perspective is “is not in its accuracy but its unfamiliarity […]  reminding readers to relish the 
disorienting picture that he offers” (144). To represent the lights of Cremorne and the landscapes 
of Balbec, new theoretical and practical models must be created—and the genius of Proust is in 
both echoing these debates in the history of painting and simultaneously innovating on the 
representational power of the literary image.  
  In order to see how Proust’s non-painted seascapes differ from Elstir’s diegetic seascape 
paintings, we need to look closely at the methodology and descriptive specificity of JF’s long 
ekphrasis of the painter’s Port de Carquethuit. In the previous chapter, we saw examples of 
Elstir’s paintings, such as the “Miss Sacripant” painting of Odette Swann, that gain aesthetic 
power through vivid material presence. Carquethuit has a very different relationship to the 
material world. Jacques Rancière argues that the Recherche participates in what he calls “un 
théâtre de la défiguration,” in which artists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries moved away 
from classical notions of beaux-arts into new forms of artistic production, using Elstir as his 
primary example from the text (89). He writes, “[c]ette défiguration, Proust l’appelle 
dénomination, en qualifiant l’art de la sensation pure chez Elstir” and cites from JF: “si Dieu le 
père avait créé les choses en les nommant, c’est en leur ôtant leur nom, ou en leur en donnant un 
autre qu’Elstir les recréait” (77). Elstir’s seascapes attempt to capture pure visual sensation with 
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its attendant distortions of the properties of objects and the relationships between them. Rather 
than drawing attention to the “specific truth” of that landscape gleaned from the close 
observation of details, as Ruskin instructs, Elstir’s paintings reveal a perceptual truth drawn from 
close attention to experiential material. His method aims to dissolve even the most basic 
distinctions between objects to reveal them in their perceptual newness.  
 The primary example of this is the Le Port de Carquethuit ekphrasis. In this passage, 
Proust identifies the defining principle of Elstir’s work as the lack of distinction between natural 
and artificial elements. Elstir’s artistic innovation is in “n’employant pour la petite ville que des 
termes marines, et que des termes urbains pour la mer” (470). The painter forces himself to not 
take into account even the most basic of distinctions we use to organize and understand a real or 
painted landscape: “le peintre avait su habituer les yeux à ne pas reconnaitre de frontière fixe, de 
démarcation absolue, entre la terre et l’océan” (470). Our habitual differentiation between urban 
and natural, between land and sea, are undone in Elstir’s painting. Valazza writes of the Port de 
Carquethuit ekphrasis that though Proust describes Elstir’s use of “termes marines” to paint the 
town and “termes urbaines” to paint the sea as a metaphor, “il importe de ne pas prêter au mot 
‘métaphore’ son sens rhétorique […] car l’opération d’Elstir n’est nullement verbale, mais bien 
visuelle […] de sorte qu’on parlera de méta-figuration plutôt que de ‘métaphore’” (305). Like 
Rancière’s notion of de-figuration, Valazza’s notion of meta-figuration draws attention to the 
new visual strategies of Elstir’s paintings.  
For diegetic viewers, the power of the Port de Carquethuit painted hinges on its ability to 
mimic chance perceptual experience of disorientation in and disorganization of the object world. 
The narrator compares Elstir’s painting to his experience of glancing out his window at certain 
times of day and looking out “avec joie” at “une zone bleu et fluide sans savoir si elle appartenait 
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à la mer ou au ciel” (460). In that moment, the visual input does not allow the narrator to 
immediately identify the constituent parts of the view from his windows; the sensory experience 
of fluid blue for an instant is undefined, unattached to an object. This initial, accidental 
impression can last only a moment before the narrator’s intelligence reestablishes the distinctions 
between sea and sky, but it is Elstir’s genius to be able to capture in painting these moments of 
referential blur. He captures accidents such the “jeux d’ombres” hinting at new relationships 
between elements: a shadow reflected in water takes on “la dureté et l’éclat de la pierre;” in turn 
the rock becomes “aussi vaporeuse que l’ombre;” light refracts off boats and water “inventant 
comme de nouveaux solides” (473-474). However, this method, theoretically striking as it may 
be, does not translate into an imaginatively powerful image when compared to the other Balbec 
seascapes. 
Compared to the descriptions drawn from the narrator’s experience, the Porte de 
Carquethuit ekphrasis is impossible to imagine in any sort of perspective; rather it is a jumble of 
objects which resemble other objects, solids which resemble liquids, and vertical and horizontal 
planes without clear distinction: 
Soit que les maisons cachassent une partie du port, un bassin de calfatage ou peut-être la 
mer même s’enfonçant en golfe dans les terres […] de l’autre côté de la pointe avancée 
où était construite la ville, les toits étaient dépassés (comme ils l’eussent été par les 
cheminées ou par des clochers) par des mâts, lesquels avaient l’air de faire des vaisseaux 
auxquels ils appartenaient, quelque chose de citadin, de construit sur terre, impression 
qu’augmentaient d’autres bateaux, demeurés le long de la jetée, mais en rangs si pressés 
que les hommes y causaient d’un bâtiment à l’autre sans qu’on pût distinguer leur 
séparation et l’interstice de l’eau […]. (471) 
Proust’s other descriptions, which we will see below, use jarring perspectival shifts but 
nonetheless allow for moments of clarity which are not present in this ekphrasis. The “termes 
marines” and the “termes urbains” that make up the constituent parts of Elstir’s tableau are 
mixed together, as we have seen, but aside from this synthetic exchange of qualities Proust’s 
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description is largely composed of a wealth of deictic information without any clear point of 
origin. We learn that “les maisons cachassent une partie de port,” the ville is built on “la pointe 
avancée” (of what is not clear), and “les toits étaient dépassés [par des mâts]” but we learn after 
the sentence containing the passage cited above that “le premier plan” is of the beach (471). The 
perspective is not changing; rather, no perspective is ever established. This long ekphrasis, 
paradoxically, does not so much describe a view as elucidate a method—in contrast to the other 
seascapes of JF, which multiply viewing perspectives while retaining visual clarity.  
JF’s seascapes more closely resemble Diderot’s textual experiments in his Salons, that 
move beyond the simple description of a landscape as an artistic representation and into a 
landscape penetrated by the participatory consciousness of the viewer (reader). Baldwin 
explicitly connects Diderot’s Salons to Proust as both share a tendency to move “between 
descriptions of nature as art and art as nature” (2013: 133). Diderot’s interest in the question of 
how to render into text the experience of seeing a painting led to strikingly original techniques 
over his years of viewing and reviewing the salons. Paintings become the impetus for immersive 
imaginative explorations, and he plays with the fiction of entering them and moving around. 
Wilda Anderson describes his method thus: “[i]n several cases he even entered into the landscape 
and described it not from the position of at dominant exterior analytical eye but from the 
positions he successively held as he wandered from point to point. He experienced the paintings 
as events rather than describing them as objects” (190). The most notable example of this is 
1767’s so-called Promenade Vernet, where Diderot writes that he has left the salon in favor of a 
walk through the countryside, and at the end of his lengthy description of his walk he reveals that 
he has been discussing a set of seven Vernet landscapes the whole time. Proust, however, goes 
one step further and leaves the museum for good, inviting the reader to enter and explore 
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landscapes that are wholly literary in construction, that resemble paintings from some angles but 
add a depth and changeability that both resembles our real experience of the world, and appears 
wholly strange and marvelous. 
While painting is the paradigmatic non-literary artform in JF, the volume where narrator 
meets Elstir and learns his methodology of privileging first impressions over organized 
understanding, the diegetic seascapes of the volume are not only or primarily painterly in 
execution. This is not to say that painting is a step on the narrator’s artistic journey that he must 
overcome, but rather that his sustained engagement with Elstir’s painterly imagination and the 
“real” landscape of Balbec which has been nourishing it helps him better triangulate his own 
aesthetic interests and desires outside of the realm of painting. Elstir’s artistic methodology 
restores a preconceptual immediacy of impression that provides the overarching philosophical 
justification for the narrator’s deconstructions and reconstructions of the elements of his Balbec 
stay. By overfocusing on Elstir’s landscape theory and practice, though, we run the risk of 
missing the complexity of Proust’s descriptions of the sea and the sky in JF and other volumes. 
These descriptions embed multiple perspectives, textures, and motions within explicit frames to 
guide the reader to construct multi-dimensional, multi-layered conceptual images. These frames 
are most often the literal frame of a window, which is never a totally transparent partition meant 
to be forgotten but rather highlighted as a constitutive part of the scene (entailing sensory 
deprivation, cutting or reflecting the view, serving as its own horizontal plane, etc.). Proust’s 
landscapes play with perceptual boundaries, and especially mix two-dimensional and three-
dimensional effects in such a way that invites visualization but does not attempt to create 
something akin to real visual input, aesthetic or otherwise. The reader can engage with these 
different descriptive parts or levels with more or less intensity; while a close reading can 
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elucidate methodically the component ‘pieces’ of the image (though it might be more accurate to 
say the component views of the image), but readers will likely retain a more general sense of the 
scene or be particularly struck by a particular feature or angle. A returning reader will likely be 
struck by different details, meaning that these images shift and change diegetically for the 
narrator (i.e. throughout the day and in different weather), perspectivally for the reader in a 
single sitting, and imaginatively for the reader over multiple readings.    
A passage from the Recherche’s first volume shows both overlap with the Port de 
Carquethuit ekphrasis through of the use of light and darkness effects, referential blurring, and is 
distinguished from it by showing a dimensional immersion in landscape. The narrator describes 
how, on days when the weather was bad when he was a child, he had to stay inside and look out 
at “la campagne que l’obscurité et l’humidité faisaient ressembler à la mer (150). This anticipates 
both Elstir’s blend of land and sea in his paintings, and the “real” seascape the narrator will 
glimpse in many blended iterations at Balbec. The narrator then describes how “des maisons 
isolées, accrochées au flanc d’une colline plongée à la nuit et à l’eau, brillaient comme des petits 
bateaux qui ont replié leurs voiles et sont immobiles au large pour toute la nuit” (150). This 
description is in some ways the thematic inverse of the Porte de Carquethuit ekphrasis. Recall 
that in Elstir’s painting “les toits étaient dépassés […] par des mats lesquels avaient l'air de faire 
des vaisseaux auxquels ils appartenaient, quelque chose de citadin, de construit sur terre […].” In 
the narrator’s description of the countryside, the isolated houses seem to be boats that have 
stopped sailing for the night, whereas in the later ekphrasis perspectival distortion makes the 
boats crowded along the port appear to be constructions on land. In the first case, water and 
darkness make this impression possible, whereas the lack of visual depth is at the root of the 
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illusion in the second. The presence and absence of water and the use of optical impediments 
(darkness and lack of dimension) connect these two passages.  
 As we saw above when exploring Proust’s use of light, this description of the countryside 
in bad weather hinges on light as a material substance instead of an epistemological guide. The 
darkness makes the countryside seem like the sea and creates object confusion that goes beyond 
appearance and into substance, with solids becoming liquids. In the Port de Carquethuit 
ekphrasis, the play of light and dark is absent, but the distorted proximity of the rows of roofs 
and boats have the same effect. The viewer’s line of sight is blocked, and they are invited to 
revel in the potential conceptual mistakes that this causes rather than to try to reconstruct the 
actual scene. Outside of this conceptual blurring, though, the narrator’s description of the 
countryside has one quality the Port de Carquethuit ekphrasis lacks. The jumbled visual 
information of the ekphrastic picture provides an explicit demonstration of a certain 
methodology of perception, which, as Milovanovic writes, is not an end to itself for the narrator 
but rather “un moyen, un outil en même temps qu’une incitation à développer sa vision dans ce 
sens” (24). It lacks the feeling of immersion that is present in other landscape descriptions 
outside of the ekphrastic mode.   
 This countryside passage, however, uses weather is a method of moving from the purely 
visual to the phenomenological by layering sense information as an essential part of the 
description. While the countryside is initially something outside at which the narrator is looking, 
the description includes atmospheric information that challenges this relationship of 
inside/outside. In summer, bad weather is just “une humeur passagère, superficielle, du beau 
temps sous-jacent et fixe,” in contrast to winter’s “beau temps instable et fluide” (150). These 
multi-layered descriptions do not present weather as a changeable element on a stable surface but 
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rather as complex and self-contradictory. Summer’s good weather is “fixe,” but occasionally 
covered with spells of bad weather, but in winter good weather is “instable and fluide,” blending 
into bad weather. The references to weather, as we will see in my chapter conclusion with 
reference to Tim Ingold’s work, move us from the realm of the seen to the realm of the felt, the 
space of bodily immersion in the world.  
 Proust’s other descriptions, unlike the Port de Carquethuit ekphrasis, do have certain 
organizational features that can be, at least in part, clearly visualized. These multiperspectival 
seascapes in ask the reader to imagine them along several axes. On the one hand, there is the 
literal multiplicity of points of view in a technical sense, that is, the number of spatial 
orientations one can take in relation to the landscape. On the other, there is the invitation to layer 
our sensory impressions of these seascapes, that is to say, to look not just at the colors and forms 
as one might in a painting, but to focus on texture, on density, on motion and/or other sensual 
features. Shattuck’s work on optical imagery through the Recherche ultimately argues that a 
stereoscopic vision, that is, one that is formed from multiple discrete images, is the best model 
for understanding Proust. In response to the passage from TR quoted in my introduction about 
the narrator using a telescope to observe general laws rather than a microscope to observe small 
details, Shattuck writes “[t]elescopes, yes, but bi- or multi-ocular: on this I insist over and above 
Proust’s apt images. For À la recherche provides us with an image combined out of many 
images; a stereoscopic re-creation of the world in depth” (107). Earlier in his argument, he notes 
the importance of this idea of multiple images for imbuing the world with depth: “Depth, or what 
is called in optics penetration effect, cannot be found in a single image, a single instantané” (42). 
Proust plays constantly with the mirages of depth and flatness in his novel, as Bal, Baldwin, and 
ffrench discuss. Bal writes of the “écran diapré” of the Recherche, aruging that to understand the 
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visual world of the Recherche, the reader must engage in a “lecture plate” which is “orientée par 
l’image visuelle présentée comme une œuvre peinte […] elle se distingue d’une lecture 
esthétique qui prend les références à la peinture comme point de départ, comme énoncé plutôt 
que comme mode d’énonciation” (24). Painted images are not objects within the Recherche to 
view, but rather the visual world of text is itself a painted surface. Baldwin identifies “a picture 
plane” in the Recherche, which he defines as “a virtual threshold that delimits the closest virtual 
approach to the objects depicted on that literal surface can make to the viewer” (2013: 137). This 
effect flattens space in Proust by making real space more like the flat surface of a picture, 
blurring the line between ekphrasis proper and the description of “real” diegetic objects. ffrench 
uses the narrator’s hidden gaze into the sadistic lesbian scene in the Vinteuil living room in 
Combray to compare the narrator’s visual world to that of a screen rather than that of a real 
space: “the volume of the room is in this sense flattened, while the look is able to roam around it 
and to choose its objects of focus. It is a surface with a virtual depth, a screen rather than a stage” 
(109). The mobility of the cinematic screen is here preferred to the fixed image on the surface of 
a painting, but both intermedial resonances hinge on the lack of depth in Proust’s descriptive 
world.  
 However, this body of work on the idea of flatness risks obscuring the presence of depth 
in Proust images, particularly in these Balbec seascapes. Proust’s seascapes push the reader to 
extend their visualization in multiple directions. While we may start as a viewer on the other side 
of a window, we do not always stay there, and the way the reader must imagine these 
descriptions is more like looking into a glass box from the side and then from above than looking 
through one pane of glass in a window. In addition, just as it is through Elstir’s paintings that the 
narrator becomes conscious of his own interactions with the landscape around him, it is through 
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our imaginative work with complex landscapes such as Proust’s that we ourselves come to 
understand our own relationship to landscape and our own sense of being in space. These artistic 
interactions do not just teach us about art, but about the dynamic role our imagination plays in 
our view of the real spaces we inhabit. Framing is extremely important to the visual effects in JF 
but it is never meant to indicate a strong demarcation between the real and the aesthetic. Rather, 
it serves to highlight certain perceptual possibilities, creating a temporary sense of distance that 
jars the habitual relationships we have with the external world. The frame both defines an object 
for aesthetic appreciation and creates a space into which we can enter and with which we can 
engage.  
The volume’s emphasis on framing begins on the narrator’s train ride to Balbec. His 
physical state is highlighted before the visual is evoked: he feels a contrast of balance and motion 
which holds him pleasantly “en équilibre” through the opposing forces of his insomnia and the 
movement and noise of the train. His description of his physical state evokes immersion in the 
sea or the sky, prefiguring the Balbec landscapes in which he will soon find himself:  he is held 
in suspension like “quelque poisson qui dort dans la mer, promené dans son assouplissement par 
les courants et la vague, ou en quelque aigle étendu sur le seul appui de la tempête” (278). This 
physical comfort resulting from the combination of exciting and soothing forces introduces the 
double spectacle the narrator will have when the sun begins to rise, and in general the volume’s 
use of paradoxical terms to stretch the reader’s imaginative capacity. Here, the opposing forces 
that fascinate the narrator appear in alternating windows and introduce tension in two ways. 
There is the tension between the idea that a window frame, like a picture frame, could 
immobilize a piece of landscape with the fact of the landscape constantly changing through the 
window as the train speeds along. Then, there is the spatial and temporal contrast between the 
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two windows to which the narrator has access, one of which shows the continuing night and the 
other of which shows the beginning of the dawn: 
[D]ans le carreau de la fenêtre […] je vis des nuages échancrés dont le doux duvet était 
d’un rose fixé, mort, qui ne changera plus, comme celui qui teint les plumes de l’aile qui 
l’a assimilé ou le pastel sur lequel l’a déposé la fantaisie du peintre. Mais je sentais qu’au 
contraire cette couleur n’était ni inertie, ni caprice, mais nécessité et vie. Bientôt 
s’amoncelèrent derrière elle des réserves de lumière. Elle s’aviva, le ciel devint d’un 
incarnat que je tâchais, en collant mes yeux à la vitre, de mieux voir car je le sentais en 
rapport avec l’existence profonde de la nature, mais la ligne du chemin de fer ayant 
changé de direction, le train tourna, la scène matinale fut remplacée dans le cadre de la 
fenêtre par un village nocturne aux toits bleus de clair de lune, avec un lavoir encrassé la 
nacre opaline de la nuit, sous un ciel encore semé de tous ses étoiles, et je me désolais 
d’avoir perdu ma bande de ciel rose quand je l’aperçus de nouveau, mais rouge cette fois, 
dans le fenêtre d’en face qu’elle abandonna à un deuxième coude de la voie ferrée ; si 
bien que je passais mon temps à courir d’une fenêtre à l’autre pour rapprocher, pour 
rentoiler les fragments intermittents et opposites de mon beau matin écarlate et versatile 
et en avoir une vue totale et un tableau continu. (278-279) 
The narrator first notices “des nuages échancrés dont le doux duvet était d’un rose fixé, mort, qui 
ne changera plus” but he immediately introduces the potential of motion into this initially 
immobile description: “je sentais qu’au contraire cette couleur n’était ni inertie, ni caprice, mais 
nécessité et vie. Bientôt s’amoncelèrent derrière elle des réserves de lumière.” This is not merely 
the narrator’s logical understanding that the morning sky will become more illuminated as the 
sun rises, it is a gesture towards the paradox at the heart of visual art—how time is represented in 
space. As we saw in chapter one, Aubert argues that for Proust images “have a duration” rather 
than being “snapshots of external reality” (279). ffrench draws a contrast between duration and 
succession in theories of movement, with Proust and Henri Bergson on the side of the former and 
photographers like Étienne-Jules Marey and Eadweard Muybridge on the other. ffrench writes, 
“[t]he key distinction here is between a theorization of the moving image which thinks it as an 
animated series of static instants, and one which grasps movement as a distinct concept and 
object, irreducible to the abstraction of the instant” (19). Even the pink “fixé, mort” contains the 
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germ of its own transformation, the suggestion of “réserves de lumière” that will change its 
qualities and tones. Although there is not much dimensionality in this description, Proust is 
moving away from flatness with the deictic indicator “derrière,” giving the reader the impression 
of depth underlying the surface, of quantities of light building up behind the soft pink of the sky.  
As the train turns through the countryside, the window is filled with “un village nocturne 
aux toits bleus de clair de lune, avec un lavoir encrassé de la nacre opaline de la nuit, sous un ciel 
encore semé de toutes ses étoiles.” This new image is particularly effective because it is both a 
temporal progression in the life of the narrator (in that it is the second of the two scenes he 
views) and a temporal regression as well, a moment logically anterior to the preceding pink 
clouds. The sky is “encore” scattered with stars, although in the previous moment it was not so 
decorated. This nonlinear viewing helps the narrator and the reader focus on the intensity of the 
visual scene and its affective correlates (the narrator notes that looking at the second scene “je 
me désolais d’avoir perdu ma bande de ciel rose”), an impulse that will find its theoretical 
description later in the volume through the description of Elstir’s work. The narrator ends this 
scene in a state of happy motion, running back and forth between the windows to “rentoiler les 
fragments intermittents et opposites de mon beau matin écarlate et versatile et en avoir une vue 
totale et un tableau continu.” His aesthetic goal is to hold these contrasting and mobile visions 
together, creating a synthetic and immersive whole experience.  
The Balbec seascapes that follow the narrator’s arrival use proximity and distance as well 
as framing devices to orient the reader in multiperspectival images that initially unfold from a 
clear standpoint and become more complex as the description grows. The below seascape draws 
the reader’s attention to its frame, beginning with the narrator’s grandmother complaining that 
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she does not like being cut off from the feeling and smell of the sea by the enormous dining 
room windows:  
[I]l parut cruel à ma grand-mère de n’en pas sentir le souffle vivifiant à cause du châssis 
transparent mais clos qui, comme une vitrine, nous séparait de la plage tout en nous la 
laissant entièrement voir et dans lequel le ciel entrait si complètement que son azur avait 
l’air d’être la couleur des fenêtres et ses nuages blancs, un défaut du verre. Me persuadant 
que j’étais ‘assis sur le môle’ dont parle Baudelaire, je me demandais si son ‘soleil 
rayonnant sur la mer’, ce n’était pas—bien différent du rayon du soir, simple et 
superficiel comme un trait doré et tremblant—celui qui en ce moment brûlait la mer 
comme une topaze, la faisait fermenter, devenir blonde et laiteuse comme de la bière, 
écumante comme du lait, tandis que par moments s’y promenaient çà et là de grandes 
ombres bleues que quelque dieu semblait s’amuser à déplacer, en bougeant un miroir 
dans le ciel. (299) 
At first, these windows both mark an absolute distinction between the viewer and the object 
viewed and collapse the sense of depth a view of the sea would normally have. In addition to not 
being able to feel the sea breeze or smell the salt, the window makes the scene appear two-
dimensional: the blue of the sky “avait l’air d’être la couleur des fenêtres et ses nuages blancs, un 
défaut du verre.” This blue and white patterning on the vertical plane of the window surface 
gives way to a description of the surface of the sea, creating an intersecting horizontal plane as 
the narrator marvels at the colors and textures the sun is creating. The sun “brûlait la mer comme 
une topaze, la faisait fermenter, devenir blonde et laiteuse comme de la bière, écumante comme 
du lait.” This triple texturing—the smooth glean of a precious stone, the creamy thickness of 
beer, the foam of milk—both suggests the narrator’s wonder at the surface of the water and are 
linked together by a series of lose associations: the tawny color of the topaz becomes the blonde 
beer; the adjective “laiteuse” turns into the third element of comparison, “lait.”  
 The second part of this description of the sun on the sea also starts out with a pattern on a 
surface: “par moments s’y promenaient çà et là de grandes ombres bleues.” As with the “vert 
aussi tendre” above, these blue shadows on the tawny-blonde sunlit sea serve to highlight the 
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insufficiency of our habitual color descriptions. As these blue shadows are described, the reader 
must change perspective a third time, this as time we leave the close observation of the surface of 
the sea to take a bird’s eye view in watching these shadows “que quelque dieu semblait s’amuser 
à déplacer, en bougeant un miroir dans le ciel.” This god and his mirror occupy a horizontal 
plane parallel to but high above the plane of the sea, such that to be properly visualized the 
reader must imaginatively place themselves even higher to capture the interplay between the two 
parallel planes. This short description thus begins with restriction, in the form of the visual and 
sensual confinement of the window magnified by the initial description of the sky as the surface 
of the window itself, but then opens up to great complexity. The comparatively limited beginning 
of the vertical windowpane allows Proust to create the second horizontal pane of the surface of 
the sea, which is then fleshed out with three descriptive textures, and finally the scene is opened 
up fully into three dimensions in the image of the god reflecting his mirror on the surface of the 
sea.  
 The visual effects of this volume hinge on this play with framing, even in the absence of 
a literal window. In the following passage, a row of flowers provides the frame with which 
Proust plays with perspective, size, and depth. The narrator is observing “ces jeunes fleurs qui 
interrompaient en ce moment devant moi la ligne de flot” and “entre lesquelles teint tout le trajet 
de l’océan parcouru par quelque steamer” (431). The choice of nouns emphasizes largeness—
ocean instead of sea, steamer instead of boat—but the rest of the passage miniaturizes these 
component parts. The description initially asks the reader to hold foreground and background in 
mind to visualize this image in the appropriate perspective: a row of normally sized flowers in 
the foreground and the distant but normally sized steamer in the background. The second half, 
however, reduces the entire scene to an Alice in Wonderland-esque play of inappropriate sizes, 
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setting up a race between a butterfly and the tiny glide of the ship. The steamer is “si lent à 
glisser sur le trait horizontal et bleu qui va d’une tige à l’autre,” a description that reduces the 
span of the ocean to a single line connecting two flower stalks (431). A “papillon paresseux” 
could outrace the ship, arriving first at the “premier pétale de la fleur vers laquelle [le steamer] 
navigue” (431). The butterfly thus appears giant, lazily bounding from stalk to stalk while the 
ship struggles to reach its distant destination. Whatever the actual destination of the ship may be 
is irrelevant; like the butterfly, it is simply navigating towards the next flower.  
The prominence of the sea in the Recherche diminishes when the narrator leaves Balbec 
at the end of Sodome et Gomorrhe. The novel’s final scene in his bedroom both recalls and 
ruptures the Balbec landscapes we have seen until this point. The narrator, determined to leave 
Balbec with Albertine to prevent a suspected lesbian liaison, says he has never known a morning 
“si belle ni si douloureuse” (512). The adjectives refer both to an outside, visual judgement, and 
an interior emotional state. The passage that follows, however, invests the physical world with 
intent, blurring the line between objective and subjective input and interpretation: 
En pensant à tous les paysages indifférents qui allaient s’illuminer et qui la veille encore 
ne m’eussent rempli que de désir de les visiter, je ne pus retenir un sanglot quand, dans 
une geste d’offertoire mécaniquement accompli et qui me parut symboliser le sanglant 
sacrifice que j’allais avoir à faire de toute joie, chaque matin, jusqu’à la fin de ma vie, 
renouvellement solennellement célébré à chaque aurore de mon chagrin quotidien et du 
sang de ma plaie, l’œuf d’or du soleil, comme propulsé par la rupture d’équilibre 
qu’amènerait au moment de la coagulation un changement de densité, barbelé de 
flammes comme dans les tableaux, creva d’un bond le rideau derrière lequel on le sentait 
depuis un moment frémissant et prêt à entrer en scène et à s’élancer, et dont il effaça sous 
des flots de lumière la pourpre mystérieuse et figée. (512-513) 
 The narrator has lost all interest in the landscapes that surround him, but the light of the rising 
sun nonetheless penetrates his room and forces a limited but ultimately profound awareness of 
his immersion in the world around him. As the passage builds to the image of the dawn, a 
lexicon of suffering builds poetic and emotional power: “sanglot” “sanglant” “sang.” The rising 
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sun is described on three levels: its internal material status, its artistic resonances, and its 
physical imposition in the narrator’s room. Materially, there is the following description: “l’œuf 
d’or du soleil, comme propulsé par la rupture d’équilibre qu’amènerait au moment de la 
coagulation un changement de densité.” The sun is initially seen by its shape, a golden egg, but 
the rest of the phrase indicates an unstable internal process that is underway, parallel to the 
disequilibrium of the narrator’s own internal state exemplified in his sudden decision to bring 
Albertine to Paris with him.  
 In the second part of the description, the sun-egg is “barbelé de flammes comme dans les 
tableaux.” From an object with its own materiality and interiority, the sun becomes a codified 
image from a painting. In the final part of the description, the sun is neither material process nor 
painted image, but an actor in its own right, imbued with theatrical agency: the sun “creva d’un 
bond le rideau derrière lequel on le sentait depuis un moment frémissant et prêt à entrer en scène 
et à s’élancer, et dont il effaça sous des flots de lumière la pourpre mystérieuse et figée.” Two 
things are happening here: the binary between the viewing subject and the represented object is 
overturned, and the frame that has structured so many images we have seen is dissolved in a 
wash of light. This sequencing of the image of the rising sun from active-unconscious (physical 
progress) to passive-unconscious (represented imaged) to active-conscious (theatrical actor) 
represents the slipperiness of our interactions with the external world. The final image of the 
“flots de lumière” washing away the rest of the scene brings us to the paradox of light—while it 
is the only thing that makes it possible to see the world, it can also inhibit viewing entirely. This 
brings us back to Mary Corse’s light paintings: going beyond the “mere” absence of visual input, 
her paintings even destabilize our point of view within light, showings its changing 
reflectiveness from different angles and doubly decentering the viewer (there is no image, but 
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even this lack of image is subject to perspectival change). The reader can feel similarly awash in 
Proust’s triple description of the rising sun: the multiple visual referents (egg, barbed flames) and 
‘felt’ state changes (coagulation) have asked us to both see and feel the object in question, and 
the final image ascribes agency to the light “frémissant et prêt à entrer en scène,” like an eager 
actor waiting in the wings whose entrance will ultimately engulf the entire stage. 
The collapse of the strict demarcation of a frame and the revelation of the permeability of 
interior and exterior, reality and art, leads us into our concluding considerations about the ways 
in which represented landscape can attune us to the real land around us. Tim Ingold’s essay on 
landscape “Earth Sky Wind Weather” begins by discussing the difficulties of accurately 
depicting the land around us by using the example of amateur drawings of the earth and sky. In 
the two studies he uses as examples, children and adults were asked either to draw the earth and 
sky, or to choose an image from a set that most closely represents how they imagine them. They 
came up with various solutions to the difficulty of this task, such as drawing a line around a 
spherical earth to represent the sky (S22, fig. 2A) or choosing a representation of a spherical 
earth but surrounded by the sky we would see looking up from the earth’s surface (S23, fig. 3). 
These imperfect solutions demonstrate, in Ingold’s words, “the perspectival double-take involved 
in the attempt to combine the spherical earth and the sky in the same picture” (S23). Though 
Proust formulates them quite differently, JF grapples with the same perspectival issues. He 
frequently evokes the horizon line in the need to represent the earth and sky together. This 
curved line is the source of perspectival delights and distortions, the place where the two spheres 
of sea and sky blur and become indistinct, as in the narrator’s reverie at the window before 
dining at Rivebelle: “Parfois l’océan emplissait presque toute ma fenêtre, surélevée qu’elle était 
par une bande de ciel bordée en haut seulement d’une ligne qui était du même bleu que celui de 
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la mer, mais qu’à cause de cela je croyais être la mer encore” (438). The visual irreconcilability 
of our scientific understanding of the world and our perspectival experience of it is underlined 
again and again in this volume.  
Ingold uses these representational difficulties to move away from conceptualizing the 
outside world as a set of objects that could be accurately represented, cognitively or aesthetically, 
were we to have the right perspective. Rather, he writes of our actual experience of inhabiting the 
world that  
It is a world […] of formative and transformative processes. If such processes are of the 
essence of perception, then they are also of the essence of what is perceived. To 
understand how people can inhabit this world means attending to the dynamic processes 
of world-formation in which both perceivers and the phenomena they perceive are 
necessarily immersed. And to achieve this we must shift our attention from the congealed 
substances of the world, and the solid surfaces they present, to the media in which they 
take shape, and in which they may also be dissolved. (S28) 
Ingold’s media are wind and weather, and he argues that we are immersed in these media and not 
outside of them. Our engagement with these media allows us to touch and change the world 
around us, and we share our immersion with other things present around us. Using the examples 
of a painter painting a tree that is blowing in the wind and of a kite being flown, he writes “t is 
not, then, the tree that moves the painter, any more than it is the kite that moves the flyer. Rather, 
the resonant movements of the flyer and the kite in the one case, and of the painter and the tree in 
the other are founded in their common immersion in the currents of the medium” (S30-31). 
Ingold uses the term “resonance” here to mean the communicative and influential mutual actions 
of elements sharing a medium. The tree is not a passive participant in the painter’s experience; it 
is active within the immersive landscape that they share and its motions impact the painter’s 
range of aesthetic responses.  
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 In JF, the medium is landscape in its spaces of transformation. Rather than land or art, 
the narrator inhabits the space in between where becoming is an aesthetic process. JF is 
constantly dissolving together objects and properties that should be distinct: boats become 
immobile as buildings or are absorbed into the horizon, the sea and sky are indistinguishable, the 
light which surrounds the Balbec diners bathes them like water. This blending finds its 
theoretical anchor in the methodology of first perceptions that the narrator learns from Elstir, but 
it is a leitmotif of the reader’s experience of Balbec as a whole. The volume offers the same 
lesson in conceptual blending to the reader. The density of descriptive information presents the 
reader over and over again with views of the sea, usually the real sea within the narrative, but 
their descriptions are laced with references of specific artists, to artistic construction and 
arrangement, to the material conditions of framing, to purposeful light effects, to theater stages, 
etc. The reader is neither strolling alongside the literal sea out there in the world nor through a 
collection of tableaux presented as ‘Views of Balbec,’ rather, they are invited to imaginatively 
participate in the construction of these landscapes.  
 Some of these descriptions are likely to be remembered by a first-time reader—including 
the Port de Carquethuit ekphrasis, the euphoric train sunrise, and the changing bedroom window 
views—but these seascape images are so embedded in the volume that an attentive reader diving 
back in could pull out seemingly endless examples. As readers, we must sustain our engagement 
with landscape the same way the narrator sustains his, both actively nuancing our viewing 
powers and passively letting ourselves notice the elements around us. Landscape is constantly 
becoming and unbecoming; it can be an unnoticed backdrop, a secret treasure, a pedagogical 
tool. These immersive images take on a life of their own. To return to Andrews’ terminology, 
there can be no land in the Recherche properly speaking. All land description is already art for 
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the reader, and the curious eye of the narrator means that even diagetically what he sees should 
be identified as landscape. There is no land “out there” to perceive, there is only the learned 
process of perception, construction, and appreciation that governs how we learn to see in the 
Recherche.  
 In his work on the status of the image in culture, Mitchell writes that what interests him 
about images is not the ambiguity of the word, but instead “the particular tendency of images to 
absorb and be absorbed by human subjects in processes that look suspiciously like those of living 
things” (2005: 2). The seascapes of JF and beyond possess this organic-seeming plasticity, 
generating multitudinous variations throughout the text and proving continuously fascinating to 
readers and critics. Mitchell writes of the different between an image and a picture that “[y]ou 
can hang a picture, but you cannot hang an image. The image seems to float without any visible 
means of support, a phantasmatic, virtual, or spectral appearance” (2005: 85). Proust’s seascapes 
tease the line between image and picture, proposing “means of support” in the form of framing 
devices but complicating this relationship in a variety of ways. A frame can be a window frame, 
solid and immobile, but the landscape outside it is in continuous flux. A frame can be a chance 
reflection into the windows of a bookshelf, doubly removed from the original and gloriously 
impermanent. A frame can be improvised between blades of grass. A frame can be exceeded by 
an outpouring of light. In order to hang a picture, it must be supported on something real. In 
order to “hang” a picture in our minds, Proust gives us the solidity of a frame, but never ceases to 
remind us that literary images cannot be so easily contained. We can freeze them and enjoy them 
for a moment, but then we must give them back to the flow of the narrative which takes us on to 
another perspective, another dimension, or another view entirely.  
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 Freed-Thall’s concept of nuance provides another lens through which to understand these 
multiplying seascapes. She writes, “[u]nderstood in the simplest sense, nuance is nothing more 
(or less) than every day, minimal variation, such as one might see the slowly changing textures 
of a cloud” (66). The constant changes of time and weather and orientation all create subtle shifts 
between viewing instances in Proust, and, as I have argued, even within a single viewing 
instance, whether the narrator’s diegetic viewing or the reader’s imagined viewing. The sea itself 
is a constantly shifting terrain, and the narrator’s attentiveness both to the consistent fluctuation 
of wave patterns as well as external influences and his own intermittently distracted disposition 
does not result in dramatic or total shifts. Rather, these fluctuations explore the tension between 
the boundlessness of possible representations of the sea with the biological and formal 
constraints of viewing: our visual and cognitive constraints, the frame of a work of art, the 
window frame, and delineation of a textual image all being examples of these constraints.  
 While Proust is not notably an ecological thinker, Freed-Thall recognizes that this 
Proustian “aesthetics of nuance implies a formalism of blurred contours and borders and a queer 
ecology that attunes us to the cloudy zone of contact between subject and object, and to the drift 
and transmutation of a subtly shifting lived environment” (67). This idea of “queer ecology” 
connects to several of the ideas I have been working with: Mitchell’s ideas about the liveliness of 
images (an image ecology); the breakdown of perspective and the dissolution of a clear subject 
perceiving a clear object; and the inability to separate the perceiving and judging mind from the 
feeling and suffering body. Ingold is helpful here in theorizing these interrelations happening in 
the context of viewing a seascape. This viewing happens along multiple intersections: the 
intersection of land and sea, of course, but also the intersection of internal and external. Ingold 
helps us rethink our understanding of how we engage with the experience of being outdoors: “To 
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feel the wind is not to make external, tactile contact with our surroundings but to mingle with 
them. In this mingling, as we live and breathe, the wind, light, and moisture of the sky bind with 
the substances of the earth in the continual forging of a way through the tangle of life-lines that 
comprise the land” (S19). We are never separate from the things we see and hear and feel when 
outdoors; we are penetrating and penetrated, partaking and creating. This is particularly rich way 
to think about our relationship as readers to Proust’s written landscapes: we are not merely 
receiving these images and marveling at their technical detail and imaginative flourish, but rather 
















CHAPTER 3: ENERGY 
 This immersion in a living landscape is on full display in Tanya Tagaq’s 2018 novel Split 
Tooth. Her protagonist visits the Northern Lights, and describes her experience as a combination 
of light, sound, motion, and sensation:  
A small sliver of green light begins to pulsate in the sky. Cold bites my face, numbing it 
after a quick stab of pain. Frostbite. Exhalations are collection in a thick coating of ice on 
my scarf but I like it. Northern Lights are always worth the cold. Legend says that if you 
whistle or scream at them, they will come down and cut off your head. This is ridiculous, 
but I admit to running home quickly when the whole horizon is full of light and the 
movement of the roaring green thunder shakes my vertebrae like dice. (55)  
This passage contains several themes that came up in our discussion of Proust’s landscapes: the 
physiological conditions of viewing (here, the freezing cold), the horizon line, the materiality of 
light. The world described is intensely energetic: the light “pulsate[s] in the sky” and fuses with 
sound, becoming the “roaring green thunder” that shakes the protagonist’s body. In contrast to 
the bodily impact and the threat of danger of Tagaq’s landscape, JF’s seascape images were in 
part defined and circumscribed by the frame of the window, which had the effect of limiting 
certain kinds of sensual content, namely smell and sound, as the narrator’s grandmother 
complains. This is not the case for Proust’s wartime cityscapes included in Le Temps retrouvé 
(henceforth TR). Here, planes drench Paris with sound: “C’était l’époque où il y avait 
continuellement des raids de gothas, l’air grésillait perpétuellement d’une vibration vigilante et 
sonore d’aéroplanes français” (84). The word “vibration” combines auditory and kinetic 
information and, when linked to the word “vibrant” or “vibrancy,” implies a particular kind of 
vision as well. This phrase reaffirms the ever-present nature of this felt noise: the raids happened 
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“continuellement,” the air cracked “perpétuellement,” and the vibration was “vigilante.” In this 
repeated underlining of this constant auditory-kinetic presence, we can see it as a backdrop or 
accompaniment to the narrator’s experience of wartime Paris. The sound and sight of planes co-
constitute their perceptual input and ask the reader to extend their imaginative scene beyond the 
simply visual. The overall effect is to inject imaginative energy into the text, energy generated by 
and yet exceeding the words used to construct these vibrant images. This chapter explores how 
Proust uses evocations of light, sound, motion, and fragmentation to create this image-energy.  
Motion, in particular, is a major component of theory about ekphrastic writing, and critics 
vary in their analysis of how and if motion can be conveyed in literary description.14 Ekphrasis is 
traditionally viewed as a still point within a narrative flow. By halting the action of a plot 
unfolding through time, ekphrasis, and literary description more generally, is often construed as 
necessarily immobile. To give two examples: Jean Hagstrum writes of the sister arts tradition 
that “[t]he pictorial in a verbal medium necessarily involves the reduction of motion to stasis or 
something suggesting such a reduction. It need not eliminate motion entirely, but the motion 
allowed to remain must be viewed against the basic motionlessness of the arrangement” (xxi). 
That is to say, the mobility of the pictorial is reduced or eliminated when expressed in writing. If 
motion remains, it remains against a static background. Murray Krieger writes that ekphrasis 
 
14 Brosch gives the following short history of theories of narrative stillness and ekphrasis: “Accordingly, from the 
idea that ekphrasis is committed to representing a preexisting visual object, it followed necessarily that it is 
primarily descriptive and hence a static element in an otherwise dynamic narrative. Lessing’s preference for poetry 
as a narrative art proceeded from the temporal restraint in painting established in the Renaissance that prohibited 
figural simultaneity and hence pictorial narrativity, on the assumption that in a picture ‘we are observing a scene 
through the frame from a fixed vantage point at one moment in time’ (Steiner 1988: 23). This convention—better 
known under the label of linear perspective— was naturalized by viewers in the Western world. It was Murray 
Krieger in particular who imported Lessing’s distinction into twentieth-century theory, regarding ekphrasis as a 
response to pictorial stasis that creates an arrest or ‘still’ point in an event-driven narrative (Krieger 1992: 266). John 
Hollander also claimed that ekphrasis aspires to a pictorial stasis contrasting with the temporal succession of verbal 




constitutes “a miracle because a sequence of actions filled with befores and afters such as 
language alone can trace seems frozen into an instant’s vision” (xvii). In this view, motion is 
inherent in the temporal flow of language but this flow can be momentarily stilled in the special 
case of ekphrasis. In Hagstrum’s analysis, the assumption that visual art closely approximates 
real objects leads to the observation that some sort of reduction of motion necessarily occurs in 
the less sensual and thus less mimetically rich verbal form. In Krieger’s, language unfolding in 
time necessarily contains its own mobility and must be stilled to present a coherent visual 
impression.  
It is against this background of analysis of narrative motion and pictorial stillness that 
Bill Brown re-reads the first and most famous example in most histories of ekphrasis: Achilles’ 
shield in the Iliad. Brown argues that in ekphrastic interpretations of this passage “ontological 
ambiguity has been elided on behalf of rhetorical analysis” (2). This “rhetorical analysis” 
distracts from the fact that this shield is neither the words that describe it nor the shield as it 
would ‘really’ be if it were a real object. Rather, the fictional shield has an animation that 
exceeds both the literary and the literal. Brown continues, “Achilles’ shield has served as the 
archetypal instance of ekphrastic poetry. In that service animate matter has been fettered into 
immobility, fixed between the pictorial and the verbal, the image and the world” (2). His 
counter-analysis of the famous shield outlines its specific mobility, arguing that Achilles’ shield 
is animate, but not with an animation with which we are familiar from lived life. Rather than 
moving through an action, completing it, and moving to another action, the figures on the shield, 
in Homer’s description, repeat the same motions: dancing, reaching towards the beloved, etc. in 
perpetuity. The shield is not a static object that becomes a narrative one, nor is it a moment of 
arrest in a forward-flowing narrative. Its figures are instead cycling endlessly through the same 
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actions or gestures. Following Brown, we will explore how Proust’s images operate outside of 
the paralysis between the visual and the verbal, and how Proust constructs instead an imaginative 
motion outside of the forward narrative push of the novel form, and outside of “ordinary” daily 
motion.  
Within my analysis, motion is a subcategory of energy within Proust’s texts. A cluster of 
descriptive tactics, including the use of light, non-progressive motion, aural and kinetic sensory 
information, and visual fragmentation encourage the reader to visualize images as energetic 
rather than static, but this energy is non-mimetic. Rather, it hinges on sensations of unfamiliarity, 
surprise, and disorientation in the moment of viewing. These sensations are both signaled to the 
reader by the narrator’s own reactions and brought about by their own imaginative experience. 
This chapter looks at the ways in which Proust’s energetic images aid in developing two themes 
in the Recherche: the portrayal of World War I, which hinges around the appearance of planes 
over Paris, and the character development of Saint-Loup, who is repeatedly inscribed in the text 
as fantastically mobile. In both cases, Proust creates images with a particular vibrancy which is 
neither static description nor narrative motion, but which gives the reader a particularly 
pleasurable aesthetic effect in that this motion does not seem to resemble anything we have 
really seen in our own experience of fast-moving people or flying planes. Unlike my first two 
chapters, which looked at images with a long history in visual art, still lifes and landscapes, this 
chapter specifically addresses the question of how literature treats non-aesthetic sensory 
experience. In the case of planes, this newness is literal and technological, but the distinct 
manner in which Saint-Loup is portrayed shows that this newness is more a question of 
descriptive technique than object described. The imagistic portrayal of energy is linked to the 
exploration of new experience in both cases.  
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Proust’s Planes at the Limit of Representation  
The first significant scene of planes in the Recherche occurs pre-war in Sodome et 
Gomorrhe, as the narrator takes a horseback ride alone to see the Verdurins (416). Proust 
anchors this scene in a sense of emotional, geographical, and temporal distance, preparing the 
reader for the irruption of a new and surprising experience. At the time of his ride, the narrator is 
experiencing a rare “désir d’évasion” during a period in his life when he is almost always with 
Albertine (416). The text couples this desire for escape with a feeling induced by the landscape 
of being out of time in an extreme past. The route he follows is described as “sauvage” as are the 
gorges he passes (416). This notion of the “sauvage” in the landscape is associated with ideas 
about roughness and bareness: he is surrounded by “rochers dénudés” and glimpses the sea 
through their “déchirures” (416). This rough-hewn landscape seems to be made up of “fragments 
d’un autre univers” (416). This alien terrain is quickly revealed to be one through which the 
narrator and the reader have imaginatively journeyed before: “le paysage montagneux et marin 
qu’Elstir a donné pour cadre à ces deux admirables aquarelles […] que j’avais vues chez la 
duchesse de Guermantes [in Le Côte de Guermantes 407-409]” (416-417). The narrator is so 
struck by this memory of Elstir’s watercolors that “le souvenir replaçait les lieux où je me 
trouvais tellement en dehors du monde actuel que je n’aurais pas été étonné si, comme le jeune 
homme de l’âge antéhistorique que peint Elstir, j’avais au cours de mon promenade croisé un 
personnage mythologique” (417). These natural and aesthetic references work together to 
dislocate the narrator from specificities of place and time, detaching him from the real world and 
letting him drift into a sort of reverie where the scope of possibility is wider than usual.  
His reveries are interrupted when  
Tout à coup mon cheval se cabra ; il avait entendu un bruit singulier, j’eus peine à le 
maîtriser et à ne pas être jeté à terre, puis je levai vers le point d’où semblait venir ce 
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bruit mes yeux plein de larmes, et je vis à une cinquantaine de mètres au-dessus de moi, 
dans le soleil, entre deux grades ailes d’acier étincelant qui l’emportaient, un être dont la 
figure peu distincte me parut ressembler à celle d’un homme. Je fus aussi ému que 
pouvait l’être un Grec qui voyait pour la première fois un demi-dieu. Je pleurais aussi, car 
j’étais prêt à pleurer du moment que j’avais reconnu que le bruit venait d’au-dessus de 
ma tête—les aéroplanes étaient encore rares à cette époque—à la pensée que ce que 
j’allais voir pour la première fois c’était un aéroplane. Alors, comme quand on sent venir 
dans un journal une parole émouvante, je n’attendais que d’avoir aperçu l’avion pour 
fondre en larmes. Cependant l’aviateur sembla hésiter sur sa voie ; je sentais ouvertes 
devant lui—devant moi si l’habitude ne m’avait pas fait prisonnier—toutes les routes de 
l’espace, de la vie ; il poussa plus loin, plana quelques instants au-dessus de la mer, puis 
prenant brusquement son parti, semblant céder à quelque attraction inverse de celle de la 
pesanteur, comme retournant dans sa patrie, d’un léger mouvement de ses ailes d’or il 
piqua droit vers le ciel. (417)  
Into the antediluvian painted scene the narrator has been enjoying irrupts a decidedly unnatural 
sound—or to be more precise, the scene responds abruptly to what is later identified as a sound. 
In general, this scene highlights the newness and the striking power of the narrator’s first 
experience with a plane by breaking down the sensory information he receives into discrete 
chunks. He feels the physical jolt of his horse rearing and is at first occupied with the struggle of 
remaining seated and calming his mount before he can attend to the noise that triggered the 
horse’s response. The narrator feels his horse’s physical response and hears the plane before he 
sees it, and it is only several lines later in the passage that the word “aéroplane” appears, as well 
as the explanation for the narrator’s immediate tears.  
Once the narrator has calmed his horse and raised his eyes to the sky, the vision he sees is 
full of strong sensory impressions and perceptual and perspectival impossibilities. We have just 
learned that his eyes are full of tears, but this liquid screen does not seem to impede the scene he 
sees fifty meters above him: “dans le soleil, entre deux grandes ailes d’acier étincelant qui 
l’emportaient, un être dont la figure peu distincte me parut ressembler à celle d’un homme.” The 
qualifier “peu distincte” does little to downplay the astonishing suggestion that the narrator, 
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looking through tears and into the sun, could make out the face of the person piloting the plane. 
Moreover, though he is on the ground looking up, he is apparently seeing the plane head-on. He 
is thus seeing the outline of a man framed by two giant steel wings and silhouetted by the sun, a 
metal man-bird surrounded by flame. This surreal, quasi-religious vision announces the next 
simile, which returns to the mythological theme introduced earlier in the reference to Elstir’s 
watercolors: “Je fus aussi ému que pouvait l’être un Grec qui voyait pour la première fois un 
demi-dieu.” The mythological figure he half-expected to meet has arrived, but rather than a 
figure from the past or a figure from a mythological time-out-of-time, he is seeing a figure from 
the extreme edge of the present. It is only after this comparison that we get the sentence that 
explains the narrator’s tears and positively identifies the object he is looking at as an airplane.  
The relationship of sensory experience to positive knowledge here is doubly complex. 
The narrator’s visual confirmation that the sound he is hearing is an airplane is the last part of his 
identification. Having never heard an airplane, though, this sound-identification is not based on 
familiarity. He is not identifying a delocalized sound but rather using the spatial location of the 
sound to identify its origin: the moment of recognition is in the realization that “le bruit venait 
d’au-dessus de ma tête.”15 This passage leads us through the spatial orientation of the narrator, 
which changes rapidly as he is thrown on his horse and then looks straight up. The fragmentation 
of this sensory experience into discreet moments prefigures the stunningly bright vibrations of 
 
15 Here and elsewhere in Proust’s descriptions of planes, sound is an essential part of their energy and vibrancy. It 
announces and accompanies their presence and impresses itself on characters who incorporate it into their 
discussions. This continuous sonic background is part of what sets these war images apart from other images in the 
text. Paul Fussell makes the case that sound is a key part of war poetry, using the example of Thomas Hardy. He 
writes, “[o]ne reason modern English poetry can be said to begin with Hardy is that he is the first to invite into 
poems the sound of ominous gunfire heard across the trenches” (24). Poetry is the literary form closest to sound due 
to its incorporation of rhythm and rhyme, but I wish to draw on this idea of “inviting in” sound in Proust. Fussell is 
arguing here that Hardy is modern not for having portrayed the subject of war, but for having invited into his poem 
the specific sound of gunfire. Proust, likewise, invites the sound of planes into the Recherche.  
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the wartime plane images included in the published text of TR. Here, this description of the 
narrator’s first plane continues with an exploration of why planes are the perfect object by which 
to examine literary mobility. The pilot seems to hesitate a moment and the narrator feels 
“ouvertes devant lui—devant moi si l’habitude ne m’avait pas fait prisonnier—toutes les routes 
de l’espace, de la vie.” This multiplication of routes and spaces helps us understand Proust’s 
images of speed and motion: these complex images too hesitate between multiple routes, 
occupying the endlessly mobile space of possibility. 
 Just as this initial description of a plane delays its identification, planes first appear in TR 
as indecipherable visual information, leading into a discussion of visual misapprehensions and 
illusions. The narrator tells us that during the wartime period in Paris “[a]vant l’heure où les thés 
d’après-midi finissaient […] on voyait de loin de petites taches brunes qu’on eût pu prendre, 
dans le soir bleu, pour des moucherons, ou pour des oiseaux” (41). Unlike the above passage 
from Sodome et Gomorrhe, this description is not of a specific instance of viewing but rather of a 
repeated and communal type of experience, but both descriptions home in on the sensory 
specificity of the experience by delaying positive identification of the plane. In the earlier 
passage, the narrator uses sound and space to arrive at the identity of his new experience; here, 
Proust leads the reader to see planes by first seeing what they are not.  
In this description, Proust plays with scale and material, moving from small organic 
objects to large metallic ones. Before planes are mentioned, the narrator compares what he is 
experiencing to another perceptual mistake. For the moment, all the reader knows is that 
something is being mistaken for birds or insects. The narrator evokes emotion, explaining 
“[a]insi quand on voit de très loin une montagne on pourrait croire que c’est un nuage. Mais on 
est ému parce qu’on sait que ce nuage est immense, à l’état solide, et résistant” (41). Here, there 
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is again a play with distance and material. The grammar of the sentence of the second sentence in 
the above quote equivocates between the (real) mountain and the (false) cloud. The cloud is 
immense, solid, and resistant rather than appearing or seeming to be, though those would be 
logical ways to soften the meta-figuration, to use Valazza’s term, of mountain as cloud. Because 
Proust is working in the verbal and not the visual, he can insist on the coexistence of those two 
visual possibilities. This sentence is not vacillating between mountain and cloud as visual 
illusions like Jastrow’s figure we saw in the first chapter, which is now duck, now rabbit in the 
viewer’s perception. Rather, it is prompting the reader to hold both in mind at once by insisting 
grammatically that both are at once.  
Just as Richardson draws attention to the pleasure of illusions, as we saw in chapter one, 
the narrator insists on the “ému” associated with the two perceptual mistakes of bird-
insect/airplane and cloud/mountain, using the word twice in two short sentences. The 
cloud/mountain comparison is followed by the revelation of the real identity of the bird-insects: : 
“[a]insi étais-je ému que la tâche brune dans le ciel d’été ne fût ni un moucheron, ni un oiseau, 
mais un aéroplane monté par des hommes qui veillaient sur Paris” (41). Proust is thus paralleling 
not only the two perceptual mistakes but also their emotional outcomes, and the repeated “ainsi” 
(“[a]insi quand on voit de très loin”/“[a]insi étais-je ému”) grammatically reinforces this parallel. 
Something odd emerges, however, when we examine the emotional element of this comparison 
more closely. The second use of “ému” in the context of realizing that the “tâche brune” is 
actually planes helmed by men watching over Paris suggests that this adjective be interpreted in 
an emotionally realistic way. The narrator’s emotion is due to his realization that he is seeing 
men who are working vigilantly to protect Paris from its enemies. The verb “veiller” evokes 
benevolent protection, perhaps even the young narrator’s desire for his mother to sit with him as 
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he falls asleep. However, the first use of “ému” in the context of the cloud/mountain invites us to 
consider another dimension, as it does not include any such clear emotional logic. This first 
“ému” is entirely linked to the impossible simultaneity of the mountain traits (“immense” 
“solide” “resistant”) and the cloud identification (“ce nuage est”). While the affective power of 
the human element of planes is certainly present, it is not entirely responsible for the emotional 
feeling in this passage, but instead works alongside and helps heighten the specifically aesthetic 
plane effects. The mountain/cloud figuration insists we consider the imaginative pleasure of the 
textual recounting of perceptual tricks.  
In the passage from Sodome et Gomorrhe, the pilot’s hesitation between competing 
directions seems to map multiple spatial possibilities in the sky in front of him. This sort of 
spatial-temporal juxtaposition is similar to what we will see in Saint-Loup’s unique positionality: 
as image information, multiple discreet Saint-Loups exist simultaneously, while as a character 
within a narrative Saint-Loup follows a progression in time. Upon leaving Jupien’s brothel, for 
example, he disappears very quickly despite the narrator’s impression that he occupies multiple 
positions in the same moment in time (see below). Without time passing, progression is 
impossible, and so a spatial multiplicity exists in competition with a temporal singularity: Saint-
Loup and the plane both advance in one single direction despite their dominant impression of 
indeterminate possibility. The imaginative impression of energy comes less from progressive 
motion (motion in or through the narrative) and more from motion as constant but without end 
goal (as in Brown’s analysis of Achilles’ shield). Looking at some examples drawn from the 
visual realm will help make this idea more concrete. In the images of Saint-Loup and of planes, 
their motion comes not from the extension of one form through space and time, but through the 
competition between two (or more) distinct, mutually exclusive but equally compelling visual 
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possibilities. In this way, textual energy is akin to visual illusions such as Jastrow’s duck-rabbit, 
which engage our mental energy because we cannot see the two possible images simultaneously 
and yet we know the other image is there. We always see either duck or rabbit, with the other 
figure remaining just beyond our perceptual limits until we shift our focus slightly, and then the 
other figure has exclusive but uneasy priority.  
The duck-rabbit is of course a relatively simple figure, reproducible enough to lend itself 
to the branding for a popular brand of beer. Complex aesthetic output, though, employs a scaled-
up version of a similar strategy. In these more complex cases in both visual and verbal art, two 
possible images do not have to remain completely exclusive, but the beholder has move towards 
holding multiple images at once, perceptually or imaginatively. E.H. Gombrich has argued the 
impression of visual freshness and immediacy that impressionism pioneered does not come from 
a privileged access to a visual primacy unbound from the stilted stylistic conventions of older 
styles. Rather, impressionist painting gains its immediacy from its increased “subjectivity” (202). 
The viewer has “more to do” to make visual sense of the paint strokes (202). Gombrich uses the 
example of Edouard Manet’s 1867 painting Les Courses à Longchamp, arguing that the painter 
“uses the very ambiguity of his flickering forms to suggest a variety of readings and to 
compensate thereby for the absence of movement” (217). As the viewer notices and enacts a 
variety of visual readings, the presence of movement, which cannot be directly represented, is 
nonetheless suggested. Gombrich’s phrasing, however, is somewhat tentative. He does not make 
the claim that the viewer is actually experiencing motion while looking at the painting, but rather 
that the painting’s formal ambiguity is a compensation for what it cannot directly represent. 
What I wish to suggest, however, is a stronger formulation of the mobile sensation that 
can follow from the copresence of competing forms in a single image, visual or verbal. 
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Richardson takes issue with Gombrich’s claim that we can never watch ourselves having an 
illusion but only become aware retrospectively that an illusion has occurred. Richardson argues 
to the contrary that we can catch ourselves in the moment of illusion, and that “this verging on a 
theoretically impossible experience, watching ourselves have an illusion, may account for part of 
the pleasure, part of the compulsive appeal, of such illusions” (23). Knowing that what we are 
experiencing is not limited to the actual representational information on the canvas or on the 
page before us is linked to the pleasurable experience Richardson calls the neural sublime, in 
which we become aware of our own perceptual limitations. Starr’s work on the neuroscience of 
aesthetics uses painting to theorize the actual perceptual and imaginative experience of motion 
via a technically static medium. She uses Jackson Pollack as her example, writing 
It is, however, neither necessary to imagine the hand that made a work nor to enact a 
neural simulation of a body in a work in order to engage the imagery of motion. In 
Pollock's 1946 Shimmering Substance […], the yellow spiral or circle that seems to 
dominate the painting doesn't actually exist on the surface of the canvas: there is no 
yellow line, only the illusion of a yellow line, which can be constructed around the 
interruptions of white, blue, green, and pink pigment. The circular image is produced by 
the sweep of the eye as it follows an imagined curve and by the standard embroidery of 
vision (whereby we assume unbroken forms even where they do not exist […]), and it is 
strengthened by the suggestive echoes of loops throughout the canvas. The vibrancy of 
the painting—its ‘shimmering’—comes through our own visual and imagined 
engagement, the sense of motion that comes from the eyes and from the filling in of the 
golden curve as it draws the viewer on and into the painting's perceptual and formal 
logic. (86) 
Compare this description to Gombrich’s of Les Courses à Longchamp. Gombrich and Starr both 
agree that actual motion is absent from the paintings they are description, but Starr is additionally 
affirming that the viewer’s sense of motion is actually engaged: “[t]he vibrancy of this painting 
[…] comes through our own visual and imagined engagement, the sense of motion that comes 
from the eyes and from the filling in of the golden curve.” Gombrich’s “ambiguity” is Starr’s 
“suggestive echoes,” but the former’s compensatory function is a much more muted statement of 
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aesthetic power than Starr’s vindication of the viewer’s ability to see what is not there. Or more 
properly, our ability to work with the painting to produce what is not there, our mutual 
engagement to see impossibly together.  
 Motion in the text works through creating “engagement,” in Starr’s words, for readers of 
the texts. We are presented with different and compelling images of a certain object-experience. 
That is to say, not simply an object, but an object in motion. Many of Proust’s most compelling 
images of motion are those that are directed by human agency but liberated in the world of the 
text into the space of possibility. Saint-Loup has a mobile freedom throughout the text, a velocity 
that allows him to move outside of the boundaries of physics. Planes exist in between the natural 
world and the technological world, and Proust asks the reader to visualize both options when 
describing them. To this undecidability is added the freedom of multiple paths and futures, which 
remain virtual in the world of the text and thus add an energy outside of the narrative.  
 This textual mobility is not and cannot be entirely separate from the narrative structure of 
verbal art but comes from the play between older aesthetic models and new integrations to those 
models, between deep structure and surface, and between visual vibrancy and verbal 
construction. Luc Fraisse writes of Proust’s curiosity about military maneuvers that “Proust porte 
sur ces opérations un regard formaliste; rien ne l’intéresse autant que l’activité recréatrice 
consistante à en deviner les structures sous-jacentes, et dans le cours d’opérations les structures 
naissantes” (2018: 18). For Fraisse, Proust’s portrayal of war seeks to identify the organization 
underlying the marches and battles, both the consistent organizational structures that govern the 
operations of war in general and the “structures naissantes” that are created in individual 
instances of war. This play of fixed and creative structures is echoed in Proust’s portrayal of 
Saint-Loup. Saint-Loup’s rapidity of motion that allows him to occupy multiple simultaneous 
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positions in space is undergirded by an ancient architecture of bones. At dinner with his friend 
early in their acquaintance, the narrator notices how “l’ossature énergique de son visage 
triangulaire devait être le même que celle de ses ancêtres” and “[s]ous la peau fine, la 
construction hardie, architecture féodale apparaissaient” (JF 452). The apparent contradiction 
between depth and solidity (“construction hardie, architecture féodale”) versus surface and 
vitality (“la peau fine”) present in the second part of the description is complicated by the first 
part. The trait Saint-Loup shares with his ancestors is described as “l’ossature énergique.” This 
expression represents the union of organizational force and pure vital energy.  
 Because war is both a studied, structured phenomenon and an energetic, unpredictable 
one, it is a particularly salient basis from which to examine how literature integrates new visual 
possibilities. Like Proust himself, the Recherche’s narrator wishes to learn more about war. He 
deeply values his conversations on the subject with Saint-Loup, so much so that once his friend 
has died the narrator wonders if he can find another military man to continue his instruction. 
During the war he is frustrated by Saint-Loup’s detachment in his letters, which does not help 
him understand war as well as he would like. He learns only tidbits from his friend at the front: 
“[t]out au plus me dit-il que depuis 1914 s’étaient en réalité succédé plusieurs guerres, les 
enseignements de chacune influant sur la conduite de la suivante,” and thus war “n’échappe pas 
aux lois de notre vieil Hegel. Elle est en état de perpétuel devenir” (59). These ideas of war as 
simultaneity in unity and as “perpetual becoming” are key features of the double nature of the 
portrayal of war in Proust. Like Elstir’s theory of first impressions which does not entirely 
encompass the narrator’s actual practice of aesthetic attention, as explored in my second chapter, 
war acts as both a structural lesson and an aesthetic practice that exceeds that lesson. This 
aesthetic practice is embedded in the visual descriptions of wartime Paris in the Recherche, 
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which asks the reader to hold their preexisting understanding of war as a phenomenon related to 
realism in art at the same time as their openness to a newly mobile aesthetic model.16 
This practice is in part a counterreading of military landscapes and cityscapes as 
pleasurable aesthetic objects. These counterreadings comprise two kinds: a deliberate, detached 
aesthetic distancing caused by placing older aesthetic models over new and disturbing 
experiences, and a pure aesthetic wonder liberated from the constraints of the wartime context 
that engendered it. In the case of the first, Saint-Loup practices this model of distance in his 
wartime letters to the narrator. In these letters, “[il] notait avec goût pour moi des paysages, 
pendant qu’il était immobilisé à la lisière d’une forêt marécageuse, mais comme si c’avait été 
pour une chasse au canard. Pour me faire comprendre certaines oppositions d’ombre et de 
lumière qui avait été ‘l’enchantement de sa matinée’, il me citait certains tableaux que nous 
aimions l’un et l’autre” (61). Saint-Loup transforms the land in front of him into landscape, one 
that this controlled by a number of distancing factors. There is the connotation of class and 
leisure, in the reference to “une chasse au canard.” There are references to art criticism, in 
“oppositions d’ombre et de lumière” and “certains tableaux.” Finally, there is a lightness of spirit 
in the reference to “l’enchantement de sa matinée.” These descriptions all rest uneasily on top of 
the narrator’s curiosity about the “real” experience of war his friend must be having. For the 
 
16 Fraisse writes of the portayal of war in the Recherche that “Si la guerre incite au réalisme, même en art, le roman 
de la guerre tourne, sous la plume de Proust, au récit onirique” (61). Jan Mieszkowski’s Watching War argues that 
the realistic portrayal of war is impossible in any medium, writing of the false dichotomy of direct representation 
(photos, videos, etc.) versus indirect (such as novels): “As consequential as technological change has been, it is the 
argument of this book that the modern perception of warfare was distinguished by a conjunction of physical 
devastation and elusive simulacra long before the invention of photography or film, much less television or the 
Internet. If we live in an era of hyperreal wars, we have been doing so for a long time, which is why verbal media 
that make no claim to facilitate unmediated transmissions of information have been and continue to be as central to 
war spectatorship as visual media, which appear to offer a more direct encounter with the exigencies of being under 
fire” (4).  
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reader, they evoke aesthetic practices without giving us any new imaginative practice in which to 
participate.  
We get that imaginative practice, however, when the narrator meets Saint-Loup in Paris 
when he is on leave during the war. The ensuring description of war planes is distinct from many 
of the images treated in my other chapters in that the detail in this passage is much more 
streamlined. While Balbec’s dining room table is an exercise in loving attention to light, color, 
and form, and while the seascapes layer dimension and texture into dioramic wonders, Proust’s 
textual planes are largely variations on light and darkness. Recall Corse’s work with light and the 
idea that light is not just an epistemological aide but rather an immersive, experiential material. 
The Paris war images inject motion into the dimensionality of light and thus they are in some 
respects the purest image-information in the Recherche. We will later explore character 
revelation as energetic image through Saint-Loup and then conclude with an analysis of 
cognitive process as an energetic image in Du côté de chez Swann’s unfolding teacup, but the 
planes over Paris are the pure materiality of image. The greater context of war is part of the 
structural makeup of the Recherche, as we will see, but it cannot narratively or affectively 
contain the image-pleasure the narrator feels under the new luminosity of the Paris wartime sky.  
When Saint-Loup and the narrator meet in Paris, the narrator comments on the beauty of 
ascending planes, which inspires Saint-Loup to comment on the respective aesthetic merits of 
ascent versus descent: 
Et peut-être encore plus de ceux qui descendent, me dit-il. Je reconnais que c’est très 
beau le moment où ils montent, où ils vont faire constellation, et obéissant en cela à des 
lois tout aussi précises que celles qui réagissent les constellations car ce qui te semble un 
spectacle est le ralliement des escadrilles, les commandements qu’on leur donne, leur 
départ en chasse, etc. Mais est-ce que tu n’aimes pas mieux le moment où, définitivement 
assimilés aux étoiles, ils s’en détachent pour partir en chasse ou rentrer après la berloque, 
le moment où ils font apocalypse, même les étoiles ne gardant plus leur place ? (65-66) 
129 
 
Let us closely examine this two-part description of these planes from the specific angle of the 
imaginative cues given to the reader. Saint-Loup is identifying two distinct aesthetic modes of 
appreciation present in this experience of watching planes over Paris, and his description 
indicates a good deal about how visual power can work in literature.  
When the narrator references the beauty of airplanes ascending in the night, Saint-Loup 
uses his admiration to identify the first of these two modes. Saint-Loup calls this the moment “où 
ils vont faire constellation,” that is, when the ascending planes will blend in with the stars. As 
they rise they approach the moment of their organization into a meaningful, harmonious 
relationship that is pleasurable because it is analogous to the already-beautiful stars. These stars-
as-planes, however, retain an element of aesthetic newness because they are charged with 
energetic potential and intelligently configured into the most pleasing arrangement. This 
energetic power is due in part to the use of the near future in the description. Saint-Loup is 
specifically pinpointing the source of the narrator’s aesthetic pleasure as the moment when “ils 
vont faire constellation”; that is, not the arrangement of planes into a constellation, but the 
moment right before when they are going to make a constellation. This first mode is the image 
as a constant state of becoming, bringing pleasure to the viewer/reader by teasing the potential 
beauty of an ultimate fixed configuration while retaining the energy of indecision. The beauty of 
the ascending planes is the way in which war’s visual imprint becomes an aesthetic object not by 
resembling other forms of beauty but in its potential to create previously unseen striking forms. 
As soon as the planes become visually indistinguishable from the rest of the night sky, the war 
image loses its aesthetic newness by matching perfectly another aesthetic category: in the 




 The second mode Saint-Loup identifies, his preferred one, occurs in the moment after the 
planes have become “définitivement assimilés aux étoiles” and then move into their descent. In 
this moment of descent that Saint-Loup particularly enjoys, the visual experience of war 
becomes new again when the planes “s’en détachent” as if from the background of a painted 
picture. Saint-Loup describes this second mode as the moment when the planes “font 
apocalypse.” The verb tense changes from the near future to the present, indicating that this 
mode represents the moment when the apocalyptic future invades the present and dissolves 
conventional spatiotemporal relationships. By its very nature, apocalyptic time occurs after time 
itself is destroyed and thus represents a permanent upheaval of the temporal flow, and here its 
power dislodges even the stars. In Saint-Loup’s description, the lights of the planes join with the 
lights of the stars, and then the very distinction between the two becomes unimportant, “même 
les étoiles ne gardant plus leur place,” a description that elides the logical knowledge Saint-Loup 
has that the descending lights are planes and not stars. Similarly, logically Saint-Loup knows that 
these descending lights are moving “pour partir en chasse ou rentrer après la berloque,” but this 
pragmatic understanding is not enough to change the aesthetic appreciation of their image. In the 
initial description Saint-Loup gives of the planes moving away from their constellations, this 
separation of moving light from its background could have indicated that the planes are moving 
away from the stars and thus out of the aesthetic register and into a more prosaic one, but the 
apocalyptic mode he then describes ups the aesthetic ante. Saint-Loup’s description of the planes 
that “font apocalypse” reverses the intuitive idea that planes in the sky are beautiful because they 
are like stars and instead displaces the stars themselves to make them more like planes. The 
conventional aestheticized image of a constellation becomes secondary to the power of the new 
aesthetic subject of war. 
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The visibility of these images is of the particular type identified in my introduction as 
“seeing the impossible,” a mode of visualization hinging less on what can be fully imagined and 
more on what can be intimated and briefly glimpsed. Their vibratory energy engages the reader’s 
imagination, but not by creating vivid mimetic visualizations. Work in cognitive literary studies 
dealing with reading and visualization tends to use vividness as a criterion for evaluating the 
descriptive power of different texts. Scarry’s work on how imagined literary images are closer to 
perceptual experience than other sorts of imagined images describes the overlap between the 
literary and the perceptual with a lexicon of the vivid, the vital, and the vibrant. Perceived 
objects have “vitality and vivacity” (3), she mentions “the vivacity of perceptual objects” (5) as 
well as “mental vivacity” (12) and alludes to “[t]he vibrancy of perception” (31). Brosch 
explores how “vivid is fast” when it comes to clear visualization: “This surprising 
counterintuitive ‘vivid is fast’ result for mental imagery presents a very important insight into 
visualization. It must mean that complicated spatial or imagistic relations that necessitate a 
realignment of spontaneous imaginings are not productive of more intense imagery” (2017: 266). 
In Proust’s images, their intensity is not their vivid resemblance to our real experience of sight. 
Rather, vibrancy is elliptically evoked at the heart of these strange, non-mimetic images. 
Within Proust’s text, the conditions of viewing necessitate perspectival shifts that do not 
correspond to viewing instances in everyday life. During a conversation with Charlus, the 
narrator launches into an extended mediation about the new means of viewing that the war has 
introduced. This new way of seeing the world has three main aspects: the physical conditions of 
viewing, the affective resonances of what is being seen, and the content that is actually being 
seen (diegetically by the narrator and imaginatively by the reader). The opening of this 
meditation describes Charlus’ overwhelm at the scene around him in Paris:  
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D’ailleurs M. de Charlus ne savait littéralement où donner la tête, et il la levait souvent 
avec le regret ne pas avoir une jumelle qui d’ailleurs de lui eût pas servi à grand-chose, 
car en plus grand nombre que d’habitude, à cause du raid de zeppelins de l’avant-veille 
qui avait réveillé la vigilance des pouvoirs publics, il y avait des militaires jusque dans le 
ciel. Les aéroplanes que j’avais vus quelques heures plus tôt faire comme des insectes des 
taches brunes sur le soir bleu, passaient maintenant dans la nuit qu’approfondissait encore 
l’extinction partielle des réverbères, comme de lumineux brûlots. (108) 
Before moving into a description of the full luminosity of the sky at night, Proust contextualizes 
his mobile lights with a series of preparatory information for the reader. First, this mise-en-scène 
of Charlus’ experience of viewing the new sights in wartime Paris. Balbec’s framed window 
scenes circumscribed their images in a conventional way in order to create a stage on which 
Proust could play with perspective and texture. In these war images, the scene is the sky, and 
Proust emphasizes the viewing constraints in quite a different way. If the window represented 
sensory constraint, the note that Charlus “ne savait littéralement où donner la tête” invites the 
reader into a sensory chaos that refuses to be circumscribed or still, even temporarily. Charlus’ 
viewing experience is itself that of motion: he raises his head often and he wishes for binoculars 
to artificially bring him to get closer to the handsome young soldiers he wishes to see. The scene 
at hand is doubly overwhelming because of its density and directionality. The solidiers are 
present “en plus grand nombre que d’habitude” but also “jusque dans le ciel.” In an enlarged 
version of Saint-Loup’s personal multiplication, here, the bodies of soldiers are spreading 
through the streets and into the sky. Even with binoculars, the narrator notes, Charlus would not 
be able to make clear sense of his surroundings. This description clues us into two parts of the 
physical conditions of viewing. While Balbec’s seascapes invited the reader to imaginative 
orientations that reach beyond the viewing capacities of the narrator (hovering above the surface 
of the sea, for example) these plane scenes, beginning with the narrator’s first experience with 
them in Sodome et Gomorrhe, require the characters themselves to take different positions. 
Additionally, these viewing experiences are less individual. The narrator is having a personal 
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experience of wartime Paris, but the presence of Charlus specifically and the rest of the 
population of Paris implicitly asks us to consider a larger audience for these images. This larger 
audience is the mirror of the readers, who are themselves having new imaginative experiences as 
they read.  
In the last sentence of the above quote, the earlier image of planes as insects returns. The 
narrator recalls having seen the airplanes in the afternoon sky earlier, and now a double 
transformation is operated: the blue evening sky deepens into night, and the brown insect-like 
blurs become fully realized as light. The passage continues with reflections on the new 
conditions of viewing inspired by the wonderous new sights, and their associated feelings:  
La plus grande impression de beauté que nous faisaient éprouver ces étoiles humaines et 
filantes, était peut-être surtout de faire regarder le ciel, vers lequel on lève peu les yeux 
d’habitude. Dans ce Paris dont, en 1914, j’avais vu la beauté presque sans défense 
attendre la menace de l’ennemi qui se rapprochait, il y avait certes, maintenant comme 
alors, la splendeur antique inchangée d’une lune cruellement, mystérieusement sereine, 
qui versait aux monuments encore intacts l’inutile beauté de sa lumière, mais comme en 
1914, et plus qu’en 1914, il y avait aussi autre chose, des lumières différentes, des feux 
intermittents que, soit de ces aéroplanes, soit de projecteurs de la tour Eiffel, on savait 
dirigés par une volonté intelligente, par une vigilance amie. (108)  
The description of planes as “étoiles humaines et filantes” immediately introduces affective and 
mobile intensity into the description of the sky. In this sentence, we see an explicit statement of 
the new stage on which these images are appearing. Here, the planes themselves are not the 
primary beauty, but rather the inducement to pay attention to the neglected sky. We normally do 
not lift our eyes up, but these planes compel us to, they “faire regarder” the sky above us. 
Similarly, Paul Fussell associates wartime with the new habit of looking to the sky. Soldiers’ 
morning and evening stand-to hours occurred at sunrise and sunset, encouraging them to notice 
the sky’s beauty at these times. Fussell ties this into a greater aesthetic history of “sky-
awareness,” which began in Britain with the chapter “On Sky” in Ruskin’s Modern Painters: 
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“Those attentive to the history of taste know that sky-awareness is a fairly late development. 
There is little need of it, for example, in the eighteenth century, which felt no pressing need for 
such emblems of infinity as sky or sea” (56). This passage in Proust, though, sets up a contrast 
between objects labeled as participating in “beauté” and the newness of the lights of the planes 
and later, the projectors on the Eiffel Tower. “Beauté” is used to describe the impression given 
from looking at the sky, the beauty of the city threatened by the enemy, and the beauty of the 
moonlight. These objects and images, though, ultimately become the background for the more 
engaging images and ideas associated with wartime. There is a labeled beauty in this passage that 
is immobile, and a mobile beauty that remains unlabeled, emerging from the murky night and 
from the complexity of its context to impress itself on the reader’s imagination.  
 In the example of the planes making us look at the sky, the implication is that the planes 
are incidental to the actual experience of beauty. They encourage us to look up, a new posture 
towards the world, but presumably what we would be struck by is the sky itself. However, that is 
not the imaginative scene the passage encourages. The next two uses of “beauté” are in the 
context of the city itself, “sans défense” against its enemies, and in the context of the “inutile” 
light of the moon spilling on the city’s monuments. This beauty is without protection and without 
purpose, lacking agency. The moon is “cruellement, mystérieusement sereine,” a description that 
takes the idea of the sky as beautiful and injects it with cruelty: the fact that the moon cannot or 
will not respond to the threat to the city on which she shines. This description is only possible 
because new elements have been introduced to the sky. The “splendeur antique inchangée” 
contrasts with the “lumières différentes, […] feux intermittents” from the planes and projectors. 
These new elements are in contrast with the moon in two senses: one is that their mobility, more 
fully explored later in the passage. The second is their agency. They are “dirigés par une volonté 
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intelligente, par une vigilance amie.” The narrator feels this particularly strongly as it reminds 
him of the soldiers he met visiting Saint-Loup at Doncières, in a scene included in Le Côté de 
Guermantes. We know from Proust’s manuscripts that he was concurrently drafting scenes 
included in TR such as Saint-Loup’s death alongside the Doncières scene (Fraisse 2018: 10). The 
textual history thus confirms the tight affective knot suggested in this passage between the 
pleasure of knowing Paris is protected, and the narrator’s pleasure in the friendship of France’s 
soldiers. The aesthetic pleasure embedded in the other parts of these scenes is thus heightened by 
the mix of fear and comfort the narrator experiences viewing the beauty of Paris. The beauty he 
has come to know in the streets of Paris is present but lacking in vibrancy, stilling to a frightened 
background to a more compelling drama of visual mobility and heightened emotion.  
Turning back to our planes, the passage we have been looking at continues with a 
sustained description of the nighttime sky: 
Après le raid de l’avant-veille, où le ciel avait été plus mouvementé que la terre, il s’était 
calmé comme la mer après une tempête, Mais comme la mer après une tempête, il n’avait 
pas encore repris son apaisement absolu. Des aéroplanes montaient encore comme des 
fusées rejoindre les étoiles, des projecteurs promenaient lentement, dans le ciel sectionné, 
comme une pâle poussière d’astres, d’errantes voies lactées. Cependant les aéroplanes 
venaient s’insérer au milieu des constellations et on aurait pu se croire dans un autre 
hémisphère en effet, en voyant ces ‘étoiles nouvelles.’ (108)  
This description echoes previous textual images of the sea and of constellations to build up a 
moving picture. The first part of the description inverses the land and the sky, noting of the air 
raid the night before that the sky was “plus mouvementé que la terre” and comparing this sky to 
the sea after a storm. This inversion recalls Elstir’s seascapes which, as we saw in chapter two, 
the artist painted “n’employant pour la petite ville que des termes marines, et que des termes 
urbains pour la mer” because he “avait su habituer les yeux à ne pas reconnaitre de frontière fixe, 
de démarcation absolue, entre la terre et l’océan” (JF 470). Here, Proust is also mixing his 
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“termes,” not comparing the sky during the air raid to the sky during a storm, but rather to the 
surface of the sea at storm. This has the double effect of giving an oddly dense texture to the sky 
and evoking a slow, continual movement: “[m]ais comme la mer après une tempête, il n’avait 
pas encore repris son apaisement absolu.” This comparison thus serves less to inscribe this image 
under the general descriptive rhetoric of Elstir, and more to evoke a new kind of textual motion. 
The sky becomes the new surface, or rather substance, on which and through which light moves.  
 The description continues with the evocation of movement by asking the reader to 
envision two types of luminous motion occurring simultaneously in the sky, fast and slow. These 
two types of motion are evoked within the same sentence, meaning that the reader must quickly 
imaginatively jump from one to the other. Rather than representing a logical sequence of lights 
speeding up, though, the slower image is described second, meaning that the more continuous 
movement is constructed by the reader after they have already visualized the faster movements, 
challenging us to hold both in our minds at once. In the case of the faster motion, airplanes rise 
“comme des fusées rejoindre les étoiles.” “Fusée” evokes a quick, bright flash of light, moving 
upwards towards the stars. The description then moves back towards the earth with the spatially 
lower and considerably slower image of projectors that “promenaient lentement.” In addition to 
the contrast of this slow stroll to the quickly rising “fusée,” the projector description evokes stars 
again, but this time in terms of spread or smear: “pâle poussière d’astres” “errantes voies 
lactées.” The flip of land and sky is then repeated in the reference to “un autre hémisphère,” 
where a different set of constellations is visible. The newly mobile sky, agitated like the sea after 
a storm, is not just another beautiful tableau the narrator contemplates. It is the opening of new 
visual possibilities, that distort spatial awareness through the double mobility of light.  
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At the end of the war, after Saint-Loup’s death, the narrator sketches out some ideas 
about the proper representation of war in conversation with Gilberte. He makes the case that 
Saint-Loup had begun to see war in the following terms: “elle est humaine, se vit comme un 
amour ou comme une haine, pourrait être racontée comme un roman, et par conséquent […] elle 
n’est pas stratégique” (288). Saint-Loup’s point of view moves away from the idea that war is a 
science and works by mechanisms that can be precisely defined and understood in objective 
terms. Instead, war becomes a complex human experience that is felt like love or hatred or told 
like a novel. As such, war can only be understood experientially, as immersive experience, and 
narratively, as something that combines emotion and event through story. The narrator then 
proposes that war be portrayed in the impressionistic manner that he has explored in Elstir’s 
methodology and identified in certain writers such as Dostoyevsky. The narrator explains, 
“faudrait-il la peindre [la guerre] comme Elstir peignait la mer, par l’autre sens, et partir des 
illusions, des croyances qu’on rectifie peu à peu comme Dostoïevski raconterait une vie” (288). 
This strategy that is initially identified with respect to Elstir thus expands in range over the 
course of the Recherche to encompass how art portrays both perceptual information (as in 
Elstir’s paintings) and human experience such as the discovery of character (Dostoyevsky) and 
finally, war. War expands the repertoire of images in the text, and the constant threat of 
apocalyptic destruction provides the unique opportunity for the narrative to step outside of time, 
and introduce a spectacular mobility that exceeds war’s function as part of the narrative structure 
of the Recherche.  
World War I is a textual object with a complex relationship to time both in and out of the 
Recherche. Fussell situates WWI as the end point of a progress-driven notion of time, writing 
that “the Great War was perhaps the last to be conceived as taking place within a seamless, 
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purposeful ‘history’ involving a coherent stream of time running from past through present to 
future” (21). The Recherche’s use of World War I is both temporally and affectively odd, as 
Valazza summarizes: “mais de nouveau c’est dans une perspective singulière que les 
circonstances de la guerre sont perçues dans le récit. En ce sens, l’événement qui parait le plus 
marquant par rapport à la temporalité de la fiction est celui de la destruction de l’église de 
Combray” (313). The Recherche as a whole is characterized by a lack of orienting dates, both 
within the greater flow of time and within the narrator’ life. Dates, durations, ages: all are by and 
large absent from the narrative. In this sense, the fact that Proust incorporates both the event of 
World War I and the date 1913 might seem to insert Proust’s fiction into a larger exterior reality. 
Rather than realism in terms of war, Proust’s text imaginatively blends real events with fictional 
ones, making the “plus marquant” event the destruction of the Combray church. The emotional 
gravity of the war appears through fictional character’s reactions to fictional destruction, 
undermining the tendency towards realism associated with war stories. The importance of the 
Combray church passages will be explored in my next chapter, but here, I wish to examine how 
war is portrayed outside of this confrontation between narrative and historical time. Proust’s 
description of wartime Paris highlights again and again the new sky the war has created above 
the city, a sky full of motion and light.  
Saint Loup’s Simultaneous Multiplicity  
The mesmerizing mobility of Proust’s plane images comes from the way in which their 
aesthetic power derives from but ultimately exceeds the context in which the narrator and reader 
experience them. The narrator is drawn to them because of their association with the sky, a pre-
existing aesthetic context, and because of their association with the protective soldiers that pilot 
them, a pre-existing narrative point. However, the images themselves have a visible intensity for 
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the narrator and an imaginative intensity for the reader that cannot be reduced to these situational 
features. Jane Bennett’s work on the concept of “vibrant matter” examines “the strange ability of 
ordinary, man-made items to exceed their status as objects and to manifest traces of 
independence or aliveness, constituting the outside of our own experience” (XVI). If we allow 
that literary images are an example of “man-made items,” this idea, alongside Mitchell’s notion 
of the aliveness of images, will help us get at something fundamental about the images discussed 
in this chapter. Proust’s mobile images are not merely literary copies of or variations on real 
visual experience, nor are they are simply descriptions of the narrator’s lived visual experience. 
They are new forms of visibility, operating in relation to but independent of other kinds of visual 
experience outside of the text. Bennett sees vibrant matter as a mix of materiality and energy, 
writing “my goal is to theorize a materiality that is as much force as entity, as much energy as 
matter, as much intensity as extension” (20). By analyzing the visual imprint of Saint-Loup in 
Proust’s text, we can see the importance of this incorporation of force, energy, and intensity to 
matter. Saint-Loup as textual object is not a copy of a human but a man-made literary image. He 
is matter and energy not as harmonious reconciliation, but as dynamic tension. We learn a good 
number of mimetic details about Saint-Loup’s appearance in the Recherche—he is blond, 
handsome, sometimes in a monocle, sometimes in a military uniform—but these details do not 
ask the reader’s imagination to do anything beyond recall handsome blonde men we have seen in 
real life and dress them up. Accordingly, these are not the features critics such as Bal and 
Phillipe Bertier draw on for their analyses of the uniqueness of Saint-Loup within the Proustian 
universe of characters. What is fascinating about Saint-Loup is his permanent impermanence, the 




 Proust’s demonstration of image energy is in full force in his descriptions of Robert de 
Saint-Loup, whose surprising mobility is again and again discussed in the text. Unlike Elstir, 
who teaches the narrator a methodology of first impressions that leads the narrator to discover in 
his own manner the spatial world around him, Saint-Loup’s physicality itself represents a new 
type of visual information for the narrator, and through him, the reader. This visual effect is 
achieved through a particular use of fragmentation. Generally speaking, fragmentation as a 
method of character portrayal is neither unique to Proust nor, in the Recherche, unique to the 
portrayal of Saint-Loup. Joseph Frank’s seminal essays on spatial form in literature identify 
“discontinuous presentation of character” as one of the defining features of Proust’s novel and of 
the modernist novel in general (239). This character presentation is subordinate to Frank’s larger 
thesis that meaning in modernist novels is constructed in spatial rather than linear terms. In terms 
of characterization, Frank argues that in novels such as Proust’s that the reader can only form an 
understanding of characters retrospectively, after having seen all their individual appearances in 
a text. Character development is not presented chronologically and progressively, but rather the 
reader must form an understanding of characters through the juxtaposition of disparate moments. 
In the “bal de têtes” scene in TR, the narrator himself experiences this character fragmentation. 
He has not watched his friends age over time but rather discovers the fact of their aging suddenly 
and jarringly, in contrast to his mental images of them at an earlier moment in time. In addition 
to this thematic fragmentation in character development, Proust uses fragmented visual images to 
describe certain characters, including Albertine in addition to Saint-Loup. In a particularly 
notable example, Proust describes time slowing as Albertine leans down to kiss the narrator and 
he sees before him “dix Albertines;” a collection of disparate impressions instead of the coherent 
and seductive whole of her face (Le Côté de Guermantes 354). This disorienting visual 
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impression corresponds to the narrator’s inability to know Albertine as he longs to, as he is 
confronted over and over again by her evasions and lies.   
The fragmentation associated with Saint-Loup is of a different, though related, type. It 
encompasses both individual descriptive moments, as with the example of Albertine’s face, and 
general character presentation, as with Frank’s point about Proust’s characterization throughout 
the novel. In addition to this, though, the particular way that Saint-Loup is repeatedly visually 
fragmented has the end effect of creating a certain kind of mobility that is unique to his character 
in the text. Late in his acquaintance with Saint-Loup, the narrator muses on the contrast between 
his friend and Saint-Loup’s uncle Charlus. While both men are changed through their lives by 
the internal pressure of their secret desires for men, the physical repercussions of these desires 
are markedly different. Proust writes of Saint-Loup that “[s]a vie ne l’avait pas épaissi, alenti, 
comme M. de Charlus, mais tout au contraire, opérant en lui un changement inverse, lui avait 
donné l’aspect désinvolte d’un officier de cavalerie” (TR 4). Specifically, Saint-Loup is marked 
by a “vélocité” (4). Thematically, of course, the idea of velocity is fitting for someone who is 
literally and figuratively fleeing parts of his life. However, this velocity defines the visual 
portrayal of Saint-Loup as well and will act as a model for the visibility of motion throughout the 
Recherche.  
When the narrator first becomes acquainted with Saint-Loup at Balbec, his early 
impressions of the young aristocrat are immediately marked by speed and mobility. Saint-Loup 
“traversa rapidement l’hôtel dans toute sa largeur, semblant poursuivre son monocle qui voligeait 
devant lui comme un papillon. Il venait de la plage, et la mer qui remplissait jusqu’à mi-hauteur 
le virage du hall lui faisait un fond sur lequel il se détachait en pied” (JF 358). The butterfly-like 
monocle is mentioned again a little further on in the same passage: Saint-Loup moves 
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“équilibrant perpétuellement les mouvements de ses membres autour de son monocle fugitif et 
dansant qui semblait leur centre de gravité” (358). Proust’s description balances the parts of 
Saint-Loup’s body and the rhythm of his movements around his monocle, making him seem to 
hover and balance while being pulled from place to place by the irresistible motion of this small 
piece of “fugitive et dansant” metal and glass. In the first citation, the narrator follows the 
butterfly image of the monocle with one of Saint-Loup stepping out from a background created 
by the window-frame effects we saw in chapter two: “la mer qui remplissait jusqu’à mi-hauteur 
le vitrage du hall lui faisait un fond sur lequel il se détachait en pied.” The half-filled horizontal 
plane of the window is in contrast with Saint-Loup’s determined movement forward. This 
forward motion does not create a horizontal axis in addition to the verticality of the window, but 
rather the character steps out of the frame entirely. The whole of his body follows his dancing 
monocle out of the framed image of the sea, defying gravity as he defies mimesis.  
Later in their friendship, the narrator attends the theater with Saint-Loup and, after the 
show, sees an astonishing sight outside:  
[J]e vis qu’un monsieur assez mal habillé avait l’air de lui parler [à Saint-Loup] d’assez 
près. J’en conclus que c’était un ami personnel de Robert; cependant ils semblaient se 
rapprocher encore l’un de l’autre ; tout à coup, comme apparaît au ciel un phénomène 
astral, je vis des corps ovoïdes prendre avec une rapidité vertigineuse toutes les positions 
qui leur permettaient de composer, devant Saint-Loup, une instable constellation. Lancés 
comme par une fronde ils me semblèrent être au moins au nombre de sept. Ce n’étaient 
pourtant que les deux poings de Saint-Loup, multipliés par leur vitesse à changer de 
places dans cet ensemble en apparence idéal et décoratif. (Le Côté de Guermantes 174) 
This description is in contrast with the narrative action actually occurring, a fight between Saint-
Loup and a man he claims propositioned him. We learn that the man is left in a sorry, grotesque 
state: “[il] parut perdre à la fois toute contenance, une mâchoire, et beaucoup de sang”(174). 
Despite this, the scene is described in a way that leaves a visual impression of rapidity and 
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harmony. Saint-Loup’s fists appear like “un phénomène astral,” flying even faster than the 
monocle he follows in the earlier description of him at Balbec. The description of his fists 
forming “une instable constellation” uses the same image of starts that will return in the wartime 
conversation about planes between the narrator and Saint-Loup we saw above. Here, we see his 
fists fly so fast they do not seem to be attached to him. He himself becomes the background from 
which his fists differentiate, as the ocean-filled window was the background he stepped out of at 
Balbec. In addition to speed, his fists seem to multiply “au moins au nombre de sept.” This speed 
and multiplication create in the narrator’s estimation an “ensemble en apparence idéal et 
décoratif.” In addition to the oddity of noticing the aesthetic harmony of a bloody fistfight, the 
narrator’s description of an ideal and decorative “ensemble” gives the impression of an 
identifiable pattern that could be fixed. This aesthetic model is of course at odds with the 
vertiginous speed of the scene. The same is true of the above reference to a constellation. Though 
it is here modified by the adjective “instable,” the pattern of a constellation must be fixed in 
order for it to be identifiable. This combination of the frenzied, physically impossible speed and 
the patterned, pleasant appearance of Saint-Loup’s fists epitomizes the animating tension in 
energetic images in literature. We are simultaneously invited to imagine the thrill and blur of 
speed, and to marvel at the pleasing patterns displayed in front of us as if the motion could be 
momentarily paused.  
 Saint-Loup’s gravity-defying speed is the link between his character as a whole and his 
visual imprint in the text. Bal writes, “[d]e tous les personnages aimés, recherchés, mal connus et 
convoités qui peuplent ce roman, le personnage qui représente avec le plus de ‘détails’ la 
poétique visuelle de Proust, c’est Robert de Saint-Loup […] Robert, c’est celui qui se rend d’un 
lieu à l’autre sans y rester, sans y passer du temps; c’est celui qui transforme l’univers proustien 
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en espace pur” (15-16). His speed is such that it spatializes the Proustian textual world; his 
motions between spaces are so immediate that he does not seem to be moving through time at all. 
Bal also contrasts Saint-Loup and Albertine, another one of Proust’s characters “mal connus et 
convoités” and who, as mentioned above, is also associated with visual fragmentation. 
Distinguishing between the two, she writes, “Robert, par contre, se soustrait au fixage d’une 
façon différente, plus active, et encore plus visuelle. Dès le début de leurs relations, la rapidité 
visuelle du mouvement a été comme un leitmotiv servant du trait permanent pour identifier le 
personnage, la caractéristique infaillible de Robert” (196). Albertine’s visual fragmentation, on 
the other hand, is only occasional and indicates the narrator’s confusion and discomfort, and her 
decomposition is not associated with speed. In the case of Saint-Loup, the close association 
between fragmentation and speed, and the consistency of these descriptive markers in his 
appearances in the text, make him emblematic of Proust’s “poétique visuelle” for Bal. This 
visual presentation allows the reader to momentarily escape both the forward-moving narrative 
of the text and the fixity of description if description is understood as a static verbal painting.  
Proust evokes visual impressions for the reader but insists that these impressions contain an 
impossible motion. 
Saint-Loup’s textual speed becomes more and more tightly associated with his desire for 
men through the Recherche, as he marries Gilberte and engages in increasingly complicated 
subterfuge to hide his liaisons with men, but this speed is his defining characteristic from his 
introduction in JF, as we saw above. Berthier’s amical ode to the character highlights again and 
again the associations between speed, evasion, and surprise evoked when Saint-Loup is 
mentioned, beginning with the name itself. Berthier argues that there is a “plasticité imaginaire” 
in the name Saint-Loup, which does not have a precise geographical or temporal origin (35). 
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Tracing this spatiotemporal mobility outwards, Berthier describes “sa manière unique d’occuper 
dans l’espace en si peu de temps tant de positions différentes” and translates the ‘message’ of 
this positionality as “Vous ne m’attraperez pas!” (43). In a literal sense, Saint-Loup is often 
fleeing within the narrative, making excuses to leave his home and Gilberte or sneaking out of 
Jupien’s brothel hoping not to be noticed. This thematic message that Berthier identifies with his 
character also describes the way in which Proust plays with literary space when he writes Saint-
Loup’s impossible mobility. The reader is teased with the idea that Saint-Loup almost but not 
quite manages to be in multiple places that once, thereby envisioning something between 
multiple discrete images of Saint-Loup in different places at once, and one Saint-Loup who is 
moving so fast as to be a blur. This tension between blurry speed and distinctly visualizable self-
multiplication animates Saint-Loup, as a similar static-mobile tension animates TR’s images of 
planes.  
This mobility is so tightly associated with Saint-Loup that even thematic arguments about 
his character tend to carry the imprint of his visual qualities. Berthier sees a clear parallel 
between Saint-Loup’s surprising appearances and his late-blooming desire for men, where Saint-
Loup’s unique visual patterning reveals what he wants to hide. In a particularly evocative 
passage, Berthier writes that Saint-Loup “parfois se laisse pressentir à Marcel par de 
surprenantes entre-visions, comme si une brèche ou un soupirail inattendu lui offraient 
brusquement accès à un dessous de cartes, un envers, pour ne pas dire une inversion” (143). This 
phrase itself is visually as well as thematically resonant. The verb “pressentir” itself balances 
between the material sensation and its intuitive corollary, i.e. sensing something not materially 
present in that moment. There is also the lexicon of seeing between or through, as if a new space 
has opened up to which the narrator has visual access: “entre-visions” “brèche” “soupirail.” This 
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phrase ends with three references to reversal: “dessous de cartes” “envers” “inversion.” Saint-
Loup’s impossible visibility is itself the underside of the textual world of the novel, his mobile 
aesthetic allowing the reader to access an imaginary visible world through the more uniform 
textual world.  
 The brothel scene is a particularly potent one regarding Saint-Loup’s visibility. He is both 
hyper-visible, bearing a unique visual signature, and invisible, with no concrete identifying 
signs:  
Quelque chose pourtant me frappa qui n’était pas sa figure que je ne voyais pas, ni son 
uniforme dissimulé dans une grande houppelande, mais la disproportion extraordinaire 
entre le nombre de points différents par où passa son corps et le petit nombre de secondes 
pendant lesquelles cette sortie, qui avait l’air de la sortie tentée par un assiégé, s’exécuta. 
De sorte que je pensai, si je ne le reconnus pas formellement—je ne dirai pas même à la 
tournure, ni à la sveltesse, ni à l’allure, ni à la vélocité de Saint-Loup—mais à l’espèce 
d’ubiquité qui lui était si spéciale. Le militaire capable d’occuper en si peu de temps tant 
de positions différentes dans l’espace avait disparu sans m’avoir aperçu dans une rue de 
traverse, et je restais à me demander si je devais ou non entrer dans cet hôtel dont 
l’apparence modeste me fit fortement douter que c’était Saint-Loup qui en était sorti. 
(117) 
The narrator here repeats several times that both in terms of what he could concretely recognize 
and what he could deduce the person he sees is likely not Saint-Loup. He cannot really make out 
the figure “trop loin […] dans l’obscurité profonde.” He is struck by something undefinable 
about the figure, but cannot make out his face, and his uniform is hidden under a greatcoat. 
Saint-Loup’s name is mentioned twice, but it is both times in negative constructions: the narrator 
cannot recognize the figure “à la tournure, ni à la sveltesse, ni à l’allure, ni à la vélocité de Saint-
Loup,” and the cheap look of the hotel “me fit fortement douter que c’était Saint-Loup qui en 
était sorti.” This description thus strips away the narrator’s ability to be certain about who he is 
seeing, and the reader’s ability to visualize the now-familiar character. In my first chapter, I 
discussed the idea that in order to best understand memory or sleep it is useless to talk to 
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someone who never forgets anything or falls asleep immediately. Rather, to learn about a 
phenomenon, you must look at its contrary, at the not-doing, or the doing-badly, rather than ideal 
functioning. This scene outside the brothel similarly highlights what can be seen by focusing first 
on what cannot be seen. It takes away all the ordinary markers of identity, both in terms of visual 
codes (facial recognition, distinctive dress such as military uniform) and logical ones (where a 
person is and how they are behaving).  
Against this literally and metaphorically obscure scene, the narrator nonetheless 
immediately intuitively identifies Saint-Loup. He doubts this identification since he cannot 
confirm it with positive visual signals, nor does it make logical sense, but that does not change 
what he senses, to return to the idea of “pressentir” from Berthier. The uniqueness of Saint-
Loup’s positionality is “l’espèce d’ubiquité qui lui était si spéciale.” This ubiquity is similarly 
described twice in three sentences: the narrator is struck by “la disproportion extraordinaire entre 
le nombre de points différents par où passa son corps et le petit nombre de seconds pendant 
lesquelles cette sortie […] s’exécuta” and describes the figure as “[l]e militaire capable 
d’occuper en si peu de temps tant de positions différentes dans l’espace.” This paradoxical 
positioning of a human figure in time and space is in some ways the opposite of the image 
analyzed in my final chapter at the end of the Recherche. That image will spread the singular 
space a body can occupy at once backwards though time and forwards into possibility, whereas 
this image of Saint-Loup coming out of the brothel spreads spatial multiplicity across temporal 
unity. Saint-Loup’s multiplicity is atemporal, whereas the novel’s end, as well as some of its 
church images, presents a synthetic fusion of space and time. In both cases, the tension between 
paradoxical presentations of space and time gives these images their marvelous energy. Here, the 
impossibly foreshortened time dimension highlights the frenetic but nonetheless distinct spatial 
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multiplicity of Saint-Loup. The narrator ends up suspecting Saint-Loup must be a spy, linking his 
pragmatic confusion of what his aristocrat friend would be doing at a seedy hotel to a job lending 
itself to a visual mode of seeing what is not meant to be seen. The scene that follows plays on 
this notion, highlighting the narrator’s access to forbidden tableaux, particularly Charlus being 
whipped.  
By way of conclusion, we will examine the way these energetic images can express 
temporal effects. Proust uses descriptive energy through non-narrative mobility in order to 
prompt the reader to build a cognitive model of the involuntary memory in the madeleine scene 
in Du côté de chez Swann. In the middle of this image, between the teacup and madeleine and the 
fully realized childhood scene, the narrator’s involuntary memories of Combray spread before 
him like Japanese paper flowers furling and untwisting out of his teacup. On my first reading of 
the volume and in subsequent rereadings I have been struck by how beautiful the image was even 
though what was being described was of an impossible complexity: the reader is asked to 
visualize both the intricate paper flowers themselves and the even more intricate city and 
surroundings of the narrator’s childhood Combray rising out of a teacup. Despite this 
complexity, the images vibrate brightly in my mind, showing up in multiple colors and 
vacillating between the cup and the flowers and the houses and the fields in a pleasant back-and-
forth rhythm. Beyond the individual pleasure it brings me as a reader, this description is perfectly 
placed between sensual immediacy and essential meaning. These paper flowers are nowhere real 
objects, neither in the narrative “present” of the madeleine and tea nor in the cognitively 
experiential “present” of the involuntary memory. They are not the sensual experience of smell 
and taste nor the immersive one of Combray. They are instead Proust’s visual and tactile 
figuration of how this experience feels, presented to the reader so that they might attempt to 
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cognitively reconstruct this particular feeling of an involuntary memory. These paper flowers 
move, extend, give way to something else, and collapse back into themselves and start again.  
Looking at the passage in more detail, it is in part the repeated verbs that give the sense 
of actions. The “petits morceaux de papier jusque-là indistincts” differentiate through a series of 
verbs: plunged in water they “s’étirent, se contournent, se colorant, se différencient, deviennent 
des fleurs, des maisons, des personnages […]” (47). The multiple verbs hint at different actions 
or transformations undergone by the paper pieces which the reader cannot fully visualize, 
arching towards form, changing colors, and finally becoming the impossible multiplicity of parts 
of a town. The action of the paragraph which contains this description is entirely in this mobile 
middle ground between teacup and town. Our efforts to visualize the paper pieces in the process 
of becoming makes us feel motion in this section and so we move with the unfurling papers, 
reaching towards something much larger and yet contained in us. The description ends with the 
miniaturization theme mentioned in the introduction to my first chapter: all of this, “ville et 
jardin,” “est sorti […] de ma tasse de thé” (47). There is a rhythm of growing and shrinking 
established in this description: the “bol de porcelaine” of the teacup giving way to the expanding 
papers becoming flowers and houses which then become the flowers and houses of Combray 
before the passage ends by recalling the teacup where it began. It expands, contracts, and ends 
where it begins, opening and closing for the reader through its own mobile energy. The 
confrontation of two distinct temporalities in one moment necessitates this vibrant textual energy 
to guide the reader through the imaginative feeling of the complex cognitive process that is being 
described in addition to their intellectual understanding.  
Towards the end of the Recherche, the images of planes and stars come back one final 
time, in a description which blends time into energetic image. In the suite of revelations known 
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as the “adoration perpetuelle,” before the matinée at the Guermantes where he will meet Saint-
Loup’s daughter and discuss his now-dead friend with his widow Gilberte, the narrator spends 
some time thinking about the strange powers of dreams. His first example of dream-power is that 
of a rapid temporal collapse: dreams will “vous mettre une femme dans la peau, jusqu’à nous 
faire passionnément aimé pendant un sommeil de quelques minutes une laide, ce qui dans la vie 
réelle eût demandé des années d’habitude ” (TR 218). The time-bound operations of habit 
become freed of their usual demands. In a few moments only, passionate love blooms for a 
person it would take years to learn to love in real life. The time of the dream is compressed, and 
a bodily link takes the place of a slow development in time. In the narrator’s words “la 
puissance” of the physical experience compensates for “la durée” which is lacking (218). The 
narrator continues with another example of this temporal compression, here giving it a spatial 
structure: “[n]’avais-je pas vu souvent en une nuit, en une minute d’une nuit, des temps bien 
lointains, relégués à ces distances énormes où nous ne pouvons plus rien distinguer des 
sentiments que nous y éprouvions, fondre à tout vitesse sur vous, nous aveuglant de leur clarté 
(218-219). This reexperience of old feelings is described in terms of distances in space: there is a 
spatial-visual lexicon here including “vu” “lointains” “distance énorme” “distinguer” “vitesse” 
“aveuglant” and “clarté.” This sentence evokes two of the effects we have been associating with 
textual mobility. There is first and most concretely the evocation of speed: these distant times 
“fondre à tout vitesse” onto the dreamer. Secondly, there is a textual energy brought about by the 
surprising combination of ideas. These old feelings rushing toward us “nous aveuglant de leur 
clarté.” This visual description could stand in for many of the mobile effects of the text; they stun 
the reader with their precise visibility which defies our expectations of what texts can do. They 
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do not ask us to envision the motion of the real world, but rather feats of speed and light, of 
simultaneous presence and absence, halt and blur, that are uniquely textual creations.  
After this image of dream-included blinding clarity, Proust uses the image of planes and 
stars to illustrate this paradoxical effect. Like the tension we felt in Saint-Loup’s description of 
the planes as “définitivement assimilés” to the stars and nonetheless falling out of place, the 
following quote evokes both the visual indistinguishability of the lights and the mobile 
distinction of the planes from the stars. The “temps bien lointains” from the quote above blind us 
with their clarity “comme s’ils avaient été des avions géants au lieu des pales étoiles que nous 
croyions” (219). The pale stars we believe we see at a fixed distance we discover to be giant 
planes zooming down on us. Dreams thus collapse temporal distance via a shock, the 
simultaneous hit of multiple emotional states at once. Through this moment of shock, they make 
us feel as though we are reexperiencing these moments of our lives. However, despite this 
shocking power, the narrator ultimately rejects dreams and the associated image of planes as the 
model by which we undo the loss that time enacts. It is true that the shock of this emotional 
compression can be powerful “jusqu’à nous faire croire, à tort d’ailleurs, qu’ils étaient un des 
modes pour retrouver le Temps perdu” (218). Ultimately, a different visual-spatial model will 
help us understand how to “retrouver le Temps perdu”: that of the church as a prototype for 
vising time as a fourth spatial dimension. It is through these church images that we build to an 
imaginative model of time as synthetic spatial simultaneity.  
While the narrator and Saint-Loup are in Paris and discussing planes and stars, a brief 
aside about Saint-Loup ties the Recherche’s most spatially remarkable character to its final 
insights about time: “j’abordai Robert qui avait encore au front une cicatrice, plus auguste et plus 
mystérieuse pour moi que l’empreinte laissée sur la terre par le pied d’un géant” (65). Saint-Loup 
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is marked by his wartime experience, albeit temporarily, as implied by the “encore.” It is this 
trace of his experience within time that touches the narrator, the trace of something that has come 
and gone, like the footprint of a giant. On a larger level, by the nature of its textual medium a 
novel such as the Recherche can only suggest visual information, and through these traces the 
reader must construct their understanding of what the universe of the story could look like. My 
next chapter will begin with a giant, and ask what, at the end of the Recherche, becomes visible 

















CHAPTER 4: TIME 
This description of Saint-Loup’s scarred forehead, “plus auguste et plus mystérieuse pour 
moi que l’empreinte laissée sur la terre par le pied d’un géant,” has a lexical resonance with the 
close of the Recherche, which describes humans “comme des géants plongés dans les années” 
(353). In both cases, the image of a giant is linked to a temporal extension. While literary time is 
often considered in terms of narrative flow and halt,17 the image of the giant suggests a different 
sort of consideration: how does time function as a visualizable element of literary description? 
Jenny Odell writes of artist David Hockney’s understanding of temporality in painting that   
Hockney valued painting because of the medium’s relationship to time. According to 
him, an image contained the amount of time that went into making it, so that when 
someone looked at one of his paintings, they began to inhabit the physical, bodily time of 
its being painted. It’s no surprise, then, that Hockney initially disdained photography. 
Although he sometimes used it in studies for painting, he found a snapshot’s relationship 
to time unrealistic: ‘Photography is alright if you don’t mind looking at the world from 
the point of view of a paralyzed cyclops—for a split second,’ he said. ‘But that’s not what 
it’s like to live in the world, or to convey the experience of living in the world. (97) 
In Hockney’s view, time is not only the time taken in the process of viewing or reading. The time 
of artistic creation is embedded in artistic productions in a way that heightens their imaginative 
impact. Hockney is not saying that painting represents time by literally depicting multiple 
discrete moments, such as cubist practice might. Rather, the long process of painting, the 
repeated visits to the canvas and the repeated brushstrokes, portray an experiential truth 
 
17 Lessing’s Laocoon and Joseph Frank’s “Spatial Form in Modern Literature” are seminal texts on time and 
narration. Krieger’s Ekphrasis: The Illusion of the Natural Sign, Hagstrom’s The Sister Arts: The Tradition of 
Literary Pictorialism and English Poetry from Dryden to Gray, and James Heffernan’s Museum of Words: The 
Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery are some benchmark texts that treat narrative time in terms of 
descriptive writing and writing about visual art.  
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impossible to capture in the ostensibly more realistic medium of photography. This is because 
we ourselves are always embedded in time as well as in in space. For Hockney, painting is thus 
analogous to human experience as it is imbued with the time it took to create it, but photography 
exists artificially outside of time and reduces three-dimensional sight to two dimensions. 
Hockney’s “paralyzed cyclops” is the opposite of Proust’s giant: the immobilized cyclops cannot 
vary his view or perceive depth, but Proust’s giant functions as a doubly powerful temporal 
extender. In the quote about Saint-Loup, the giant represents an impossibly ancient time, of 
which there can be only traces. Saint-Loup’s scar is the trace of an anterior moment in his life, 
closer on an objective temporal scale than the mythic giant, but just as unknowable—and far 
more precious—for the narrator. The giant is a symbol of the unknowability of the past that 
nonetheless communicates with the present, leaving traces and scars. In the Recherche’s closing 
passage, the giant’s outsized spatial extension indicates the possibility of directly perceiving 
temporal depth.   
Hockey chooses a paralyzed cyclops in particular for his complaint about photography, 
because depth perception hinges on having more than one image to compare, something the one-
eyed giant lacks. Depth perception does not spontaneously occur but happens over time as we 
learn to recognize the world has solidity and extension. The pioneering eighteenth-century 
cataract surgeries undertaken by William Cheselden showed that this was a learned process and 
not an immediate ability. One of his patients recovering from surgery described how “‘all objects 
whatever touched his eyes, as what he felt did his skin’: his vision was imbued with the 
sensuousness of touch” (Plunkett 391). This patient had not yet developed the understanding that 
objects exist extended in space and not immediately present in a two-dimensional visual field. To 
return to Shattuck’s observations about stereoscopic vision in the Recherche discussed in chapter 
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two, his main point is that an accurate picture of a given subject can only be constructed by two 
or more perspectives. As he writes,   
All these figures of altitude are in reality images of an extended and deepened vision. 
Altitude represents the capacity to see far, to bring together and combine in the mind’s 
eye images enormously removed from one another. The magic lantern which transforms 
Marcel’s room in the opening pages metamorphoses at the end into the stereoscopic 
vision of a giant standing erect in life and thus commanding Time. (130) 
Shattuck footnotes this passage with another giant, in the following quotation from a 1932 text 
on optics discussing the use of stereoscopic photographs during war to find enemy guns: “‘In 
other words, the scene in the stereoscope appeared to the observer exactly as the original scene 
would have appeared to a giant with an interpupillary distance equal to the stereoscopic base’” 
(153). Proust’s giants in time and this stereoscope-as-giant contrast with Hockney’s paralyzed 
cyclops, representing the potential for a greater-than perspective: greater than a singular point of 
view, temporal or spatial, on a singular scene. The multiplication of perspectival points in time as 
in space creates depth, and the aim of this chapter is to show how the reader of the Recherche is 
trained to blend time and space, accessing an imaginative understanding of time as a fourth 
spatial dimension.  
The novel’s close combines the openness of potentiality and the density and depth of 
what has been experienced. Reflecting on the work he has begun, the narrator tells us: 
Aussi, si elle m’était laissé assez longtemps pour accomplir mon œuvre, ne manquerais-je 
pas d’abord d’y décrire les hommes, cela dût-il les faire ressembler à des êtres 
monstrueux, comme occupant une place si considérable, à côté de celle si restreinte qui 
leur est réservée dans l’espace, une place au contraire prolongée sans mesure puisqu’ils 
touchent simultanément, comme des géants plongés dans les années à des époques, 
vécues par eux si distants, entre lesquelles tant de jours sont venus si placer—dans le 
Temps. (TR 353) 
While the images discussed in the previous chapter are of a complexity that poses an imaginative 
challenge to the reader, the challenge is even greater in the case of seeing time. Seeing in a fourth 
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dimension is a practical problem as well as a conceptual one: we can only imagine dimensions 
we have already seen. Physicists can walk a reader through a conceptual exercise of what a one- 
or two-dimensional existence would be like, and, as we saw in the introduction with Abbott’s 
1884 novel Flatland, literature can be handy in these kinds of thought experiments. But in 
addition to the reader’s comparative ease at imagining “Pointland,” “Lineland,” and “Flatland,” 
we also saw how once the two-dimensional narrator asks his three-dimensional teacher about the 
four-dimensional world he believes must exist, teacher and reader are both confronted with the 
insufficiently of their imagination. While we can to some extent envision a world limited to two, 
one, or no dimensions because we have the ideas of a point and a line and a flat plane in our 
three-dimensional reality, we have no spatial tools with which to construct an imaginative notion 
of a fourth dimension. Proust proposes a literary solution to this practical and conceptual 
problem. He introduces four-dimensional space in Du côté de chez Swann in his description of 
the Combray church. For the young narrator, this church is “un édifice occupant, si l’on peut 
dire, un espace à quatre dimensions—la quatrième étant celle du temps” (60). We will see below 
in more detail how Proust inscribes this fourth dimension into his description of the church 
through his evocation of the repeated motions of the devout slowly alternating the building’s 
structure that inscribe passing time on its materiality, and through the self-propelling image-
energy that emanates from the church, opening it the ever-incomplete potentiality of the future.  
As the narrator experiences his first involuntary memory, he recalls the Combray church 
as both the literal and figurative center of the town, as chapter one discussed: it stands “résumant 
la ville, la représentant, parlant d’elle et pour elle aux lointains” (Du côté de chez Swann 47). 
This idea of the church as a centering and structuring object returns throughout the novel, and 
church images function both as lessons in artistic production and reception, and as temporal 
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anchor points through the narrator’s life. At each reprise, the narrator meditates on the aesthetic 
and affective qualities (or lack thereof) of the church at hand. In addition to these thematic 
considerations, these extended meditations ask the reader to mentally build churches and this 
repeated practice prepares us to grapple with the Recherche’s final image of a human life 
stretched into four dimensions, like a giant smeared across time and space.  
In the passage below, the narrator describes his childhood visits to the Combray church 
on Sundays:  
Pendant que ma tante devisait ainsi avec Françoise, j’accompagnais mes parents à la 
messe. Que je l’aimais, que je la revois bien, notre Église ! Son vieux porche par lequel 
nous entrions, noir, grêlé comme une écumoire, était dévié et profondément creusé aux 
angles (de même que le bénitier où il nous conduisait) comme si le doux effleurement des 
mantes des paysannes entrant à l’église et leurs doigts timides prenant de l’eau bénite, 
pouvait, répété pendant des siècles, acquérir une force destructive, infléchir la pierre et 
l’entailler de sillons comme en trace la roue des carrioles dans la borne contra laquelle 
elle bute tous les jours. Ses pierres tombales, sous lesquelles la noble poussière des abbés 
de Combray, enterrés là, faisait au chœur comme un pavage spiritual, n’étaient plus elles-
mêmes de la matière inerte et dure, car le temps les avait rendues douces et fait couler 
comme du miel hors des limites de leur propre équarrissure qu’ici elles avaient dépassées 
d’un flot blond, entraînant à la dérive une majuscule gothique en fleurs, noyant les 
violettes blanches du marbre ; et en deçà desquelles, ailleurs, elles s’étaient résorbées, 
contractant encore l’elliptique inscription latine, introduisant un caprice de plus dans la 
disposition de ces caractères abrégés, rapprochant deux lettres d’un mot dont les autres 
avaient été démesurément distendues. Ses vitraux ne chatoyaient jamais tant que les jours 
où le soleil se montrait peu, de sorte que fit-il gris dehors, on était sûr qu’il ferait beau 
dans l’église ; l’un était rempli dans toute sa grandeur par un seul personnage pareil à un 
Roi de jeu de cartes, qui vivait là-haut, sous un dais architectural, entre ciel et terre (et 
dans le reflet oblique et bleu duquel, parfois les jours de semaine, à midi, quand il n’y pas 
d’office—à l’un de ces rares moments où l’église aérée, plus humaine, luxueuse, avec du 
soleil sur son riche mobilier, avait l’air presque habitable comme le hall, de pierre 
sculptée et de verre peint, d’un hôte de style Moyen Âge—on voyait s’agenouiller un 
instant Mme Sazerat, posant sur le prie-Dieu voisin un paquet tout ficelé de petits fours 
qu’elle venait de prendre chez le pâtissier d’en face et qu’elle allait rapporter pour le 
déjeuner) ; dans un autre une montagne de neige rose, au pied de laquelle se livrait un 
combat, semblait avoir givré à même la verrière qu’elle boursouflait de son trouble grésil 
comme une vitre à laquelle il serait resté quelques flocons, mais des flocons éclaires par 
quelque aurore […]. (58-59)   
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The narrator’s description begins with a rhapsodic “[q]ue je l’aimais, que je le revois bien, notre 
Église !” The strong affective sensations associated with the church—love and community pride 
(“notre Eglise”)—bookend a specifically visual and imaginative verb—“que je le revois bien.” 
His love and his sense of belonging allow him to clearly “re-see” the church of his childhood. 
Repetition is an important feature of this description. First, there is the literal repetition of his 
visits to the church with his parents indicated in the imperfect tense with which the above 
paragraph begins (“j’accompagnais”). There is then a descriptive of repetition as destructive 
power through the slow accumulation of small movements. The church is worn “comme si le 
doux effleurement des mantes de paysannes entrant à l’église et de leurs doigts timides prenant 
de l’eau bénite, pouvait, répété pendant des siècles, acquérir une force destructive.” This 
counterintuitive equation of the soft sweeping of fabric and of timid fingers with destructive 
force prefigures a tension that continues through the whole of the novel, which I described in my 
first chapter as the tension between material power and material instability.  
The narrator then moves into a description of the stone of the church itself, which 
continues to play with the tension between softness and power. “Ses pierres tombales,” he tells 
us, “n’étaient plus elles-mêmes de la matière inerte et dure, car le temps les avait rendues douces 
et fait couler comme du miel hors des limites de leur propre équarrissure.” Time, far from 
binding the stones of the church into a fixed pattern, has freed them from their material 
limitations. The adjectives “interte” and “dur” contrast with “douces” and the noun “miel,” 
forming a chiasmus:  
 matière inerte et dure […] rendues douces […] comme du miel 
The reader’s pleasure in this description is reinforced by this structural contrast between inert 
stone and liquid honey, and between hardness and softness. The singularly material initial 
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terms—the stone is inert and hard—give way to the doubly material and gustatory secondary 
terms. “Douce” means both soft and sweet, and honey evokes the paradoxically liquid quality of 
the stone and is of course also a sweet substance itself. This description thus associatively recalls 
the sweetness of the narrator’s involuntary memory experience with the madeleine, and this echo 
between pastry and sweetness is again reinforced by the reference to Mme. Sazerat kneeling next 
to a packet of petits fours.  
This passage invokes the relationship of an image to the surface which contains it, most 
famously demonstrated in the magic lantern passage where the child narrator’s bedroom walls 
become unfamiliar when covered with projections of scenes from a story. While that experience 
provoked anxiety and discomfort in the narrator,18 these feelings are not echoed in this passage. 
Rather, the church seems to be the proper space for this relationship of image to surface to be 
explored as the church interior functions as a playground of light and color. While the magic 
lantern is an external apparatus that changes the narrator’s room, the church here seems to be its 
own image-generator; both the lantern and the walls onto which it projects: “[s]es vitres ne 
chatoyaient jamais tant que les jours où le soleil se montrait peu, de sorte que fit-il gris dehors, 
on était sûr qu’il ferait beau dans l’église.” The narrator highlights several images: “un seul 
personnage pareil à un Roi de jeu de cartes” suspended between sky and earth on one of the 
church’s windows and the aforementioned Mme Sazerat kneeling in the “reflet oblique et bleu” 
of the empty noontime church. The third tableau, a “montagne de neige rose” at the base of 
 
18 Proust writes of the young narrator’s reaction to the magic lantern, which was supposed to distract him on 
evenings when he was sad, that “ma tristesse n’était qu’accrue, parce que rien que le changement d’éclairage 
détruisait l’habitude que j’avais de ma chambre et grâce à quoi, sauf le supplice du coucher, elle m’était devenue 




which a battle is occurring19 is described in terms of an image and the surface it occupies: the 
combat “semblait avoir givré à même la verrière qu’elle boursouflait de son trouble grésil.” 
Rather than an image projected onto a surface, this image swells the surface, puffing it up. The 
description of a “trouble grésil,” evoking hail, references repetition, as if repeated tiny hits of hail 
have changed the very structure of the glass, the same way repeated passes of fingers have 
changed the structure of the font. The source of this change to the glass, though, is not a physical 
action, even a very light one, but rather the imagined action of the image on the glass. The image 
changes the surface which contains it. 
In the same passage, the narrator describes a mobile dance of colors from another piece 
of stained glass in the church:  
“[S]oit qu’un rayon eût brillé, soit que mon regard en bougeant eût promené à travers la 
verrière tour à tour éteinte et rallumée, un mouvant et précieux incendie, l’instant d’après 
elle avait pris l’éclat changeant d’une traîne de paon, puis elle tremblait et ondulait en une 
pluie flamboyante et fantastique qui dégouttait du haut de la voûte sombre et rocheuse, le 
long des parois humides, comme si c’était dans le nef de quelque grotte irisée de 
sinueuses stalactites que je suivais mes parents […]. (59)  
Before this description, the narrator has been continuing to enumerate the discreet images he has 
seen in the church, describing a set of little rectangular windows that remind him of a deck of 
cards. Suddenly something changes. This change is luminous, but it is not clear what causes it. It 
might be a change from outside the church (“soit qu’un rayon eût brillé”) or a perspectival 
change from the narrator’s movement (“soit que mon regard en bougeant eût promené”). In both 
cases, the discreet images on the stained-glass windows give way to luminous cascades of color 
and motion. The windows are “tour à tour éteinte et rallumée, un mouvant et précieux incendie,” 
 
19 Note the perspectival shift necessitated by the order in which the elements of this scene are introduced: “une 
montagne de neige rose, au pied de laquelle se livrait un combat.” The mention first of the mountain of pink snow 
makes it oversize in the reader’s imagination. It must then be moved into the background in the second part of the 
description when the actual subject of the scene (a battle at the mountain’s base) is revealed.  
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then they are “l’éclat changeant d’une traine de paon,” and finally they “tremblait et ondulait en 
une pluie flamboyante et fantastique.” All three of these figurations evoke light and color: 
“rallumée” “incendie” “éclat” “train de paon” “flamboyante.” All three as well evoke change and 
motion: “mouvant” “changeant” “ondulait.” In addition to these general evocations of motion, 
there is in the first image a flickering of light (from “éteinte” to “rallumée” and in the reference 
to fire), in the second an unfolding evoked by the image of a peacock’s spread-out feathers, and 
in the third there is the passive downward motion of rain that is also energetically vibrating 
(“tremblait”).  
These luminous images then leave their windows entirely, and there is a complete 
interpenetration of space and image: the rain “dégouttait du haut de la voûte sombre et rocheuse 
[…] comme si c’était dans le nef de quelque grotte irisée de sinueuse stalactites que je suivais 
mes parents.” The church’s stones are reevoked in a way that brings natural space into the 
constructed space of the church. The idea of the “nef” of a “grotte” creates an impossible space, 
one both humanly and naturally sacred, and penetrated by light. The falling light from the 
stained-glass windows becomes the iridescence of the sinuous stalactites. The reference to 
stalactites encapsulates again the theme of repetition: each tiny, ephemeral water drop that 
creates a stalactite is like the repeated play of light and color from the church’s windows that has 
given the space a self-illuminating quality. The final detail that the narrator is following his 
parents makes this image all the more dynamic: his experience of the scene is in flux rather than 
from a singular perspective.  
From this rich description of the Combray church, two paths through the Recherche’s 
churches to its final image present themselves. On the first path, we trace how churches become 
an important part of the narrator’s artistic apprenticeship, suggesting, above all, questions about 
162 
 
the relationship of surface beauty to temporal depth in determining the aesthetic value of a given 
object. This line of questioning will lead the narrator the importance of presenting his characters 
as “plongés dans les années” in his own novel. This path through the novel will guide us from 
the Combray Church to other geographical locations, from the countryside near Balbec to 
Venice. The second path is more directly personal to the narrator, and hinges less on aesthetics 
and more on the experiential presence of the Combray church. While the first path takes us 
through the body of the Recherche as a whole, this second one unifies two far disparate 
moments, the young narrator’s love of his church, demonstrated above, and the adult narrator’s 
reconsideration of this church as the object of indifference and then of memorialization 
following its destruction in World War I. Both paths, that of artistic instruction and that of 
experience and memory, guide the reader to the spatialized temporality of the novel’s closing 
words.   
Proust uses a path simile to map the narrator’s cognition in the wake of Albertine’s death 
in Albertine disparue, to examine the different mental routes we take to arrive in the same place. 
It is helpful, here, to demonstrate the linked but disjointed movements through time and space 
that characterize the geography and temporality of the Recherche, which our two paths through 
the novel’s churches will highlight:  
En effet en nous, de chaque idée comme d’un carrefour dans une forêt, partent tant de 
routes différentes, qu’au moment où je m’y attendais le moins je me trouvais devant un 
nouveau souvenir. Le titre de la mélodie de Fauré, Le Secret, m’avait mené au Secret du 
roi du duc de Broglie, le nom de Broglie à celui de Chaumont. Ou bien le mot de 
Vendredi Saint m’avait fait penser au Golgotha, le Golgotha à l’étymologie de ce mot 
qui, lui, paraît l’équivalent de Calvus mons, Chaumont. Mais par quelque chemin que je 
fusse arrivé à Chaumont, à ce moment j’étais frappé d’un choc si cruel que dès lors je 
pensais bien plus à me garer contre la douleur qu’à lui demander des souvenirs. Quelques 
instants après le choc, l’intelligence qui, comme le bruit du tonnerre, ne voyage pas aussi 
vite, m’en apportait la raison. Chaumont m’avait fait penser aux Buttes-Chaumont où 
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Mme Bontemps m’avait dit qu’Andrée allait souvent avec Albertine, tandis qu’Albertine 
m’avait dit n’avoir jamais vu les Buttes-Chaumont. (124-125) 
This “carrefour” of memory is at first glance a fairly straightforward simile—many roads leading 
out of a crossroads means many roads leading in, and the narrator’s point is that he can arrive at 
the same memory via a number of cognitive routes. He gives several examples in which word 
association leads him back to the word Chaumont, which reminds him of the Buttes-Chaumont 
park and thus to the debilitating jealousy he felt at the thought of Albertine’s potential sexual 
relationships with women such as Andrée. These linguistic roads start at different places, maybe 
a musical piece, maybe Good Friday, but they lead to the same memory. Examining the passage 
more closely, though, the cognitive experience is the narrator is describing is more than a simple 
associative lexical chain. At a certain moment in this associative process, the communication 
system—the mental ‘language’ in which is the narrator is communicating with himself—sharply 
changes. In the moment when he arrives at the word Chaumont, the chain of associative but still 
intellectual reasoning he has been following is abruptly broken: “à ce moment j’étais frappé d’un 
choc si cruel que dès lors je pensais bien plus à me garer contre la douleur qu’à lui demander des 
souvenirs.” Rather than the moving along a smooth cognitive path from Chaumont to Buttes-
Chaumont to the memory of Albertine’s lie, the Chaumont step triggers an emotional explosion 
that the narrator is unable at first to withstand, wishing to leave the path entirely. 
This pain is short lived, however, as the narrator’s understanding catches up with his 
emotional response, explaining and soothing: “[q]uelques instants après le choc, l’intelligence 
qui, comme le bruit de tonnerre, ne voyage pas aussi vite, m’en apportait la raison.” In this 
process, the narrator’s mind is not advancing along a path smoothly from point to point, even if 
we allow that this path is crisscrossed by a vast number of other paths. Rather the path itself is 
not stable, and different parts of the mind are apt to move along it at different speeds. In this 
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case, the narrator’s emotional self leaps from Chaumont to Buttes-Chaumont with the speed of 
lightening. Lightening is a doubly fitting attribution, implying both speed and damage. The 
narrator is not just surprised by the emotion he feels, it is so painful he wishes to flee it without 
understanding its cause. It is as if lightening has hit the path ahead of him and his first impulse is 
to flee into the woods without assessing what has happened. His fear of the lightening and the 
emotional wound it opens dissipate when the narrator understands the reason for his response, 
which is like thunder which is simultaneous but registered at a delay. The explanation itself 
serves as a salve, and the narrator can calmly walk away from the memory-path, safe from its 
shock effect until it surprises him again.   
Path One: The Church as Artistic Instruction  
 With this understanding that our reading paths, like the narrator’s mental ones, are non-
linear, affective, and associative, we can begin down the first. Here, at a recently restored church 
in Marcouville-l’Orgueilleuse, the narrator brings Albertine on a daytrip during his second visit 
to Balbec, in Sodome et Gomorrhe. Their joint viewing leads to a mis-en-scène of the 
intermedial considerations of architecture:  
Sur son église, moitié neuve, moitié restaurée, le soleil déclinant étendait sa patine aussi 
belle que celle des siècles. À travers elle les grands bas-reliefs semblaient n’être vus que 
sous une couche fluide, moitié liquide, moitié lumineuse ; la Sainte Vierge, sainte 
Élisabeth, sainte Joachim, nageaient encore dans l’impalpable remous, presque à sec, à 
fleur d’eau ou fleur de soleil. […] « Elle ne me plaît pas, elle est restaurée » me dit-elle 
[Albertine] en me montrant l’église et se souvenant de ce qu’Elstir lui avait dit sur la 
précieuse, sur l’inimitable beauté de vieilles pierres. Albertine savait reconnaître tout de 
suite une restauration. On ne pouvait que s’étonner de la sûreté de goût qu’elle avait déjà 
en architecture, au lieu du déplorable qu’elle gardait en musique. Pas plus qu’Elstir, je 
n’aimais cette église, c’est sans me faire plaisir que sa façade ensoleillée était venue se 
poser devant mes yeux, et je n’étais descendu la regarder que pour être agréable à 
Albertine. Et pourtant je trouvais que le grand impressionniste était en contradiction avec 
lui-même ; pourquoi ce fétichisme attaché à la valeur architecturale objective, sans tenir 
compte de la transfiguration de l’église dans le couchant ? (402-403) 
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The context of this passage repeatedly highlights its theme of aesthetic consideration; before 
driving to Marcouville-l’Orgueilleuse Albertine had been painting a church in Quetteholme 
(401) and in the section cut from the quote above, the narrator is commenting on Albertine’s 
clothing and accessories (402). The passage itself draws attention to the difference between 
Elstir’s views on painting and his views on architecture, and Albertine’s taste in architecture 
versus her taste in music. The narrator signals to us that he does not particularly like the church 
he is viewing, but the opening description is a striking recollection of the fluid materiality we 
saw in the Combray church: “le soleil déclinant étendait sa patine aussi belle que celle des 
siècles. À travers elle les grands bas-reliefs semblaient n’être vus que sous une couche fluide, 
moitié liquide, moitié lumineuse.” Of course, there is a distinction here between the materiality 
of two churches implied in the distinction between the effect of the sun and that of time. The 
liquidity and luminosity of the Balbec church seem to radiate from its stones themselves, 
whereas this passage keeps the emphasis on superficiality of this description: “sa patine” and 
“une couche” both indicating a primarily surface-level appraisal. However, this luminous patina 
of liquid sunlight is “aussi belle” as the transformations of time. This is a purely aesthetic 
judgment, lacking the affective resonances of the narrator’s description of the Combray church, 
but it prepares the reader for the narrator’s critique of Elstir’s inconsistency.  
As they stand in front of the church, Albertine tells the narrator that “[e]lle ne me plaît 
pas, elle est restaurée.” The two halves of this utterance have a causal relationship: because the 
church is restored, I do not like it. She has learned both how to recognize and how to appraise a 
restored church from Elstir, who had praised “l’inimitable beauté des vieilles pierres.” The 
certainty with which she pronounces her judgement on the Marcouville-l’Orgueilleuse church 
both amuses the narrator by its learned contrast to Albertine’s poor taste in music, and leads him 
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to consider the aesthetic implications of this architectural lesson she has learned so well from 
Elstir. Although the narrator agrees with the ultimate conclusion to which Albertine’s Elstir-
esque reasoning leads her, letting the reader know that “pas plus qu’Elstir, je n’aimais cette 
église,” he nonetheless disagrees with Elstir’s logic. Elstir’s methodology in painting privileges 
the primacy of impression over any evaluation of the inherent qualities of the represented object 
itself. Striking impressions, be they of asparagus, Odette de Crécy in drag, or ships that look like 
buildings, determine what is worthy of representation, not their objective value.20 The 
implications of Elstir’s and Albertine’s negative judgment of restored churches extends beyond 
intellectual exercise. Remember that this scene opened with Albertine painting a different 
church. This church at Quetteholme represents the preservation and extension of the deep past: 
“à la surface riante de la pierre affleuraient des anges qui continuaient, devant notre couple de 
XXe siècle, à célébrer les cérémonies du XIIIe” (401). The question of what gets represented and 
why is thus raised both diegetically (Albertine paints the Quetteholme church rather than the 
Marcouville-l’Orgueilleuse church) and metareferentially (we are reading representations of both 
churches). Elstir evaluating churches is not the same Elstir who models aesthetic openness in JF 
but rather a figure more like the petulant young poet from “Chardin et Rembrandt,” with the 
restored church standing in for the Chardinian kitchen. The lesson seems to be the same: why 
allow your a priori evaluation of an object to distract you from the ever-present possibility of 
beautiful accidents of mood and light? The “transfiguration de l’église dans le couchant” that the 
narrator sees at Marcouville-l’Orgeuilleuse is one of these beautiful accidents, like the dining 
room table still lifes of “Chardin et Rembrandt” and JF.  
 
20 In addition to impressionist painters, one of Proust’s sources for Elstir’s characters was the French art historian 
Émile Mâle, who studied religious art and architecture. This is perhaps in part the source of the disconnect between 
Elstir’s thoughts on painting and those on architecture (Fraisse 1990: 19). 
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At this point we need to ask, if Elstir is wrong to evaluate churches differently than other 
sorts of aesthetic material, is there anything distinct about churches in the representational 
philosophy of the Recherche? This restored church, it seems, is serving as an intellectual exercise 
that ultimately reaffirms the methodology of first impressions with which the reader is already 
familiar. The narrator is indicating the beauty of the sun-draped façade of an otherwise 
unattractive church, but he is not invested in this beauty, and by proxy, it is unlikely the reader 
will be either. Imaginatively, this passage is not really asking the reader to do anything new. 
Imagining a layer of liquid light which beautifies the stones is something which the reader is 
well-prepared to do not only by a number of liquid and luminous effects in the novel in general 
(see chapter two) but by the specific application of these effects to the Combray church. 
Otherwise we are mostly asked to test Elstir’s ideas for consistency with the narrator. It is not 
clear that the conclusion at which the narrator arrives—Elstir’s aesthetic philosophy is 
inconsistent in the matter of restored churches—is of any great import to the narrator.  
The restored church, in other words, has little to teach us. In too fully belonging to the 
present, the restored church lacks a true fourth dimension, as does the church considered only as 
a historical artefact. This second case occurs when the narrator visits the Balbec church, which 
loses the magic of the narrator’s imagined version: looking at the statue of the Virgin Mary, he 
laments “c’était elle enfin, l’œuvre d’art immortelle et si longtemps désirée, que je trouvais 
métamorphosée, ainsi que l’église elle-même, en une petite vieille de pierre dont je pouvais 
mesurer la hauteur et compter les rides” (JF 284). The restored church has too little time because 
it has not been able to undergo the layered changes that make time truly visible. The church 
considered only as a historical object has the opposite problem; it is weighed down by too much 
time and thus not open to dynamic change. Like the paralyzed cyclops of photography with 
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which we began the chapter, the restored church and the merely historical church are both 
temporally impoverished, the former through the foreshortened past dimension and the latter 
through the foreshortened future dimension. Note that in neither case is the church in question 
necessarily uninteresting or unworthy of aesthetic representation and contemplation. We saw 
above that a restored church can be the site of similarly beautiful material effects as an older one. 
In the absence of aesthetic effects, one can learn understand the historical value of the church in 
question, which is what the narrator does with the Balbec church,21 in effect becoming better 
“readers” if not “seers” of the church at hand. In addition, the difference between a church that is 
time-impoverished or time-mired and one that is fully temporally dimensional is at least in part a 
matter of subjective affective investment. The narrator experiences the Combray church as 
existing in four dimensions not because of its objective qualities but because of his own 
experience, literal and imaginative, with that space. Other churches, and perhaps other spaces, 
could have the same qualities for other people: a mix of fluctuating, fascinating aesthetic effects 
and an individual and communal affective grounding. It is this combination that the narrator 
experiences as the visible fourth dimension.   
When attending to the status of architecture in the Recherche, it is easy to get mired in the 
exigencies of understanding historical specificity, and to consider architecture as a less 
imaginatively mobile art form than painting or prose. Here we can return to Anne Henry’s 
comments, quoted in my first chapter, about the status of architecture in the Recherche. Recall 
that Henry argued that architectural works are style-bound in the time of their creation and thus 
doomed to remain inaccessible to future generations in the absence of specific training. It is true 
that Proust’s aesthetic goals are not in line with art solely as historical preservation or 
 
21 See JF 475-477, where Elstir explains the historical and artistic value of the church to the narrator.  
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remembrance.22 However, the enemy here is not the passing of time, but rather the notion of 
finitude. The narrator remarks, contemplating his own creation, “combien de grandes cathédrales 
restent inachevées!” after using an architectural metaphor for great works of literature, parts of 
which “ne seront sans doute jamais finies, à cause de l’ampleur même du plan de l’architecte” 
(338). An incomplete work, even thrust deep in the past, retains its dynamism through this lack 
of completion. This in fact extends the time dimension of a given work indefinitely, as an 
incomplete work necessarily evokes its own potential continuation. This is true even when we 
are ultimately reminded—and how true this is in the case of the Recherche itself—that it can 
never be finished.  
The aesthetic, the affective, and the temporal layer together in Proust’s most evocative 
church scenes, deepening both the narrator’s appreciation and the reader’s imaginative 
experience. This imagistic depth is what, as we saw in the introduction, Bergotte identifies in the 
“petit pan de mur jaune” he notices in the Vermeer painting Vue de Delft. Standing in front of the 
painting that will be the last thing he sees, Bergotte thinks to himself that his writing should have 
been more like the “petit pan de mur jaune”: “[m]es derniers livres étaient trop secs, il aurait 
fallu passer plusieurs couches de couleur, rendre ma phrase en elle-même précieuse, comme ce 
petit pan de mur jaune” (La Prisonnière 199). The “petit pan” thus represents saturation and 
layered attention and weds a method of work—taking many passes—to an aesthetic outcome, 
here exemplified by Bergotte’s emotion at this detail. Like Hockney’s notion of the time 
 
22 In an analysis of Proust’s notes and drawings in scholarly manuals of medieval art, Leriche writes that Proust was 
aware that “1. there is a cultural history of art and of the gaze, that renders illegible to him most works from past 
eras, unless he approaches them with the aid of works of erudition; 2. these works are thus neither universal nor 
intelligible a priori, on first viewing; 3. it is not the work of visual art that allows us to see the world; rather, on the 
contrary, lived and sensory experiences make us attentive to a work’s most minute details, even non-symbolic ones. 
The work of art therefore functions as a mirror onto which the viewer’s gaze is projected. According to the Proustian 
theory of reading, are we not our own reader?” (170).  
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dimension in painting, another way of expressing what is precious about the many layers of the 
“petit pan” is that it has a certain depth in time. Proust and Hockney thus share a notion of the 
materiality of the time dimension in painting in which layers of paint correspond to the time of 
creation. But Bergotte’s revelation here is not just about painting. Rather, he understands the 
genius of Vermeer’s work in the same moment that he realizes the failure of his own, that he did 
not layer his writing in the same way. The comparison and self-critique are multi-medial: 
Bergotte has learned something about how to write by seeing how a master painted. This 
principle of layers is shared by painting and literature, at least in Bergotte’s mind.  
Proust returns to this idea of layering in Le Temps retrouvé. The narrator explicitly 
evokes layering as he finally begins to write and realizes that  
comme des individualités (humaines ou non) sont dans un livre faites d’impressions 
nombreuses qui, prise de bien des jeunes filles, de bien des églises, de bien de sonates, 
servent à faire une seule sonate, une seule église, une seule jeune fille, ne ferais-je pas 
mon livre de la façon que Françoise faisait ce bœuf mode […] dont tant de morceaux de 
viande ajoutés et choisis enrichissaient la gelée ? (340)  
It is important here not to conflate the work the narrator is producing with the work Proust has 
produced.23 Though the beginning of the sentence is hypothetical (“dans un livre”) the reader can 
hardly help but see Albertine, the Combray church, and Vinteuil’s sonata as the specific 
examples of the of the general objects evoked, but the book the narrator is writing remains 
hypothetical (“ne ferais-je pas” “would I not make”). What is important in this passage is not the 
description of a specific textual object but the elaboration of an additional element in the 
principle of layering. The idea of a book being made as Françoise’s boeuf mode is made is not 
just a reaffirmation of a principle of multiplicity. It is not enough to say that one uses a lot of 
pieces of meat to make a boeuf mode, or one uses a number of impressions of young women to 
 
23 See Joshua Landy’s article “Proust, His Narrator, and the Importance of the Distinction.”  
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construct an Albertine, or one makes a “petit pan de mur jaune” by layering a lot of strokes of 
yellow paint. This culinary comparison is both the multiplicity of elements and the individual 
time of creation. Putting lots of pieces of meat together in a pan on the counter will not make a 
dinner to impress Monseiur Norpois, and all the girls I saw in my adolescence have never led to 
me to create an archetypal “jeune fille en fleur” in art. In Françoise’s cooking, Proust’s writing, 
and Vermeer’s painting, there are elements of individual taste and of change over time. The 
component parts of a composite creation must be allowed to blend and incorporate to form a 
cohesive object.  
To consider one more church on this path through the narrator’s artistic apprenticeship, 
the description of the narrator’s trip to Venice and time at Saint-Marc basilica combines art, 
affect, and personal and historical temporal perspectives. In a general sense, the narrator’s visit 
to Venice is densely layered with temporal references. He has longed to visit the city since 
childhood but could not on account of his health, meaning that his trip has already been 
anticipated in desire and imagination. In addition, when he finally does visit, the narrator is 
undergoing a continually changing process of grief following Albertine’s death. These personal 
histories coupled with the age and beauty of the city itself make a rich terrain for speculation on 
individual and collective relationships to time. To get a sense of the complexity and importance 
of these speculations, we will examine Proust’s description of Saint-Marc in two parts. In the 
first, we will foreground the narrator’s sense of the edifice itself, and the descriptive overlaps 
between this passage and the Combray church description from the first volume. We will then 
turn to the affective and aesthetic associations the narrator attaches to the church, and what these 
associations reveal to us about art and time in general. 
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Like the Combray church standing in for the narrator’s memories of the town as a whole, 
Saint-Marc comes to stand in for a certain type of Venetian scene:  
C’est le plus souvent pour Saint-Marc que je partais, et avec d’autant plus de plaisir que, 
comme il fallait d’abord prendre une gondole pour s’y rendre, l’église ne se représentait 
pas à moi comme un simple monument, mais comme le terme d’un trajet sur l’eau marine 
et printanière, avec laquelle Saint-Marc faisait pour moi un tout indivisible et vivant. 
Nous entrions ma mère et moi dans le baptistère, foulant tous deux les mosaïques de 
marbre et de verre du pavage, ayant devant nous les larges arcades dont le temps a 
légèrement infléchi les surfaces évasées et roses, ce qui donne à l’église, là où il a 
respecté la fraîcheur de ce coloris, l’air d’être construite dans une matière douce et 
malléable comme la cire de géantes alvéoles ; là au contraire il a racorni la matière et où 
les artistes l’ajourée et rehaussée d’or, d’être la précieuse reliure, en quelque cuir de 
Cordoue, du colossal évangile de Venise (Albertine disparue 225-226). 
As with the initial description of the Combray church above, the narrator is not describing a 
singular viewing instance, but the temporal accretion of repeated visits forming a composite 
picture. The narrator’s love for the church is in part due to the gondola rides he takes to get there, 
the “trajet sur l’eau marine et printanière” that is an inseparable part of his experience of Saint-
Marc. Before he mentions Saint-Marc directly in the passage above, he describes how from his 
hotel room he felt “l’ombre tiède et le soleil verdâtre filaient comme sur une surface flottante et 
évoquaient le voisinage mobile, l’illumination, la miroitante instabilité du flot” (225). In the 
Combray description, the luminous images that fill the church from the stained-glass windows 
seem to be self-generating and form a sort of image-rain that creates the impression of a grotto 
filled with iridescent stalactites. In this Venice description, a similar living luminosity is 
provided by the water-bound nature of the city itself, which colors all of the narrator’s 
impressions. The canals create this hall-of-mirrors effect, making a constantly changing 
landscape that the narrator follows to Saint-Marc.  
Proust’s depiction of Saint-Marc’s particular materiality again echoes what we have 
previously seen in the Combray church. As the earlier description evoked how the church’s 
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stones were imprinted by the continual movement of villagers through the centuries, Saint-Marc 
too carries the material inscription of time: “le temps a légèrement infléchi les surfaces évasées 
et roses.” As is the case in Combray, this temporal inscription has undone the association of 
stone with fixity and permanence, here giving the church “l’air d’être construite dans une matière 
douce et malléable comme la cire des géants alvéoles.” This description is doubly antithetical to 
our habitual associations with stone, evoking both the softness of wax and the hollowness of a 
honeycomb structure. The “matière douce” and the honeycomb reference recall the specificity of 
the Combray church where the stones have become “comme du miel.”  
Another parallel between Combray and Saint-Marc is the affective association with 
family. As a child, he goes to church with his parents, and as an adult, he visits Venice with his 
mother. In the Combray passage, the presence of his family is evoked but not lingered on, but the 
adult narrator in Venice is more reflective about the effect of the presence of others on aesthetic 
experience:  
Voyant que j’avais à rester longtemps devant les mosaïques qui représentent le baptême 
de Christ, ma mère, sentant la fraîcheur glacée qui tombait dans le baptistère, me jetait un 
châle sur les épaules. Quand j’étais avec Albertine à Balbec, je croyais qu’elle révélait 
une de ces illusions inconsistantes qui remplissent l’esprit de tant de gens qui ne pensent 
pas clairement, quand elle me parlait du plaisir—selon moi ne reposant sur rien—qu’elle 
aurait à voir telle peinture avec moi. Aujourd’hui, je suis au moins sûr que le plaisir 
existe sinon de voir, du moins d’avoir vu une belle chose avec une certaine personne. 
Une heure est venue pour où quand je me rappelle ce baptistère, devant les flots du 
Jourdain où Saint Jean immerge le Christ tandis que la gondole nous attendait devant la 
Piazzetta il ne m’est pas indiffèrent que dans cette fraîche pénombre, à côté de moi il y 
eût une femme drapée dans son deuil avec la ferveur respectueuse et enthousiaste de la 
femme âgée qu’on voit à Venise dans la Sainte Ursule de Carpaccio, et que cette femme 
aux joues rouges, aux yeux tristes, dans ses voiles noirs, et que rien ne pourra plus jamais 
faire sortir pour moi de ce sanctuaire doucement éclairé de Saint-Marc où je suis sûr de la 
retrouver parce qu’elle y a sa place réservée et immuable comme une mosaïque, ce soit 
ma mère. (226) 
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The reference to his mother placing the shawl around his shoulders draws us into the 
physiological fact of the narrator’s often sick and suffering body, and to his relational and 
emotional ties to others. The earlier visual description of the “fraîcheur du coloris” is paralleled 
here by the “fraîcheur glacée,” wedding the soft pink color of the church’s interior to the 
temperature of the air, reminding us that the visual cannot be disconnected from the 
phenomenological. We then move into a discussion the affective pleasure of having a loved one 
physically present while viewing art. The narrator recalls his dismissive attitude toward 
Albertine’s repeated assertations that she would like to see certain paintings with him, which has 
now been replaced with the conviction that “le plaisir existe sinon de voir, du moins d’avoir vu 
une belle chose avec une certaine personne.” The experiential meaning of the joint viewing 
changes over time, and while it may be indifferent in the moment of its occurrence the memory 
becomes sweeter because it includes the other person. In the case of Saint-Marc, “[u]ne heure est 
venue où quand je me rappelle ce baptistère […] il ne m’est pas indifférent que […] à côté de 
moi il y eût une femme drapée dans son deuil […] ce soit ma mère.” His memories are not just of 
the objects themselves but of having seen these objects with his mother, and she is thus a 
permanent fixture (“elle y a sa place réservée et immuable comme une mosaïque”) in his 
memory of the church (226). It is not necessarily that he had more pleasure in the moment 
because she was there (though one does imagine the scarf around his shoulders helped) but he 




After this passage about his mother, the narrator tells us that when not at Saint-Marc, the 
painter whose work most often occupies his time is Carpaccio.24 This scene continues the play 
between layers of temporality with a sudden memory of Albertine:  
Je regardais le barbier essuyer son rasoir, le nègre portant son tonneau, les conversations 
des musulmans, des nobles seigneurs vénitiens en larges brocards, en damas, en toque de 
velours cerise, quand tout à coup je sentis au cœur comme une légère morsure. Sur le dos 
d’un des compagnons de la Calza, reconnaissable aux broderies d’or et de perles qui 
inscrivent sur leur manche ou leur collet l’emblème de la joyeuse confrérie à laquelle ils 
étaient affiliés, je venais de reconnaître le manteau qu’Albertine avait pour venir avec 
moi en voiture découverte à Versailles, le soir où j’étais loin de me douter qu’une 
quinzaine d’heures me séparaient à peine du moment où elle partirait de chez moi. (227)  
Before this moment of surprise, Proust’s discussion of Carpaccio creates a Russian doll effect 
where aesthetic layers are unpacked to reveal a kernel of emotional reality when “Carpaccio […] 
faillit un jour ranimer mon amour pour Albertine” (226). He begins his description of Carpaccio 
with a tissue of reference to history (“ce Pont Vecchio du XVe siècle” “la vie vénitienne de 
l’époque”) and art (“tant de Venises de Whistler” “cette éblouissante Légende de Joseph”). 
Suddenly, he recognizes a moment from his personal history in one of the paintings, a moment 
akin to Roland Barthes’ idea of the punctum where “tout à coup je sentis au cœur comme une 
légère morsure.” The description is not just personal (“au cœur”) but physical and painful 
(“morsure” albeit “légère”). He is struck because he has noticed “le manteau qu’Albertine avait 
pour venir avec moi en voiture découverte à Versailles” in one of the paintings. The Fortuny-
made garment is another illustration of the complexity of the relationship between art and reality, 
containing its own individual temporality. 
 
24 Susan Ricci Stebbins has pointed out how the prominence of Carpaccio is an unusual feature of the Recherche, as 
he was considered a minor figure at the time but was beloved by Ruskin and Proust and thus participates in Proust’s 
own personal intellectual history (73).  
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Proust describes the relationship of Carpaccio’s painted garment to Albertine’s real one 
in a characteristic sentence that combines the figurative and the literal: “[o]r c’était dans ce 
tableau de Carpaccio que le fils génial de Venise [Fortuny] l’avait pris [le manteau], c’est des 
épaules de ce compagnon de la Calza qu’il l’avait détaché pour le jeter sur celles de tant de 
Parisiennes” (227). This is certainly a striking description of the process of inspiration, but the 
emotional power of this moment for the narrator of is both a general illustration of the 
permeability of the real and the aesthetic, and a specific illustration of a specific kind of 
temporality where the present changes the past. Like the narrator’s experience of involuntary 
memory, the coat gives him bodily access to his past: “un instant le manteau oublié m’ayant 
rendu pour le regarder les yeux et le cœur de celui qui allait ce soir-là partir à Versailles avec 
Albertine” (227). He is given the eyes and the heart of the person he was at a specific earlier 
moment in time, but with added knowledge, since the night he was to go to Versailles with 
Albertine “j’étais loin de me douter qu’une quinzaine d’heures me séparaient à peine du moment 
où elle partirait de chez moi.” His temporal experience is doubled, and he is experiencing both a 
moment in the past which is gone and that moment from the perspective of what he knows now.  
The Carpaccio painting thus encloses in a moment of viewing one of the major themes of 
Albertine disparue, the ways in which grief makes the narrator aware of the non-linear flow of 
time. By the time the reader arrives at Saint-Marc with the narrator, they have already been led 
through a series of imaginative experiments meant to illustrate the relationship of temporal layers 
within the narrator’s life. In one, the narrator uses an aquatic image to describe the disjointed 
relationship between his intellectual and emotional states vis-à-vis Albertine’s death: “[s]ans 
doute en moi, comme j’étais un homme, un de ces êtres amphibies qui sont simultanément 
plongés dans le passé et sans la réalité actuelle, il existait toujours une contradiction entre le 
177 
 
souvenir vivant d’Albertine et la connaissance que j’avais de sa mort” (115). The amphibian 
metaphor allows the narrator to describe how he is simultaneously operating with two very 
different cognitive models of his former love. One cognitive layer is his intellectual 
understanding of the fact that Albertine is dead, and the second is his bodily-emotional memory 
of her, which remains alive. Over the course of the novel, the latter will fade as the former 
becomes the habitual default, but during this process the two states are simultaneous and 
nonetheless distinct. This demonstrates Ender’s point that “memories are constructions, that they 
depend on mood and context” (5). The narrator’s memories of Albertine are not reducible to 
discreet units evenly produced by each new experience he had of her. His knowledge that 
Albertine is dead is a new part of his memory of her, but it does not function as a culmination or 
an end point. Rather it coexists with his living memories of her, until by force of repetition the 
memory-structure changes and the intellectual knowledge of her death becomes the base and the 
vivid sensation of her presence the exception.  
The specific metaphor of humans as amphibian is a fitting one for doubled states of 
being. Amphibians not only inhabit both land and water, but they also absorb air and water 
through their skin, representing the permeability of these two states. They thus represent at once 
the simultaneity of and the distinction between states of being. Human temporal experience, 
similarly, deals both in absolutes—the past is gone and the future is coming—and in the endless 
permeability of the present in which memories of the past are continually altered and possibilities 
for the future continually changed. As we saw in chapter 2, Freed-Thall identifies the shore 
between water and land as part of what she calls Proust’s “aesthetics of nuance”: “a formalism of 
blurred contours and borders and a queer ecology that attunes us to the cloudy zone of contact 
between subject and object, and to the drift and transmutation of a subtly shifting lived 
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environment” (67). She draws attention to the importance of “minimal variation” in Proust, 
meaning tiny changes, just on the edge of perceptibility, such as in clouds (66). This is also the 
process by which time operates on memory in Proust. For the narrator, the minimal variations of 
his memories of Albertine eventually create new neural pathways towards a new conceptual 
understanding of her being dead. In the physical world, this process of minimal variation is 
represented by the traces in stone of the repeated steps and devotions of generations of 
churchgoers in Combray.  
In Le Côte de Guermantes, the narrator explicitly reflects on the relationship between 
water, architecture, and time: 
Ainsi plus tard, à Venise, bien après le coucher du soleil, quand il semble qu’il fasse tout 
à fait nuit, j’ai vu, grâce à l’écho invisible pourtant d’une dernière note de lumière 
indéfiniment tenue sur les canaux comme par l’effet de quelque pédale optique, les reflets 
des palais déroulés comme à tout jamais en velours plus noir sur le gris crépusculaire des 
eaux. Un de mes rêves était la synthèse de ce que mon imagination avait souvent cherché 
à se représenter, pendant la veille, d’un certain paysage marin et de son passé médiéval. 
Dans mon sommeil je voyais une cite gothique au milieu d’une mer aux flots immobilisés 
comme sur un vitrail. Un bras de mer divisait en deux la ville ; l’eau verte s’étendait à 
mes pieds ; elle baignait sur la rive opposée une église orientale, plus des maisons qui 
existaient encore dans le XIVe siècle, si bien qu’aller vers elles, c’eût été remonter le 
cours des âges. Ce rêve où la nature avait appris l’art, où la mer était devenue gothique, 
ce rêve où je désirais, où je croyais aborder à l’impossible, il me semblait l’avoir déjà fait 
souvent. (138) 
This picks up several threads of imagery and association that are repeated through the 
Recherche. In chapter one we saw how the narrator appreciated the reminder of the deep past of 
the sea in the form of the fish served for a meal that becomes the “polychrome cathédrale de la 
mer.” As we just saw, Albertine disparue describes man as an aquatic being jointly plunged in 
the past and the present. This particular passage uses an anticipatory recollection of the narrator’s 
time in Venice (which is not to occur for several volumes) to prime the reader for the coming 
dream description of a city in the sea. In the Venice recollection, the narrator tells that that 
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during his late-night walks “j’ai vu, grâce à l’écho invisible pourtant d’une dernière note de 
lumière indéfiniment tenue sur les canaux comme par l’effet de quelque pédale optique, les 
reflets des palais déroulés comme à tout jamais en velours plus noir sur le gris crépusculaire des 
eaux.” This notion of an invisible echo of light asks the reader to see light without seeing it. 
Proust guides us to complete this difficult imaginative task by associating the idea of light with a 
different set of sensual markers. “[É]cho” and “dernière note […] tenue” reconfigure light as 
sound, something that can be evoked and then held like a musical note but cannot be seen. In the 
absence of sight, sound becomes a way to see, and here, the reverberations of sound stand in for 
the reverberations of luminosity. This invisible luminous echo is then used to differentiate the 
“velours plus noir” of the reflected buildings from the “gris crépusculaire” of the water. The idea 
of an echo ties into the discussion of dreaming which will follow, as dreams are an echo of 
reality.  
This dream the narrator describes, which he has the impression that he has dreamed 
before, “était la synthèse de ce que mon imagination avait souvent cherché à se représenter, 
pendant la vielle, d’un certain paysage marin et de son passé médiéval.” This dream is the 
literalized manifestation of the imagination’s attempt simultaneously hold the experiential 
present of a landscape with its medieval past. Most concretely, the image of a “cité gothique au 
milieu d’une mer” with which the narrator’s dreaming mind portrays this synthesis seems to be 
pulled directly from his watery sightseeing in the Venice canals. The reflections have been 
materialized into a literal city, but otherwise the image is similar. Like the invisible light 
conveyed through sound, though, Proust complicates his image instructions to the reader. He 
embeds descriptive contradictions in the image to create a mobile tension, similar to the tension 
in chapter three between planes assimilated to the image of stars and also falling away from 
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them. In that scene, the simultaneous demand on the reader to imagine two different scenes, an 
indistinguishable sky of lights and moving lights zipping away from immobile ones, created a 
vivid energy in the image. In this description of the sea-city of the narrator’s dream, the narrator 
inverses the expected idea of water as surface and buildings as surface inscription implied in the 
connection to the reflected buildings of Venice in the canal. Here, the gothic city becomes the 
container and the water the thing contained: “je voyais une cite gothique au milieu d’une mer aux 
flots immobilisés comme sur un vitrail.” Look at the relative size jumps the reader needs to 
mentally make to through this description: they begin with the image of a city reflected in a canal 
from the Venice memory, then move the city to the much larger surface of the sea, and then 
miniaturize the sea as immobile on a stained-glass window. In this third image of the stained-
glass window, we must suddenly freeze the image of the sea, which would have likely before this 
point retained a certain imaginative mobility. This miniaturized, frozen sea in the stained-glass 
window moves away from experiential accuracy towards artistic representation. This passage 
thus engages the reader in a complex play of surface and reflection, container and contained, and 
dream and art and reality, makes this image imaginatively pleasurable in its complexity. Let us 
look now at what it might tell us about the relationship of art and time.  
One interpretation of this dream would be that it represents the narrator’s desired access 
to a past that is otherwise experientially unavailable. He mentions specific buildings from the 
past, the “église orientale” and “maisons qui existaient encore dans le XIVe siècle” and tells us 
that “aller vers elles, c’eût été remonter le cours des âges.” The dream architecture represents a 
path back into the past. But the narrator’s interpretation of the dream does not initially seem to 
have much at all to do with time: “[c]e rêve où la nature avait appris l’art, où la mer était 
devenue gothique, ce rêve où je désirais, où je croyais aborder à l’impossible.” Here, the 
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reconciliation is not between the present (sea) and the past (gothic city) but between nature (sea) 
and art (gothic city). The gothic city is certainly very old, but this is not an essential part of the 
nature/art reconciliation since we already have the JF cathedral-fish description which does not 
hinge on the fish being old (for the sake of the diners, one hopes it is not). Thus, this dream could 
represent nature and art existing together in a marvelous synthetic dream-present, and the past of 
the gothic city could simply be a detail imported from the narrator’s Venetian wanderings. I do 
not believe this to be the case, however. This dream-present is open to the past in a dynamic 
way, since moving towards the church and the houses is “remonter le cours des âges.” The 
temporal relationship in this dream is configured spatially. While it is not explicit here, the text is 
moving us further towards seeing time as a fourth dimension. This passage combines the 
animation effect discussed in chapter three with the spatial play described in chapter two, and the 
combined effect is to have an animated image that is spatially complex. That its spatial 
complexity takes the form of an accessible time dimension is part of our preparation for the 
novel’s final figure in four dimensions: a human life. 
There is one issue with considering this medieval dream-city in the sea as a true four-
dimensional image: it lacks real existence in time, and thus does not really exist in a four-
dimensional perspective. The narrator has the impression that he has had this dream many times, 
but the dream-city does not properly exist along different distinct points in time for him. The city 
presents the coexistence of artistic present and medieval past and gestures towards spatialized 
time without allowing the narrator to properly experience that dimension. The time dimension is 
thus distorted and foreshortened, somewhat in the manner of Sodome et Gomorrhe’s restored 
church. Both combine elements of the present and elements of the past in a way that is too 
transparently synthetic. They lack the temporal depth that can only come from simultaneously 
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imaginatively holding numerous distinct images from different points in time. However, the 
restored church and the dream-city hold an important lesson about the relationship of present to 
past. My third chapter discussed the narrator’s description of the opposition of ancestral traces 
and fresh life in Saint-Loup’s face: “[s]ous la peau fine, la construction hardie, l’architecture 
féodale apparaissaient. Sa tête faisait penser à ces tours d’antique donjon dont les créneaux 
inutilisés restent visibles, mais qu’on a aménagées intérieurement en bibliothèque” (JF 452). The 
present is not only the visible layer structured by the past, but rather the two form a complex 
whole subject to deconstruction and reconstruction. The relationship of the present to the past is 
not strictly one of progression, and this non-linear relationship of expression between the two 
indicates time expressed as space where mobility is possible in multiple directions.  
Path Two: The Combray Church, Experience, and Memory 
Ultimately, the object the Recherche pushes us to see in four dimensions is not a 
cathedral, but rather the multidimensionality of human life. In order to correctly see a life in four 
dimensions, we need to access new kinds of vision, namely ones that allow for a normally 
impossible perspective. Joshua Landy makes the case that this is the great philosophical problem 
of the Recherche: “since the true self is hidden even from its owner, artistic expression is the 
only route to authentic introspection […] art ‘alone expresses for others and renders visible to 
ourselves that life of ours which cannot effectually observe itself,’ concludes Marcel” 
(Philosophy as Fiction 13). Art gives us a way out of the dilemma that we have no way to 
directly and effectively understand ourselves in the course of everyday life. The same problem 
Tiffany outlines in the case of complex scientific discoveries about the quantum world here 
becomes true of the most familiar of objects, our own selves. We must glimpse ourselves 
obliquely, the same way I have been arguing that we imaginatively glimpse the art objects and 
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descriptive scenes scattered throughout the Recherche. As a solution to this problem, Landy uses 
imaginative patterns as a template from which to understand individual selves. In the case of 
Proust’s narrator, “Marcel's is fundamentally a spatial imagination,” separating and classifying 
the periods and people in his life by the spaces in which they occurred or with which they are 
associated (75). His understanding of the self is thus fundamentally spatial:  
Marcel's is a genuinely three-dimensional account, accommodating both synchronic and 
diachronic variations. ‘As there is a geometry in space, so there is a psychology in time, 
in which the calculations of a plane psychology would no longer be accurate,’ he writes. 
For him, as we have seen, the Self (‘le moi’) is defined as the accumulation of its 
consecutive states (‘les moi’), sedimented over time; at any given instant, we are the sum 
of an extremely large set of existences, many of which are entirely unknown to us, and all 
of which cohabit simultaneously in the mind. (110) 
Proust’s images of churches have prepared the reader for the idea of the self as this 
“accumulation of consecutive states […] sedimented over time” not just as a theoretical truth, but 
as an imaginative action, a thrust towards visualizing the impossible to visualize. The image of 
the church evokes the same multiplicity in simultaneity we need to imagine seeing our lives 
across time. As Diane Leonard writes, Proust’s novel functions “by laying down impressions in 
the reader's mind […] which become layered in memory in a vertical 'fourth dimension' where 
they co-exist simultaneously, like the stratifications of different centuries in the Church of 
Combray” (“Ruskin in the ‘Recherche’”). A church is multitudinous both in construction (as an 
assemblage of many stones) and in its use (as the site of repeated actions over many years). The 
idea that our own existence can be localized in both time and space, that we only occupy one 
space and one time at once, in fact conceals the reality: we too are constructed and assembled 
from a multitude of selves and across a multitude of times and spaces. 
Landy and Leonard’s use of superposition and stratification draw on the following 
passage from Albertine disparue: “[n]otre moi est fait de la superposition de nos états successifs. 
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Mais cette superposition n’est pas immuable comme la stratification d’une montagne. 
Perpétuellement des soulèvements font affleurer à la surface des couches anciennes” (126). This 
metaphor of stratified rock concretizes the idea of man as an amphibian creature stretched 
between two temporal states, as does the forest path metaphor we saw earlier in the chapter. Our 
movement from past to present is not linear, as different parts of the mind move along the forest 
path at different speeds, and the stratified layers of a mountain do not build neatly upwards on 
one another but shift continuously. But nor are these states completely random. The paths come 
from somewhere and move towards somewhere, and the layers come from somewhere and build 
to something. They are in perpetual recombination and refiguration, and new elements are 
always being added, but there is a building effect that is similar to what Proust explores with the 
church, which is both constructed according to a fixed plan and constantly changing with and in 
the material and imaginative impressions of the church goers. 
The Combray church serves as an anchor point through which the time of the novel, and 
the time of the narrator’s life, become visible in an uneasy tension between past and present, 
imagination and reality, investment and indifference, and presence and absence. The last 
discussions of the Combray church in the Recherche occur after its destruction during World 
War I, in passages included in Le Temps retrouvé. This destruction, far from erasing the church 
from the imaginative universe of the novel, occasions outpourings of love for the edifice. 
However, while the church is still standing, the adult narrator has lost much of his affective 
investment in the church. Compare the following description from his window at Tansonville to 
the initial description in Du côté de chez Swann: 
Je ne regardais en somme tout cela [le parc de Tansonville et la forêt de Méséglise] avec 
plaisir que parce que je me disais : ‘C’est joli d’avoir tant de verdure dans la fenêtre de 
ma chambre’, jusqu’au moment où dans le vaste tableau verdoyant je reconnus, peint lui 
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au contraire en bleu sombre, simplement parce qu’il était plus loin, le clocher de l’église 
de Combray. Non pas une figuration de ce clocher, ce clocher lui-même, qui, mettant 
ainsi sous mes yeux la distance des lieues et des années, était venu, au milieu de la 
lumineuse verdure et d’un tout autre ton, si sombre qu’il paraissait presque seulement 
dessiné, s’inscrire dans le carreau de ma fenêtre. (3-4) 
In contrast to the young narrator’s deep sense of the specialness of the church, and to the tributes 
we will see below that follow its destruction, this description of the church from a distance is 
emotionally, aesthetically, and literarily flat.    
Even before the Combray church is evoked, the narrator demonstrates his lack of 
investment in the scene before him. His pleasure at the landscape outside of his window is not a 
spontaneous or organic feeling, but the product of his secondary awareness that “[c]’est joli 
d’avoir tant de verdure dans la fenêtre de ma chambre.” The marker “je me disais” implies that 
this is an intellectual effort to have the proper reaction to the view in front of him. But then, 
something changes, and the reader will likely be intrigued by the structure “jusqu’au moment où 
[…] je reconnus,” having been primed to pay attention throughout the novel to these moments of 
sudden recognition as hallmarks of involuntary memory. However, there is no aesthetic or 
emotional payoff that follows. It is unclear if this moment of recognition entails more than 
simple identification, i.e., if it makes the narrator realize the superficiality of his forced 
appreciation of the lush landscape, or if it spoils the simple pleasure of that experience. The 
church appears as a shadow on the lush landscape: “peint lui au contraire en bleu sombre.” This 
descriptive detail is immediately empirically explained: it appears this way “simplement parce 
qu’il était plus loin.” The church is a shape and a color that intrudes on the narrator’s experience 
of the landscape around him, but its evaluation is coded as neutral.  
As the description continues, we get a better sense of why the church strikes the narrator, 
though it continues to be experientially and imaginatively flattened. The narrator explains that he 
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is seeing “[n]on pas une figuration de ce clocher, ce clocher lui-même, qui, mettant ainsi sous 
mes yeux la distance des lieues et des années, était venu, au milieu de la lumineuse verdure et 
d’un tout autre ton, si sombre qu’il paraissait seulement dessiné, s’inscrire dans le carreau de ma 
fenêtre.” The specification that he is seeing the literal bell tower and not a figuration thereof is 
odd, considering the novel’s flexible play with the borders between art and reality. But the fact 
that he is seeing the bell tower itself does not seem to add anything to the narrator’s response. To 
be sure, the detail that the bell tower evokes “sous mes yeux la distance des lieues et des 
années,” does seem to invite some sort of temporal reflection. However, that reflection does not 
occur, leaving us to assume that this is in fact a straightforward statement that the bell tower is 
both far away from his window and reminds him of the past. The visual description that follows 
reduces the church to the figuration the narrator claims he is not seeing: “il paraissait seulement 
dessiné” and “était venu […] s’inscrire dans le carreau de ma fenêtre.” The church is a two-
dimensional drawing, and in the next sentence the narrator steps away from his window to 
admire a scarlet band of color appearing in a room down the hall.   
Later, as he is preparing to leave Tansonville, the narrator tells us  
J’étais triste en remontant dans ma chambre de penser que je n’avais pas été une seule 
fois revoir l’église de Combray qui semblait m’attendre au milieu des verdures dans une 
fenêtre toute violacée. Je me disais : ‘Tant pis, ce sera pour une autre année, si je ne 
meurs pas d’ici là’, ne voyant pas d’autre obstacle que ma mort et n’imaginant pas celle 
de l’église qui me semblait devoir durer longtemps après ma mort comme elle avait duré 
longtemps avant ma naissance. (13)  
Compared to the scene above where he gazes at the church from the window, this passage 
contains a stronger affective tone. There is an emotion associated with the church, and the idea 
that it seems to be waiting for him demonstrates his personification of the structure. Here, he is 
no longer just interacting with a shape in the distance. But what he does not know in this moment 
of sadness, and what an attentive reader will glean from the ironic description of his certitude 
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that the church will stand forever, is the fact that it will be destroyed during the war. In his time 
at Tansonville, the only obstacle he can imagine to returning to the church someday is his own 
death. Habit, the merciful and terrible deadener, has dulled the narrator’s relationship to the 
church he found so magical as a child. Time is no longer the fourth dimension that fills the 
narrator’s mind with the material and imaginative power of so long a history. Here, time is 
merely an indication of predictability.  
The destruction of the Combray church is one of the ways in which the advent of World 
War I destabilizes the imaginative landscape of the novel’s characters. This destruction, 
however, revitalizes the portrayal of this structure, inviting the characters to elegiac but energetic 
reimaginings in remembrance. The narrator himself learns of the destruction of Combray in a 
letter from Gilberte. The contrast between a macro level of military strategy and a micro level of 
memory turns this letter that could easily be a simple lamentation of loss into a surprisingly 
tender and evocative remembrance. In the following quote, I have coded the words indicating 
love, enjoyment, and togetherness in green, and those describing the battle in red: “Que de fois 
j’ai pensé à vous, aux promenades, grâce à vous rendues délicieuses, que nous faisons ensemble 
dans tout ce pays aujourd’hui ravagé, alors que d’immenses combats se livraient pour la 
possession de tel chemin, de tel coteau que vous aimiez, où nous sommes allés si souvent 
ensemble!” (63). This description begins and ends with affective intimacy, and the repeated 
pronouns—vous three times and nous twice—moves the emphasis away from Gilberte herself 
and to their shared experience of Combray. For the war, what matters is the certainty of 
possessing “tel chemin […] tel coteau,” but in contrast to that brute force stands the soft but 
ultimately triumphant repetitive power evoked in Gilberte’s double imaginative (“Que de fois 
j’ai pensé”) and literal (“nous sommes allées si souvent”) relationship to the landscape.  
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The narrator witnesses another reimagining of the Combray church, this time by Charlus, 
during the war. Like Gilberte, Charlus ruminates on the destruction of the church and finds a 
curious power to his memories now that the actual edifice has been destroyed. Charlus reflects to 
the narrator, “Combray n’est qu’une toute petite ville comme il y a tant d’autres en France. Mais 
nos ancêtres étaient représentés en donateurs dans certains vitraux, dans d’autres étaient inscrites 
nos armoires. Nous y avions notre chapelle, nos tombeaux” (102). In this short description, 
Charlus repeats nos and notre four times. Charlus is an arch-snob, so of course there is an 
element of pride to his description. Combray may be a small town like any other, but it is the 
Guermantes’ small town. However, reading this description alongside Gilberte’s very personal 
and affective nous exposes another resonance of Charlus’ words, that of the contradictory power 
of personal loss to reanimate the stories to which it would seem to have put an end. Charlus 
believes he should be indifferent to Combray, which is neither his primary residence nor a 
particularly celebrated town aesthetically or historically, but the destruction of the church makes 
visible for him just how imbued it was with his conception of family.  
Fussell’s work on World War I and memory, discussed in chapter three, treats this idea of 
the revalorization of a community building following its wartime destruction. Fussell examines 
how Flanders and Picardy each “had its symbolic piece of ruined public architecture”: in 
Flanders, the medieval “Cloth Hall” in Ypres and in Picardy, the Basilica in Somme (41). For 
individuals from these regions, these community spaces of work and worship, dating back 
centuries, filled the necessary imaginative space of conceptualizing the public losses of the war 
and of representing the sense of beauty and community that must be protected. For Proust, the 
nostalgia Gilberte and Charlus feel is not a nation-level patriotism, but rather one with deep roots 
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in the community memory. This imaginative power is not determined by an external set of 
aesthetics or historical values, but rather by personal experience.   
During his conversation with the narrator, Charlus does go on to worry about the fate of 
the Reims cathedral in much more exaggerated tones, demonstrating his dismissive attitude 
towards the objective value of the Combray church (102). Gilberte is aware that Combray has 
become historically important during the war, but her technical localization that “c’est la 
fameuse cote 307 dont vous avez dû voir le nom revenir si souvent dans les communiqués” stands 
in sharp contrast the affective outpouring of her memories of the same location (63). What is 
imaginatively powerful for her is“[l]e petit chemin que vous aimiez tant, que nous appelions le 
raidillon aux aubépines et où vous prétendez que vous êtes tombé dans votre enfance amoureux 
de moi, alors que je vous assure en toute vérité que c’était moi qui étais amoureuse de vous” 
(63). This little path is well-loved and given its own nickname in contradistinction to the dry 
label of “cote 307.” These memories are not only the occasion to recall the emotions of youth, 
but also to correct the narrator about his misapprehension that his feelings for her were not 
returned. Combray’s entrance into World War I does not make it precious to characters because 
they can suddenly see it on a macro historical level, but rather because its damage and 
endangerment releases their memories from their habitual constraints and lets the novel’s 
characters experience them in all their plentitude.  
We can here return to Valazza’s point about the strangeness of World War I temporality 
in TR. As we saw in my third chapter, he argues that the inclusion of the war in the novel anchors 
its temporality in real events, and yet the most emotionally significant wartime moment is the 
fictional destruction of the Combray church. Edward J. Hughes compares Proust’s interest in 
village churches to that of Maurice Barrès, quoting passages from both arguing that local 
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churches should be preserved at the time of the 1905 debates about the separation of church and 
state in France. Barrès writes in an open letter to the Minster of the Interior: “la plus modeste 
[église] n’est-elle pas infiniment précieuse sur place? Que m’importe que vous conserviez une 
église plus belle à Toulouse, si vous jetez bas l’église de mon village ?” (36). Hughes parallels 
this to Proust’s defense of village churches: “the sight of another provincial church, similarly 
misshapen, reinforces the sense of a keenly recognized and vital cultural artefact: ‘Alors je ne me 
suis pas demandé comme à Chartres ou à Reims avec quelle puissance y était exprimé le 
sentiment religieux, mais je me suis involontairement écrié: “L’Église!”’ (36). It is possible that 
underlying this privileged position of the Combray church in the Recherche could be an interest 
in the societal role of the provincial church in general.  
To some extent the village church is a generalizable experience. Many French people of 
Proust’s generation and the preceding and succeeding ones would have had a childhood church 
that might have been beloved to them. But it is hardly a given that such a specific experience of 
temporality would have been shared, or even that this specific experience of temporality would 
have happened to Proust himself in addition to his narrator. For contemporary readers, there is a 
fair chance the reader has no personal equivalent to a village church. The importance of 
analyzing the existence of a fourth dimension in church representations in the Recherche is not 
really to teach us about the representation of churches in general, but to prepare us to work on 
imagining human life in fourth dimensions. It is linked to the grieving process the narrator goes 
through in Albertine disparue where the shifting intellectual and emotional layers of the self 
suggest a non-progressive selfhood. Proust’s creation of the Combray church as a centering 
device for the narrator’s childhood, and the adult narrator’s thoughts on and conversations about 
the Combray church as its material edifice is destroyed and it joins the imaginative world, 
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suggests new and more flexible temporalities. The church as image in Proust is itself an “être 
amphibie,” as Proust suggests about human lives. This double identity is built into Proust’s 
creation of this edifice. Fraisse notes that prior to the publication of Du côté de chez Swann, 
Proust sought advice from Émile Mâle about the accuracy of the architectural language in his 
description of the Combray church. However, Fraisse distinguishes Proust from authors of the 
nineteenth century who would seek out this knowledge before constructing their textual 
knowledge, whereas for Proust “vérification” only came after “invention” (1990: 19). The 
Combray church is anchored in the specificities of the past: it combines individual (narrator’s 
childhood), national (village churches, World War I), and aesthetic (history of architecture) 
narratives that must be retrospectively brought to light in order to become legible to the reader. 
At the same time, due in part to the descriptive primacy of the composition process, all readers 
can access his churches as imaginative potentialities, forever built and rebuilt in our own 
consciousness as we engage with his textual world.   
 Here we find the place that the path away from the Combray church to other churches in 
other places meets the path that stays in Combray through time. These sites through space and 
time have served as visualization exercises as well as meditations on the links between 
architecture, aesthetics and temporality. They are important texts of their own right, and prepare 
the reader for the spatialized time they encounter at the novel’s end, which I will requote here:   
Aussi, si elle m’était laissé assez longtemps pour accomplir mon œuvre, ne manquerais-je 
pas d’abord d’y décrire les hommes, cela dût-il les faire ressembler à des êtres 
monstrueux, comme occupant une place si considérable, à côté de celle si restreinte qui 
leur est réservée dans l’espace, une place au contraire prolongée sans mesure puisqu’ils 
touchent simultanément, comme des géants plongés dans les années à des époques, 




In this passage, we meet the final giants of the Recherche. In addition to an abstract or second-
level argument about the relationship between time and identity, there is a visual instruction to 
the reader. In order to understand how the narrator intends to describe his characters, we have to 
both be and see giants. Be giants, in order to have enough elevation to see what cannot be seen 
from our normal perspective, as we too only occupy a place “si restreinte” in space. See giants, 
as these “êtres monstrueux” that humans might become when we see them occupying their 
proper extension in time. As we have reexamined the matter, space, energy, and now time of the 
Recherche, we have seen how the reader’s imaginative toolbox of visual and conceptual skills 
grows through engagement with the novel. All of these elements of image-making are necessary 
practice for the reader to have had in order to understand the theoretical and imagistic power of 
the image with which the Recherche closes. We can now look back briefly on each chapter and 
review this toolbox the reader has acquired by the novel’s end in light of the closing lines.    
In the first chapter, we looked at the relationship of art to the material world: how it 
draws on it for inspiration, and how it calls into question our perceptual certainty of its existence. 
My argument centered on the claim that the Recherche’s multifaceted relationship to materiality 
theorized many points of connection between art and reality. Proust’s visible universe is a tissue 
woven of literary suggestion, painted precedent, and lived experience. This chapter 
retrospectively justifies what I am suggesting here, which is that by pushing the limits of our 
cognitive powers, art can suggest new and better ways of making visible lived life. Because 
literary visibility only exists in the collaboration between the reader’s mind and the writer’s 
words,25 it is possible to create extraordinarily flexible imaginative images. By the end of the 
 
25 In a broad sense, this is true of visual art as well. It is not as though it is meaningful to suggest that a painting is 
made of real images even in the absence of a viewer, but it is certainly easier to point to an image “out there” in the 
case of a painting than in the case of a work of literature. 
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novel, the reader is not only combining multiple competing visual impulses but stretching these 
visual impulses through time. In reading this ending, I argue that the reader is offered the chance 
to briefly glimpse the span of their lives as a whole. For this to be true it must be true that 
literature can make us visualize, and that this process of literary visualization has real 
consequences for our conceptualization of objects in the world—including our own lives. The 
final reference to touch (“puisqu’ils touchent simultanément […] à des époques”) gives a 
concrete materiality to what could be a troublingly disorienting idea. Our real interactions with 
the objects that make up the world around us are part of this temporal simultaneity, one that 
helps us anchor in the tantalizingly present details of lived life.  
In the second chapter, we explored depth and dimensionality in Proust’s literary spaces. 
The ease with which we identify the three spatial dimensions in lived life does not necessarily 
translate to a three-dimensional literary world, as critics working on flatness in Proust have 
demonstrated. This is the case with visual art as well, where giving the sensation of depth on a 
canvas comes from a set of conventions one must learn and practice. Dimensionality in visual art 
can create awe, such as we saw from Diderot and the Goncourt brothers’ writings on Chardin’s 
in chapter 1. Proust leverages the imaginative freedom of literary images to play with depth and 
flatness, inviting the reader to view scenes from multiple perspectives and manipulate their 
dimensionality. This mental play with spatial dimensionality is preparation to stretch that spatial 
awareness through time. Like Proust’s Balbec seascapes, the final lines hinge on an immersive 
effect, through words and phrases such as “occupant” “plongés” “dans le Temps.” This 
immersion indicates that time is substance through and in which we move, not reducible to order 
or fixed direction. Our spatial work with the Balbec seascapes has prepared us in one more way 
for this final image, by asking us to lift our perspective above the frame initially delineated 
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around certain images and to view them from a higher elevation. In Flatland, when the three-
dimensional Sphere visits the narrator in his home in Flatland, the narrator can only perceive him 
in two dimensions. The Sphere must lift him out of his plane entirely in order for him to 
experientially grasp that there is a third dimension to the universe. We must perform a similar 
imaginative lift in order to occupy the giant perspective from which we can see human life 
stretched through time.  
My third chapter deals with adding an additional element to the ‘how’ of imagining a 
human life in time, which is how to imagine it in energetic motion. Considering an object from 
the fourth dimension of time removes any notion of completion or fixity, as it is multi-directional 
in time: it is possibility as well as history. This sense of incompletion creates depth by stretching 
an object from the past into the potentialities of the future, but this is not a depth that is fixed the 
way that the depth of an object considered only in space could be. Rather, time is an experiential 
flow, which moves at varying speeds and along different tracks. Time in this sense is motion, 
both the forward-moving container of our experiences and the labyrinth-like connections and 
layers we contain. To get a sense of all of these moving parts that make up our cognitive 
relationship to time, Proust’s final image is vertiginous, to remind us that we are always moving 
through time and across it, even when we are immobile in space. This effect in the text hinges on 
the adjective “plongés.” Combined with a notion of the vast distance between moments and 
years, this adjective evokes both a submersion and the sensation of diving or falling. This image 
is at once a backwards movement into the past and soaring movement by which human life is 
seen stretched to its full size.  
 These final words thus should not be understood as a resolution or firm termination, but 
rather as an invitation to continue the imaginative process we have been practicing throughout 
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the Recherche as a whole. Our time of reading has not only been the number of pages or the 
number of hours (days, months, years) we have spent with Proust’s massive novel, but the 
synthetic present of our reading as a thing in four dimensions. Our own repeated engagement 
with the text, like the motions of the devoted churchgoers of Combray, has involved us in the 
work of co-constructing a universe. The last impossible thing we see is ourselves, simultaneously 
inside and outside of the novel, touching its time and our own time, already moving away into 
the next task that calls our attention, already invited back to begin the imaginative journey of the 
















CONCLUSION: DOMES, LABYRINTHS, LABORATORIES, PLAYGROUNDS  
 In his poem Adonais, Percy Shelley writes the following of the contrast between the 
complexities of life and the ultimate transcendence that comes with death: “Life, like a dome of 
many-colour'd glass,/Stains the white radiance of Eternity” (462-463). These words privilege 
eternity over life, which “stains” eternity, in order to valorize the power of death to reunite us 
with that “radiance.” But consider the image in these lines, the play of multicolored lights over 
luminous white. The pleasure of this imagery conveys quite a different message to readers, 
inviting us to enjoy the contrast and the interplay of color and light. In Proust’s novel, giving 
attention to the multicolored form as well as the radiant ideas gives us a richer reading 
experience. Stretching our cognitive capacities for visualization allows us to be more engaged 
readers, and to understand our relationship to the text reciprocally. Proust famously writes that 
readers are “les propres lecteurs d’eux-mêmes” but it is not just that the things we read enlighten 
us to ourselves (TR 338). My understanding of this constructive process of our individual 
engagement with the text weds individual reading response with formalist analysis: we will all 
build different textual universes, but the text provides us all with certain building materials. This 
co-constructive relationship provides a model for how we engage with the broader world around 
us. As new materialist and eco-critical theories ask us to reconsider subject-object dynamics, and 
cognitive science asks us to reconsider our understanding of consciousness, returning to artworks 
like Proust gives us a chance to test out our imaginative skills, to practice building impossible 
worlds in order to return to the one we inhabit with a new sense of awe at all that we do not 
know and cannot see.   
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This practice is open-ended and pays large dividends. Closely engaging with the visual 
aspects of writing makes us more attentive to visual art, not as a contrast to or a substitute for 
verbal art, but as another universe to imaginatively enter and explore. It helps us move past our 
expectation of transparency in art, by questioning the transparency of vision in general. On a 
larger level, this imaginative flexibility helps us pay more attention to the world around us. 
Though Proust’s novel defamiliarizes the world, the Recherche’s textual universe is recognizably 
our own. Even as our brain’s tendency towards habituation works to standardize our experience, 
Proust’s novel makes manifest that habituation, by showing it as a multi-layered process with 
cracks and discontinuities. In short, it helps us be comfortable with the uncertainty of our own 
lives. As we move through the time of our own experience, the world changes in and around us, 
as personal, national, and global shifts that throw our understanding into disorder. In our lives, 
we are inevitably confronted with the impossible, or rather, the possible keeps unpredictably 
expanding. If we have practice letting our imaginations stretch, move beyond their habitual 
categories, and recognize that something can be the same and different simultaneously, we are 
better equipped to be open to these changes. We can integrate them into our imaginative 
understanding, not as totalities we can grasp, but as possibilities we can intimate, as mysteries we 
can keep exploring.   
Proust encourages us to live in the space of feeling slightly unmoored, but not entirely 
lost or stuck. Jenny Odell uses the labyrinth as a model for the kind of attention to the world 
around us that is most valuable, writing “[l]abyrinths function similarly to how they appear, 
enabling a sort of dense infolding of attention; through two-dimensional design alone, they make 
it possible not to walk straight through a place, nor to stand still, but something very well in 
between” (7). Odell’s notion of the “dense infolding of attention” indicates that what we need is 
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not more subjects for contemplation but more depth and time with which to contemplate what is 
in front of us. Our journey through the world of the Recherche cannot be rushed, nor can it be 
fully taken in on a first time through. Each path we wind through the text is different, as we 
ourselves are in the place of the narrator peeking out his Balbec windows each morning to see 
what sea will be there to greet him. And what we get is what we put in, since it is not easy to 
entangle ourselves in Proust’s universe. It takes practice to see impossibly, but it attunes us to 
new visions in other places. Throughout my four chapters, I have put each theme in dialogue 
with writing by or about a contemporary writer or painter. These act as anchor points from which 
to begin each chapter—models and miniatures, multiperspectival light, luminous energy, and 
painted time. These are all works I read while working on my dissertation, and though they 
represent disparate times, geographies, and forms, they stood out to me because of the analysis of 
Proust I was doing. Though sustained engagement with Proust, I became a better reader and 
viewer of art, attentive to the ways in which authors and artists stimulated me to think in new 
ways. I began to see glimpses of the impossible, in other words, embedded in artistic practice 
around me.  
Freed-Thall identifies Proust’s novel as a “semiotic laboratory,” writing “In Search of 
Lost Time is not only a celebration of the death-defying essence of art. It is also a semiotic 
laboratory that multiplies and accumulates interpretive and phenomenological possibilities” (36). 
Even more than a laboratory, perhaps, the Recherche is an imaginative playground. This is not to 
say that there are not serious elements to the novel—far from it. But its imagistic qualities invite 
the reader to step into a world that resembles our own, but, as we move through it, emerges as 
something engagingly defamiliarizing. The novel thematizes visual illusions and distortion, but 
beyond that, in some ways it is a visual illusion, suspending the reader between the solid world 
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we use for orientation and grounding, and a version of that world that has been freed from 
perceptual habit and broken open. The cognitive benefits of this include pleasure but go beyond 
that too. The world is full of things we cannot capture neatly as sight or insight. Some of these 
are external: Abbott’s Flatland and Tiffany’s work on poetry and physics draw attention to the 
unimaginable in science (dimensions beyond our own, quantum mechanics, string theory, the 
multiverse, black holes, the universe itself). We can additionally think of Timothy Morton’s idea 
of the “hyperobject,” which considers objects like global warming which we are not equipped to 
conceptualize but nonetheless are impacted by. And as I write this in 2021, every part of our 
daily life has undergone irreparable changes from the coronavirus pandemic. But on a smaller 
scale there is the difficulty of understanding our own selves: the submerged layers of the brain to 
which we will never have access, the way the body influences cognition and emotion, the 
problems of memory. A text like Proust’s increases our ability to cope with the sort of world we 
inhabit. Rather than attempting to control what is around us, the imaginative play we engage in 
throughout the Recherche asks us to consider that we do not need to completely understand the 
world to enjoy the fact of being alive. We are always embedded in mystery, and Proust asks us 
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